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International democratization of authoritarian states has created a complex political dynamic 
pitting the goal of democratic diffusion against the objective of maintaining dictatorial power. By 
enacting legal reforms while episodically upholding rights or freedoms, amid repression, semi-
authoritarian regimes generate diverse political grievances for obtaining constitutional rights and 
observations of those rights. Semi-authoritarian regimes have developed new tactics of 
manipulation of information exchange to address these grievances. This dissertation argues that 
to model semi-authoritarian constitutionalism, scholars must tackle complex multi-level 
interactions of aggrieved sub-national and state actors under influences of democratization. This 
dissertation develops a theory, and testable hypotheses, of semi-authoritarian resilience modeled 
as a complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS).  This approach emphasizes concepts such as 
initial conditions, system structure, information exchange, and emergent phenomena.  
Using the logic of abduction, through iteration between theory and empirical evidence, a 
parsimonious explanation is inferred with policy implications for reexamining how democracy is 
fostered across borders on multiple levels. A multi-level, multi-dimensional representation of 
interactions across the systems demonstrates a non-monotonic relationship between mobilization, 
grievance, and repression over time in which a convergence of preferences for more immediate, 
partial democratic reforms lowers mobilization under semi-authoritarianism, but incentivizes 
some groups to mobilize outside the existing constitutional system.  This dissertation’s 
pragmatic, multi-method research design explores implications of the developed model over time 
  v 
in the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey, from 1876 to present, and also spatially in 
contemporary Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.  
Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, a theory of a constitutional semi-authoritarian 
dynamic of cycles through phases of repression, reform, and rights over time is developed as an 
emergent phenomenon of the CASoS. Citizens’ discourse over constitutional reform in public 
communication processes in Turkey is analyzed using Structural Topic Modeling to understand 
stealth authoritarian resilience through information exchange and control.  Finally, the evolution 
of Kurdish groups making constitutional claims for self-determination and their cooperation 
across borders in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, under various influences of democratization, is 
analyzed as an inter-organizational network, demonstrating the adaptive mechanisms that can 
deepen sub-national grievances, prolonging conflict, but enhancing the resilience of 
constitutional semi-authoritarianism. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) began intensively 
engaging Turkish citizens, civil society organizations, and government representatives, in a 
public constitutional reform process in 2007. The intensity of the reform process has ebbed and 
flowed; its conclusion is unknown in 2015. The AKP’s constitutional reform process notably 
included a “deliberative democratic,” participation phase intended to gather public opinion from 
civil society actors. Based on this body of public opinion, a representative commission of 
members of Turkey’s Parliament would then debate over and draft articles, and finally decide 
upon a new Constitution unanimously. Ultimately, the goal was to redesign the current 1982 
Constitution of Turkey to a civilian, democratic constitution. Yet at the same time, from 2007 
onwards in Turkey, the AKP heightened repression against an upsurge of domestic dissent. In 
what are now collectively known as the Gezi Park protests, in the summer of 2013, the AKP’s 
increased used of authoritarian repression injured over 8,000 citizens and resulted in eleven 
fatalities in its crackdown on citizens’ freedom of assembly (Türk Tabipleri Birliği 2013).i  In 
2015, the repression is reconvening around all opposition, but organized Kurdish political 
opposition in particular. 
In addition to egregious violations of freedom of assembly, the AKP government had one 
of the worst records of violations of freedom of speech in the world. Media was, and is, restricted 
by concentration of ownership and state censorship boards; journalists are also subject to 
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individual intimidation, harassment, imprisonment, or exile or expatriation (F. Phillips 2013). 
Turkey had the most journalists in jail of any country in the world for 2013 and 2014 
(Committee to Protect Journalists 2014). The government has also banned Twitter and engaged 
in cyber-retaliation against journalists during recent protests, elections, and regarding the 
Kurdish issue (Hürriyet Daily News 2013; Reuters 2013; Scott 2014). Beyond widespread 
censorship and repression of protests, there were more indications of democratic recession in 
Turkey in this period, despite its ongoing legal de jure reforms under the democratization 
program per the European Union’s accession criteria for Turkey to join the supranational 
economic and political organization of states.  
The AKP won large majorities in the country’s local and Parliamentary elections 
consecutively for over a decade, from 2002 onwards, until a surprising loss in 2015, the 
consequences of which remain to be seen. Failed coalition government negotiations led to “snap” 
or rerun elections to be held during the end of 2015 (Dettmer 2015). Legislation changing the 
local and provincial structure of governance through redistricting, electoral, and administrative 
reforms gave the AKP electoral advantage in the Parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2011 and 
in the local elections of 2009.ii Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP 
effectively held charge of the executive and legislative branches, and increasingly retained power 
over the judiciary. The AKP promulgated the legislation that created the popularly elected 
Presidential office, with Erdoğan winning the first popular Presidential election ever held in 
Turkey in August 2014.iii International and domestic observers deemed conditions under which it 
was held unfair, yet criticisms have gone without redress (OSCE/ODIHR 2014).iv From 2013 
onwards, Erdoğan combined the powers of the Prime Ministry and Presidential offices in his 
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“Primesidency” (S. A. Cook 2015). One example of this was Erdoğan’s decision as President to 
preside over Cabinet meetings, a position legally held for the Prime Minister (Kiliç 2014).  
Existing barriers to representation in the electoral system in Turkey, including the 10 
percent threshold for a political party’s entrance into Parliament, combined with the AKP’s 
aforementioned reforms, made electoral gains for political opposition parties highly unlikely 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2011).v The gains made by opposition parties, including the secular Republican 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, or CHP), the Turkish nationalist Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, or MHP), and most importantly, the Kurdish Halk 
Demokrasi Partisi (HDP) or People’s Democracy Party, in June 2015 were a surprise for nearly 
all observers. The local elections of 2014 were the first to be denounced with widespread 
allegations of violence and voting fraud, making the AKP’s Parliamentary seat losses 
particularly stunning (Al Jazeera English 2014; Hürriyet Daily News 2014).  
While international observers applauded the AKP’s initial effort to create a civilian 
constitution, over time the regime’s use of repression was condemned. The major connection 
between the domestic constitutional reform and the international recognition of growing 
authoritarianism in Turkey was Erdoğan’s concerted attempt to gain de jure recognition of his de 
facto consolidation of executive powers through constitutional reform. United domestic 
opposition to a stronger Presidency brought the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission’s 
negotiations to a standstill (Varol 2015).  
Meanwhile, citizens protested and dissented, devising creative non-violent methods to 
lower the risk of brutal repression. The “Standing Man,” one Turkish citizen who showed his 
dissent by simply standing silently in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, went viral, and was 
accompanied by other tactics of quiet protest catching the attention of the international human 
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rights and democracy promotion community (Carvin 2013). Despite the Turkish police’s reckless 
and egregious use of water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray, throughout 2013 and 2014, 
protestors regularly took to the streets. Voters took their dissatisfaction to polling stations in June 
2015, voting the AKP out of its majority position in Parliament. While “snap” elections will be 
held in the fall of 2015, Turkey has entered into armed conflict with non-state actors in 
Southeastern Turkey, in Syria and in Iraq. 
This dissertation, through investigating constitutional change between democracy and 
authoritarianism as a complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS), develops a new explanation 
for semi-authoritarian regime dynamics that accounts for these seemingly contradictory, complex 
phenomena. Authoritarianism of any kind is the antithesis of liberal democratic constitutionalism 
as it was originally intended. This juxtaposition is what makes semi-authoritarian 
constitutionalism, or increasing de jure democratic constitutional commitments while 
simultaneously using increasingly repressive or unconstitutional tactics, puzzling.vi A classical 
constitutional historian wrote “constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation 
on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the 
government of will instead of law” (McIlwain 2005, 20–1).  
Scholars who study constitutionalism normatively dichotomize constitutional systems 
and authoritarian systems as points on opposite ends of a democracy-authoritarianism 
continuum, yet in between, new kinds of resilient constitutional rule are developing, according to 
comparative constitutionalists (Tushnet 2013). For those who understand constitutions to be tools 
of self-government, or of legal restraints to hold rulers to account, authoritarian constitutionalism 
can seem almost farcical. Leaders in overt authoritarian regimes, for example, in the Soviet 
Union, brazenly contradicted the constitution; it was commonly joked that while there was 
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freedom of speech in the Soviet Union, there was no freedom after speech (Ginsburg and 
Simpser 2013). The first Constitution of the Ottoman Empire was anathema to liberal, 
democratic constitutionalism.1 Constitutional documents have not always promoted liberal 
constitutional norms, and authoritarian regimes have used them to increase their power for 
centuries. However, regimes’ nuanced use of the reforms of such documents under the systemic 
influence of democracy promotion to increase their resilience through adaptation, I argue, is a 
new phenomenon developed through learning. 
Moreover, semi-authoritarian governments’ increased resilience, or their ability to adapt 
and maintain power despite challenges, is an important policy problem in the 21st century, as 
more than half of all polities in the world are not free. Freedom House designates 55 of the 
world’s 195 polities, home to just over 1.7 billion people, or 24 percent, of the world’s total, as 
“partly free;” and 51 of world polities as “not free,” representing 26 percent of the world’s total 
population, or 2.6 billion people (Puddington 2015). To develop an explanation of the 
contemporary politics of constitutional semi-authoritarianism, this dissertation grounds its 
research design in the principles of pragmatism, applies the framework of complex systems, and 
uses a research strategy guided by an abductive logic of inquiry, or “inference to the best 
explanation.” 
Abduction, argued to be cornerstone of scientific methodology, is the logic of everyday 
and scientific reasoning, and normally thought of as being one of three major types of inference, 
the other two being deduction and induction. The major objection is abductive explanations are 
                                                 
1 Among the 1876 Constitution’s articles were those proclaiming the Sultan’s executive and 
religious authority, as well as his immunity: “His Majesty the Sultan, under the title of ‘Supreme 
Caliph,’ is protector of the Muslim religion … He is the sovereign and padişah (emperor) of all 
of the Ottomans … His Majesty the Sultan is irresponsible; his person is sacred” (Boğaziçi 
University 1876). 
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“underdetermined,” as alternate hypotheses have not been ruled out. In developing new 
hypotheses, the rule of thumb for an abductive explanation holding up is “enough” rather than 
“exact” (Douven 2011). Explained further in Chapters II and III, abduction develops new 
hypotheses by drawing evidence from a thick description of events. This dissertation develops an 
explanation of how semi-authoritarian regimes have become resilient by legally accommodating 
some liberal constitutional norms via international democracy promotion, addressing a challenge 
from above, while simultaneously domestically violating democratic constitutional norms, to 
address challenges from within and from below. Namely, this is a theory of stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism. 
This dissertation is unconventional. It applies the relatively new paradigm of complexity 
science to these social, political, and legal phenomena. Instead of testing alternative hypotheses 
to isolate a causal effect, this research attempts “conceptual breakthrough” (Eidlin 2010). To do 
so, the dissertation touches upon different subfields of international relations, political science, 
public policy, and comparative public law. In completing this task, the dissertation brings 
together many different literatures, including those on democratization, semi-authoritarianism, 
democracy promotion, comparative constitutionalism, policy learning, political communication, 
and political theory, to generate theories and hypotheses for a future research program for semi-
authoritarian resilience. 
1.1 THE ARGUMENT 
By examining the complex interactions between systemic international influences, states, and 
subnational actors, this dissertation argues that semi-authoritarian regimes have become more 
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resilient, or have an increased capacity to sustain themselves, not despite, but in concert with, the 
multi-level challenges to their rule. Those challenges may come from above as the pull or push, 
positive or negative influence, or as “carrots” or “sticks” of international democracy promotion, 
conceptualizing international democracy promotion as an aggregate force rather than “unitary 
actor.” Semi-authoritarian “regimes” or “governments” are conceptualized in the model as 
systems whose boundaries are defined regime elites and their aligned and un-aligned 
organizations as political organizational networks, which create challenges from within. Finally, 
challenges may also come from below, from subnational groups that can mobilize to act 
collectively to oppose the semi-authoritarian regime, causing the regime to use tactics that 
violate liberal democratic constitutional norms to maintain power, but in combination with 
democratic practices as well.  
The theory of constitutional change under semi-authoritarianism developed in this 
dissertation hinges on the gap between the regimes’ levels of de jure constitutional rights, their 
de facto implementation of those rights, citizens’ perceptions of that gap, and the risk generated 
for semi-authoritarian regimes in sparking organized opposition. Throughout this research I refer 
to the difference of policy in practice, or “de facto,” and on paper, or “de jure” in line with 
research like Versteeg’s and Law’s which differentiates between law as “parchment” and law as 
it is practiced (Law and Versteeg 2013). As shown in Table 1 below, in a system of semi-
authoritarian regimes enacting constitutional change, regimes with an overt authoritarian 
dynamic consistently have a low observation of human rights, but they may have a high or low 
commitment to rights and freedoms in their constitutions, creating sham or weak constitutions, 
respectively.  
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The “sham” and “weak” categories come from comparative de jure and de facto matrix 
designating four types: sham, weak, modest, and strong constitutions (Law and Versteeg 2013). 
Sham and weak constitutions generate different levels of grievance, defined as “the distance 
between the ideal policies of the state and its citizens” (Shadmehr 2014, 623). In this model, 
there are three components to grievance: the distance between the ideal policy of citizens and the 
regime’s policy, both their de jure policy commitments and their de facto policy observations, 
and finally, the perception or sentiment of citizens regarding the grievance. 
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Outside of overt authoritarian regimes with weak and sham constitutions, a new category 
semi-authoritarian constitutionalism, in which rights are specified, but limited, in ways such that 
democratic rights and freedoms may be upheld or legally violated at leaders’ discretion, has 
arisen. The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and its evolution over the last 30 years 
is exemplary of the third, or stealth, category (Isiksel 2013). Regimes under the stealth 
constitutional authoritarian dynamic have more variance in their observation of, and 
commitment to, constitutional rights and freedoms. Policy change over time and across issue 
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areas within constitutions allows them to create more resilient semi-authoritarian regimes using 
techniques like information exchange and control to meet challenges that may arise from above, 
from within, or from below. 
These dynamics have different impacts on the evolution of political opposition in semi-
authoritarian regimes depending on the influence of democratization. A stealth dynamic of 
authoritarianism makes citizens more likely to accept partial democratic reforms by working 
within the existing system, provided citizens can periodically protest to have their rights 
recognized, to hold the regime to account for its de jure constitutional commitments, creating a 
“wet blanket” effect on mobilization. Under the stealth dynamic, the cost of facing repression 
may be higher than the driving motivation of grievance, as little recourse available for opposition 
domestically or internationally when a regime can claim it is legally democratic while practicing 
repression, leading to inaction and semi-authoritarian resilience through maintenance of the 
status quo. 
As modeled in Chapter III, depending on grievance, citizens have a non-monotonic or u-
shaped incentive to respond to claim their rights (Shadmehr 2014; Lorentzen 2013). Which phase 
the semi-authoritarian constitutional regime is in determines its constitutional dynamic – the 
overt regimes with weak or sham constitutions, or the stealth regime – and impacts regimes’ 
constitutional choices on paper and in practice.  By cycling through these different dynamics, the 
interrelationships between grievances, repression, and their effects on mobilization present a 
powerful means to enhance semi-authoritarian resilience. As regimes cycle through these 
dynamics, they challenge the opposition’s avenues to collective action and counter the influence 
of democratization in different ways. Semi-authoritarian regimes’ longevity occurs through the 
development of a robust façade of commitment to democratic constitutionalism through reform, 
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side-by-side with simultaneous observable instances of protecting constitutional democratic 
rights and liberties, and instances of dictatorial-like repression. 
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF A COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH 
International relations scholars have proposed five types of mechanisms linking international 
system with domestic politics, including direct system effects, indirect system effects, 
moderation effects, interaction effects, and a composite model which combines all four effects 
(Chaudoin, Milner, and Pang 2015).2 A complex adaptive system or complex adaptive system of 
systems model most closely approximates the composite model; however, that model fails to 
account for concepts already identified in the complex systems literature as universal, such as 
emergence, initial conditions, system flows or exchange, and system structure (Miller and Page 
2007; Glass et al. 2011; Katz 2011).  
Furthermore, scholars are increasingly using the framework of complex adaptive systems 
to understand law and politics. To model these dynamics as a complex adaptive system 
emphasizing these concepts, this dissertation employs a multi-method design. Systems or 
processes of complexity are difficult to explain, predict, evolve, or engineer, but more closely 
approximate the most pervasive policy problems of the 21st century, like disasters, climate 
change, and humanitarian crises (Gell-Mann 1994, Mitchell 2009, Page 2011). This dissertation 
develops the argument that stealth constitutional authoritarianism and opposition to it emerges 
from the interaction between regime, opposition, and self-determination movements over time in 
                                                 
2 See Chaudoin, et al. 2015 for an excellent review.  
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the nation-state system under the influences of systemic international democratization. The 
chapters provide empirical data to document how, why, and with what ramifications this resilient 
dynamic of semi-authoritarianism has come into being, and proposes that approaches to 
democratization need to be reframed in order to effectively challenge it.  
External actors promoting democracy impact regimes and political opposition in semi-
authoritarian states, creating a system in which actors converge toward a moderate commitment 
to normative constitutionalism rather than a radical overthrow of the state. Actors’ adaptive 
preferences for this status quo drive these phase transitions. As a result, observers see a growing 
capacity by semi-authoritarian regimes to act procedurally according to the rule-of-law and 
upholding of rights, while actually governing through rule-by-law, or the use of legal institutions 
to consolidate authoritarian rule, with repression (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Moustafa 2007; 
Moustafa 2013). The influences of democracy promotion incentivize political leaders to meet the 
de jure constitutional standards of a liberal constitutional democracy. Meeting these thresholds 
allows some states to maintain the financial, institutional, and normative benefits of the 
international democracy programs, and to avoid the costs of transgression, such as political or 
economic sanctions, or military intervention.  International democracy promotion has been 
shown to have a positive effect on democratization in most cases, yet there remain anomalies in 
certain subsectors, such as human rights, in certain cases at specific times (Finkel, Perez-Linan, 
and Seligson 2007). Partially democratic regimes with high levels of factionalism have been 
shown to be the most unstable of all varieties of regimes (Goldstone et al. 2010). This research 
examines one of the mechanisms behind those anomalies, pertaining particularly to the evolution 
of regimes and opposition in provinces of the former Ottoman Empire (Pace 2009). 
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The research is grounded in the region’s constitutional history since the Ottoman Empire. 
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire leading to the formation of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are 
the initial conditions of the complex adaptive system of systems. The emergent phenomena of 
the CASoS of constitutionalism under authoritarianism are dynamic non-equilibrium states that 
shift between phases, driven by the regimes’ use of repression, and the level of grievance, or the 
gap between state commitments and observations of constitutional rights, and citizens’ sentiment 
toward that gap. 
Across the globe, these system dynamics are demonstrated in the incomplete commitment 
of governments or regimes to liberal, constitutional democracy. In semi-authoritarian regimes, 
they converge to increase the resilience of the regime to actions against it. Yet the system 
dynamics also account for the creation of islands of dissent, from protests to self-determination 
movements seeking varying degrees of autonomy from the regime. Over time, actors develop 
preferences for moderate democratic reforms, enabling leaders to fine-tune mechanisms of power 
consolidation that are procedurally legal and, at face value, seemingly democratic, while their 
actions, in aggregate, undermine constitutional democracy in spirit. Opposition must overcome 
the dampening effect on mobilization and cooperate to act collectively and establish governance 
external to the existing constitutional system. 
While semi-authoritarian or nominally-democratic processes may take place in any 
polity, including so-called consolidated democracies, they do not affect the regime or 
government’s resilience similarly because there are alternate avenues to act collectively for 
dissenters and opposition. This dissertation employs relevant findings within multiple fields, 
together, with original empirical work, to generate an explanation of constitutional semi-
authoritarianism that shows the utility of the complex adaptive systems approach. Empirically, it 
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contributes to a body of literature that identifies legal and political systems as complex adaptive 
systems of systems.  
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
1.3.1 Democratization and Authoritarianism Review 
To begin disaggregating these constitutional authoritarian environments, in Chapter 2, I review 
literature on nominally democratic institutions, as they relate to a complex adaptive systems 
approach. Authoritarian regimes are diverse, and semi-authoritarian regimes, even more so. At 
the line between democracy and authoritarianism lay a variety policies, processes, and 
institutional configurations that authoritarian regimes may incorporate into their political 
systems, including constitutions and constitutional reform processes. The literature on nominally 
democratic institutions focuses heavily on institutions like courts, legislatures, political parties, 
and elections. By examining in detail the role of constitutional reform processes, the study 
contributes to scholarship on the role of nominally democratic processes and institutions in semi-
authoritarian contexts, adding an in-depth look at constitutions and constitutional change 
processes to that literature. 
1.3.2 Research Design and Methods 
In Chapter 3, I explain the ontological approach of the dissertation according to concepts from 
complex systems theory and principles of pragmatism. I then summarize how the use of multiple 
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methods – Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Structural Topic Modeling, and inter-
organizational network analysis – are used to infer and gather evidence for a model of semi-
authoritarian resilience. As an empirical work of theory development through abduction, the 
research does not challenge any major schools of thought, nor take on great debates, such as the 
civilizationism of Lewis and Huntington, in its analysis, but rather attempts conceptual 
breakthrough (Lewis 2001; Lewis 1994; Huntington 1993a; Huntington 1993b). 
1.3.3 Complex Adaptive System of Systems Model 
In Chapter 4, I develop the theoretical framework for semi-authoritarian constitutionalism using 
the syntax of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development grammar of institutional change. 
This chapter develops two variants, overt authoritarianism and stealth authoritarianism, 
depending on whether or not the target regime’s actions result from a “carrots” or “sticks” 
influence from international democratization influence in the larger action arena. Subsequently, 
the overt or stealth authoritarian variants enact different action situations for regimes, opposition, 
and the formation of self-determination movements with constitutional claims for democratic 
autonomy. I use the implications of the theoretical framework developed to implicitly model a 
complex adaptive systems of systems model for the resilience of constitutional semi-
authoritarianism. The CASoS model incorporates disaggregated actors on three levels with 
adaptive preferences that interact across space and over time in a cyclic dynamic. 
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1.3.4 System Structure and System Dynamics 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the research examines how regimes develop the capacity to maintain both 
“authoritarian” and “constitutional” features by comparing constitution-making processes over 
time from the Ottoman Empire and throughout the Republic of Turkey (1876 to 1981). Utilizing 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Chapter 5 generates heuristics to identify the building 
blocks of “Overt” and “Stealth” authoritarian constitutional conditions. To understand how the 
capacity was built for constitutional authoritarianism, regimes are operationalized as networks to 
understand communication mechanisms of domination or persuasion as strategic drivers behind 
varieties of constitutionalism under authoritarianism. I use the major episodes of constitution-
making and constitutional reform processes of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic to 
identify the learning that takes place under semi-authoritarian constitutionalism.  
Chapter 5 examines system structure by characterizing semi-authoritarian regimes in part 
based on latent dimensions that are orthogonal to democracy, and operationalizing them as 
political organizational network structures with elites under repression. The Turkish cases of 
constitutional reform span authoritarian regime types from dynastic constitutional monarchy 
(1876, 1909, and 1921), single parties with varying levels of personalism (1924 and 1945), and 
military-led regimes (1961 and 1980).  
Chapter 6 uses the heuristics generated in Chapter 5, complementary to a dataset of 
observed levels of international democracy promotion and constitutional rights and freedoms in 
Turkey from 1982-2011, to confirm hypotheses regarding constitutional authoritarian dynamics. 
It finds that the Overt-Weak constitutional dynamic precedes the Overt-Sham constitutional 
dynamic. With more intense democratization influence, the Stealth constitutional dynamic 
follows, unless increased repression leads back to the Overt-Weak constitutional dynamic, 
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consolidation of power leads back to the Overt-Sham constitutional dynamic, or competition 
leads to a fragile state of democracy.  
1.3.5 Information Exchange and Control  
Chapter 7 of the dissertation examines a new mechanism of Stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism, or the use of controlled public communication processes to enhance resilience 
while simultaneously being under the positive influence of democracy promotion, or “carrots” 
for democratization. Chapter 7 examines the use of quasi-democratic deliberative processes as a 
new practice of stealth authoritarianism under the current Justice and Development Party, or 
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), ruling party in Turkey, from 2007 to 2013. As the party 
gained power and strength from 2002 to 2015, culminating in an increasingly authoritarian 
regime under Erdoğan’s AKP government from 2007 to the present, it developed unique 
capacities to both maintain procedural rule-of-law while simultaneously consolidating its power 
and using repression, effectively disadvantaging the position of the political opposition and 
silencing dissent.  
Data available from the post-2010 reform process provide a methodological opportunity 
to extend and test the tools of natural language processing (NLP) for quantitative content 
analysis to Turkish. Due to its agglutinative nature and rich morphology, text analysis in Turkish 
provides some unique challenges and opportunities for extending and testing these new analysis 
toolkits. The conclusions of this chapter suggest that stealth authoritarian political leaders use 
varying levels of citizen conflict as indicators of issue areas in which to control the exchange of 
information regarding policy change at the constitutional level to increase the appearance of 
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democracy while preventing the opposition from acting collectively or mobilizing against the 
regime. 
1.3.6 Initial Conditions and Emergent Phenomena 
Chapter 8 synthesizes the entire theoretical framework by presenting research that examines 
opposition response in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, or the mobilization of Kurdish minority groups 
into self-determination movements. The initial conditions of these political systems, after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, yielded an independent state in Turkey and colonial states in 
Iraq and in Syria with different relationships to external powers, but similar strategies for 
managing minority groups. By comparing the Kurds’ self-determination movements in Turkey, 
Iraq, and Syria, under varying semi-authoritarian constitutional dynamics, this chapter explores 
the Kurds’ constitutional claims for democratic autonomy and transnational cooperation between 
their movements for self-organized governance.  
Chapter 8 summarizes evidence from constitutional clause and human rights datasets to 
ascertain measurements of the official constitutional environments of the Turkish, Iraqi, and 
Syrian states, dividing de jure commitments to democratic rights and freedoms from de facto 
observations of democratic rights and freedoms over time. After presenting and analyzing the 
data of the states’ constitutional dynamics, the Kurds’ self-determination movements are 
analyzed under these different dynamics. Utilizing an original dataset, I trace the multi-level 
interactions of conflict and cooperation in the complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS) 
under the influences of democracy promotion and between the dynamic phases of semi-
authoritarian constitutionalism in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.  
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This original dataset is presented as an inter-organizational network within the multi-
level dynamic system from 1982 to 2012. Each group of Kurds has, to varying degrees, sought 
self-determination through constitution-making and maintained varying levels of commitment to 
democratic constitutionalism. This analysis concludes that the interactions in the CASoS affect 
Kurds’ constitutional claims, or commitments to liberal constitutional democracy, the degree of 
autonomy sought, and the groups’ ability to mobilize through cooperation across each of the 
countries examined. 
Chapter 8 examines, through the constitutional commitments of the Kurds – the largest 
stateless ethnic group in the world – how self-organization of cooperation between groups 
making constitutional claims develops under dynamics of semi-authoritarianism. This chapter 
offers insight into how Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian governments have impacted Kurds’ strategies 
for collective action, resulting in the emergence of self-determination movements with outcomes 
ranging from broadened electoral agendas to quasi-states of self-organized constitutionalism 
within semi-authoritarian constitutional states. In an era when “constitutionalism” is increasingly 
usurped for authoritarian purposes, this final empirical chapter explores how Kurds’ choices of 
constitutional modes of governance return the study of constitutionalism back to its origins, to 
the development of democratic self-governance. 
1.3.7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Finally, I make policy recommendations regarding these semi-authoritarian polities to 
address the potential effects of current democracy promotion and suggest programmatic changes 
in a new era of resilient stealth authoritarianism. Chapter 9 proposes conclusions, policy 
recommendations, and further research regarding constitutionalism and semi-authoritarian rule. 
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It recommends further research in political networks on the mechanisms underlying factionalism 
in network structures through the communication strategies of dominance or persuasion in 
hierarchical and opinion-leader network structures. In political communication, further research 
on levels of citizen conflict and sequencing of information control and exchange is warranted. 
Increased attention to the nuanced censorship, propaganda, and information manipulation 
campaigns of semi-authoritarian regimes is recommended for policy-makers in semi-
authoritarian countries, as well as detailed knowledge of citizens’ degree of conflict or unified 
support for issue areas in reform to predict political instability. The dissertation recommends that 
policy-makers exercise caution when exerting pressure on authoritarian regimes to make partial, 
de jure policy changes for democratization without monitoring de facto observation of those 
reforms. 
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2.0  DEMOCRATIZATION OF AUTHORITARIANISM 
Over half of all countries in the world are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, but what makes 
them resilient? The variety of regimes that exist between democracy and authoritarianism have 
many names: competitive authoritarianism, semi-authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, 
and stealth authoritarianism (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Levitsky and Way 2002; Levitsky and 
Way 2010; Ottaway 2013; Varol 2014). This chapter reviews existing theories in these polities of 
the development of nominally democratic institutions under democratization to increase semi-
authoritarian longevity, or, as it is conceptualized here, resilience. 
The theories of complex adaptive systems (CAS), or system of systems (CASoS), have 
long been applied to the dynamic nature of law-making, the interactions between law, politics, 
and society, and the complexity of legal systems over time (Katz, Gubler, et al. 2011; Katz, 
Bommarito, et al. 2011; Holz 2007; Jones 2008; Kades 1996; Katz, Stafford, and Provins 2008; 
John B. Ruhl 1996; J. B. Ruhl 2012; J. B. Ruhl 2013; Spulber and Yoo 2004). Problems in law, 
politics, and society dealing with ethics, dispute resolution, and allocation of scarce resources in 
diverse communal, societal, national, international, and supra-national systems fit well with the 
CASoS framework (Katz 2011). Analysis of this complexity is aided by recent advances in 
computational methods to create and test empirical models.  
In international relations and comparative politics, scholars also link empirically complex 
interactions between international systems and domestic politics. Composite models of direct 
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system effects, indirect system effects, moderation effects, and interaction effects on multiple 
levels most closely approximate a complex system of systems model (See Chaudoin, Milner, and 
Pang 2015 for a recent review). However, these models fail to account for concepts already 
identified in the complex systems literature as essential for understanding, modeling, or 
engineering accurate outcomes, including the concepts of emergence, initial conditions, system 
flows or exchange, and system structure. 
This dissertation applies the CASoS framework temporally to constitutional change in the 
Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey, and spatially in former provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire, in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. By examining interactions within a multi-level system of 
systems under the influences of democratization, the dissertation proposes a theory of semi-
authoritarian resilience in which regimes adapt to increase their resilience by addressing 
challenges to their rule, from above, or international democracy promotion influences, challenges 
from within, or incumbent challengers or political opposition, and from below, or opposition, 
dissent, or groups making constitutional claims for self-determination outside the state.  
Challenges from above consist of the positive and negative influences of international 
democracy promotion on nation-states in the international system. While international 
democracy promotion is, for certain, a diverse group of actors with different incentives, actions, 
goals, and intentions, this dissertation groups them as composite positive influence or negative 
influence. Positive influences, or “carrots,” are incentives to democratize, and include aid, loans, 
and membership in international organizations that provide legitimacy and other benefits. 
Negative influences, punishments, or “sticks,” are the withdrawal of benefits or membership, the 
enactment of sanctions, or military interventions into a state. 
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Challenges from within come from those seeking to replace the regime incumbents or 
from political opposition challenging the government. Though the term, “regime” implies a less 
democratic state, while the term, “government” implies a more democratic state, semi-
authoritarian regimes by definition shift between categories. In lieu of the longer phrase, 
“governments with different conceptions of authority over time and space,” regime and 
government are used interchangeably in this research. Due to their use of nominally-democratic 
institutions to consolidate power, the conflation in terms adequately reflects the superfluous 
nature of setting a hard boundary between what is democratic and what is authoritarian in semi-
authoritarian polities.   
Within the nation-state, the government or regime is conceptualized as a political 
organizational system, with aligned individuals and organizations and opposed individuals and 
organizations. Regimes are also disaggregated into organizational systems with more 
hierarchical or more opinion-leader structures, using theories of political networks 
complementary to the complex systems approach. The boundary around the state system is set 
according to those who follow the currently existing constitutional order. Incumbents may seek 
to reform the order, opposition may seek to reform the order, or either set of actors may entirely 
replace the existing order; however, they do not make constitutional claims to self-determination 
as a group outside of it. 
Challenges from below come from political opposition that has overcome the barriers to 
collective action in order to mobilize against the semi-authoritarian regime or government. In 
this research, the mobilization is conceptualized as groups making constitutional claims for self-
determination outside of the currently existing political organizational system that composes the 
semi-authoritarian regime or government. Moreover, the groups making constitutional claims for 
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self-determination, hereafter self-determination movements, may act transnationally across 
regimes in order to mobilize their challenge. Therefore, theories of collective action 
complementary to the complex adaptive systems approach address how the interactions in the 
system both create and react to challenges from below. Below, I review the existing theories of 
nominally-democratic institutions and where they are complementary to, or fall short of, the 
application of the complex adaptive systems of systems approach to the phenomenon of 
constitutional semi-authoritarianism. 
2.1 EXISTING RESEARCH: STRATEGIC INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
Institutional isomorphism is a term used more broadly by organizational theorists as a type of 
policy transfer that involves the insemination of externally-identified solutions into national 
political systems (Radaelli 2000). Extant theories for authoritarian longevity include effective 
formal political institutions and the degree of intensity of external pressures for democratization, 
two factors that when combined, produce strategic institutional isomorphism (Hess 2013).3 The 
interaction between the two – democratization and formal political institutional change – are 
modeled in this dissertation as reform by semi-authoritarian regimes under the influence of 
democratization. Worldwide, this influence of democratization has resulted in the global transfer 
or diffusion of democratic institutions, yielding the phenomenon of “nominally-democratic 
institutions” in semi-authoritarian regimes. 
                                                 
3 Other factors include effective international security, control over economic resources, and 
high-level economic performance (Huntington 1993b; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Geddes 
1999; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Vandewalle and Vandewalle 1998; L. Way 2008; Skocpol 
1979; Bellin 2004; Levitsky and Way 2010). 
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2.1.1 Rise of Nominally-Democratic Institutions and Practices 
The majority of existing research on nominally-democratic institutions focuses on strategic use 
of representative institutions; for example, in electoral processes, political parties, legislatures, as 
well as in non-representative institutions such as elite decision-making bodies, courts and 
judiciaries (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Moustafa 2007; Moustafa 2014; Gandhi and Lust-
Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Blaydes 2010; Boix and Svolik 2013). Representative 
institutions, like elections and legislatures, by design, give political majorities incentives to 
manipulate rules for self-gain. Constitutional reform provides the opportunity for “institutional 
self-dealing,” increasing the power of the actors’ institution (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009, 
211). Representative institutions also provide a structure for distributive politics, or “competitive 
clientelism,” which incumbent political leaders use to draw larger support bases from both 
assembly members and the electorate (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 
2007). Resources are offered through these structures to spread the spoils of political office, to 
persuade the public to support, and other leaders to adopt, the regime’s policy positions (Blaydes 
2010).  
Much constitutional reform in semi-authoritarian countries focuses on electoral 
processes. Elections as nominally democratic institutions “institute the principle of popular 
consent, even as they subvert it in practice” in non-democracies (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). 
Elections also help incumbent political leaders in semi-authoritarian political systems to reduce 
risk of violent regime change or coups by offering periodic public engagement. Partially free or 
fair elections in particular are used for informational purposes in order to identify support bases, 
opposition strongholds, and voters’ policy preferences in order to form and appropriately target 
ideological inducements (Magaloni 2006), while elections that are not free and unfair are used to 
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silence or repress opposition (Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). In their most repressive 
function, elections may serve to mobilize voters coercively to show their support. Incumbents 
under semi-authoritarianism use internationally-observed elections to bolster their own 
legitimacy and to disadvantage the opposition (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009).  
Non-representative institutions, such as courts, are coopted through court-packing, and 
then help coordinate governance, or assimilate political opponents through silencing them 
(Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Moustafa 2007). Courts can implement ideologically 
controversial policies to allow political distance from core elements of the regime (Ginsburg and 
Simpser 2013), or to bolster a regime’s claim to ‘legal’ legitimacy and may build legitimacy for 
regimes by facilitating trade and investment through the enforcement of property rights 
(Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; Moustafa 2007). 
There are three mechanisms behind these strategic institutional changes. Nominally-
democratic institutions are used strategically to coopt opposition, coordinate governance, or 
dominate, coerce, or control potential contenders or opposition to prolong semi-authoritarian 
longevity. First, coordination refers to the ability to cooperate to act collectively to achieve an 
outcome. A key factor in coordination is whether commitments are credible (North and Weingast 
1989; Weingast 1997). Coordination increases internal efficiency and insulates the regime from 
external threats. Nominally democratic institutions function to ease the coordination of 
governance under semi-authoritarianism by increasing transparency among factions within the 
regime, and by strengthening compliance with the regime’s policies, both through ideology and 
administration (Magaloni 2008; Boix and Svolik 2013).  
Second, cooptation is a strategy that achieves actors’ aims through the assimilation of 
smaller, opposing groups, or their views, into the larger group or ideology itself. Opposing 
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viewpoints can either be induced to adopt the regimes’ views, or silenced, a more coercive form 
of cooptation. Ideologically, cooptation is a mechanism of persuasion of other leaders and the 
public to accept the incumbents’ rule in response to their partial adoption of ideological 
commitments or beliefs underlying policy preferences of the opposition or the public, according 
to frameworks of policy change driven by advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988; Leifeld 2013; 
Weible et al. 2011), accounting for apparent ideological switching by an incumbent regime 
(Leifeld 2014). Finally, nominally-democratic institutions can function as instruments for social 
control, domination, or coercion. High-level decision-making councils (e.g. politburos) may be 
embedded within legislatures or political parties to eliminate the problem of secrecy among 
authoritarian regimes by solving commitment and monitoring problems between members of the 
ruling coalition (Svolik 2012). However, coercion itself is the most difficult to mask as 
democratic. 
2.1.2 Constitutional Change as Nominal Democratic Practice 
Constitutional change, in addition to offering political leaders an opportunity to change the 
design of institutions and political processes in their self-interest, offers an additional opportunity 
for political leaders to engage with opposition and the public in the processes of change. The 
effects are interactive and occur on multiple levels, in systems within systems. Adding the 
influences of democratization makes the system adaptive and complex. Yet as reviewed in the 
previous section, existing explanations of nominally-democratic institutions are largely strategic 
or functional, and constitutions and constitutional reform processes are no exception to this 
trend.  
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Scholars, in large part, have evaluated the participatory value of constitutional adoption 
or adaptation processes in their role as veneers covering regimes’ strategic reforms of the 
institutional system of government in their own self-interest. These reforms are also known as 
“window-dressing,” or “cheap talk” masking self-dealing reforms (Ginsburg and Simpser 2013; 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009). However, recent research has gone beyond to analyze how 
the use of seemingly democratic constitutional reform processes makes regimes impenetrable to 
domestic and international democracy and rule-of-law advocates. This area of research requires 
that research address the normative nature of constitutionalism and democracy in part, by 
assessing the authenticity of inclusion, participation, and self-governance. 
Abusive constitutional reform processes allow authoritarian actors to “remove members 
of the political opposition, and to replace them with officials loyal to the incumbents; to weaken, 
disable, or pack courts as well as other mechanisms of accountability; and to establish 
government control over the media and other key institutions” (Landau 2013, 194). One scholar 
laments that this “undermining of democracy through the use of the tools of constitutional 
change is likely to be increasingly common in the future,” and that there are “few adequate 
responses in comparative and international law” (Landau 2013, 259). Currently scholars have 
observed it across the globe, from polities as diverse as Honduras (Landau and Sheppard 2015) 
to Hungary (Halmai 2013). 
In strategic accounts, governments practice abusive or stealth authoritarian actions at all 
levels of the legal hierarchy and in both authoritarian and democratic systems (Varol 2014). 
These practices accomplish a variety of strategic goals for the government, including distraction 
from authoritarian practices, distortion or censoring of information, and the ability, selectively, to 
apply the rules to dominate the political sphere (2014). A key to this argument is the ability of 
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the regime to tout the existence of rule of law on paper, but to use its own discretion when 
enacting or upholding it (2014).4 Opposition policymakers are prosecuted for libel, or audited for 
corruption, while supporters and their networks are handed lucrative public contracts and citizens 
are given economic or ideological inducements through adjustments in social policies, among 
other benefits. This theory modifies the static strategic actor assumption to be adaptive, dynamic, 
and multi-level, and unpacks actors’ normative commitments accordingly in the framework of 
CASoS. 
Strategic analyses of semi-authoritarian constitutionalism expose a paradox: regimes 
depend on the assumption of credible commitment, yet intrinsic to the definition of all 
authoritarianism is the opposite, or the leader’s ability to act on a “whim” (Tushnet 2013). This 
whim is made credible through the mechanism of legal discretion, which can be used to promote 
certain values and menace others (Hart 2013). In democracies, legal discretion is used to promote 
values like efficient governance. On the other hand, in semi-authoritarian systems, legal 
discretion is used to give incumbents political advantage and to disadvantage or punish political 
opposition, moving the system towards authoritarianism. Therefore, this dissertation 
conceptualizes these changing strategies over time more accurately as actors’ adaptive 
preferences in a complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS). 
Constitution-making processes are underexamined as nominally-democratic institutions 
under semi-authoritarianism, with some exceptions (Barros 2002; N. J. Brown 2001; Ginsburg 
and Simpser 2013; Isiksel 2013; Law and Versteeg 2013). Most analyses focus on the strategic 
or functional, rather than the systematic or normative, nature of the reforms. Through the 
                                                 
4 Varol aptly quotes Peruvian president Oscar Benevides as saying, “For my friends, everything. 
For my enemies, the law,” (Varol 2014). 
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creation and selective application of formal rules, or “reform,” in constitution-making processes, 
semi-authoritarian regime leaders use laws and legal reform as nominally-democratic processes 
for non-democratic ends (Varol 2014; Ginsburg and Simpser 2013; Landau 2013; Scheppele 
2013). The use of changing, formal legal rules as nominally-democratic institutions is also 
overshadowed by research on informal rules or extra-legal actions, as democracy and rule of law 
are assumed to oppose authoritarianism and illegality (H. E. Hale 2011; Levitsky and Way 
2010). 
In strategic models, the multi-level interactions that produce the uncertainty inherent in a 
complex adaptive system of systems, and therefore the likelihood of surprising outcomes, known 
as emergence in the framework of CASoS, is overlooked. Constitutions create the rules by which 
rules are made or changed; therefore the existing constitution contains the initial conditions for 
adaptation within the system itself. Constitutions are systems of institutions or rules that interact 
to create the constitutional environment as a whole, making the CASoS framework the most 
appropriate (Bednar 2012; Vermeule 2011). In the model developed under the CASoS 
framework, the actors in the reform process are a set of political leaders, interest groups, and the 
public, nested both within the constitutional system, and the international system of 
democratization influences. The model is based in the syntax of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework, as shown in Chapter III. 
2.2 AN ALTERNATIVE: SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE 
Semi-authoritarian regimes have adapted to become more resilient by addressing challenges 
from above, from within, and from below. In the theory developed in this dissertation, a system 
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component within a CASoS is more appropriately conceptualized as resilient, rather than as 
having longevity. Democratization and formal institutional change have created the institutional 
isomorphism of structures, agencies, and processes identified by democracy promoters as 
“democratic” into democratizing authoritarian regimes. The consequences of this isomorphism 
for the political incumbents and political opposition is not always direct or anticipated in target 
countries in terms of how the institutions function and impact actors and their preferences. The 
CASoS approach helps to shed light on these unanticipated effects. Resilience is assessed as 
regimes’ adaptability to challenges from above, from within, and from below. 
 
2.2.1 Addressing Challenges from Above 
Regimes have adapted to address the positive and negative influences of democracy promotion 
in the international system by either creating a façade of moderate democratic commitment or by 
cooperating with each other to opt out of the existing democracy promotion system. External 
actors exert a democratizing influence on regimes through coercion, conditionality, or diffusion 
(Huntington 1993b; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 
2006). This dissertation characterizes them as rewards or punishments for adherence to rules, or 
“carrots” and “sticks.” Powerful democracies, such as the United States (US), international and 
regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and nongovernment organizations can play a role in empowering the popular 
challengers of autocratic regimes (Hess 2013). The establishment of democracy in one country 
also has a powerful demonstration effect on its neighbors; opposition movements that have 
effectively toppled authoritarian regimes in their own countries have introduced strategies in 
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neighboring autocracies (Huntington 1993b; Bunce and Wolchik 2006). Constitutional 
development has been shown to diffuse regionally through empirical research as well (Elkins, et 
al.). These effects are the indirect outcome of the positive influence of democracy promotion. 
In challenges from above, regimes must also address the positive influence of democracy 
promotion by adapting to become moderately democratic. One prominent constitutional scholar 
argues: “authoritarian constitutionalism may best be defined by attributing moderately strong 
normative commitments to constitutionalism – not strategic calculations – to those controlling 
these nations” (Tushnet 2013, 9).  The semi-authoritarian leader’s commitment to 
constitutionalism is shown through procedural requirements of the rule-of-law, yet employs 
excessive selective enforcement of the law, making the regime impenetrable to criticism and 
dissent and protest by external actors. Yet importantly, semi-authoritarian regime actors’ 
normative commitment to constitutionalism still must exist. Under this political dynamic, 
incumbent leaders have learned how to use legal procedures to increase their resilience. This 
dissertation demonstrates how the capacity to enact this dynamic, stealth authoritarian 
constitutionalism, was gained by semi-authoritarian leaders, and how it has developed, but it also 
points out potential vulnerabilities in semi-authoritarian constitutional regimes. 
Regimes address the negative influence of democracy promotion by cooperating with 
each other or by simply opting out of the system of international democracy promotion to the 
extent possible. There are also indirect system effects of negative influences of democracy 
promotion, or those countries subject to sanctions or military intervention for violating 
democracy promotion thresholds. Other states or organizations may also work to help 
authoritarian regimes resist democratization by serving a direct stabilizing role in authoritarian 
regimes. Countries such as Russia and China have worked to help vulnerable autocrats resist the 
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threat of democratic contagion (Gat 2007; Carothers 2006; Ambrosio 2009; L. A. Way 2005). 
Autocrats pool resources and expertise or take direct actions to mitigate the threat of democratic 
contagion by offering diplomatic support and reducing the international pressure to abide by 
democratic or international human rights norms (Hess 2013). In areas where international 
democracy assistance has contributed to regime change, regimes condemn them as unacceptable 
foreign interference in another country’s affairs (Carothers 2006; Gat 2007; Ambrosio 2009; 
Burnell 2006). 
Previous research has also shown the paradoxical effects that some types of democracy 
promotion can have on politics in semi-authoritarian regimes. For example, the behavior of 
political opposition tends toward boycott in internationally-monitored elections (Beaulieu and 
Hyde 2009). Citizens’ gain increasingly antagonistic views toward democracy promoters 
themselves (Jamal 2012). Political participation has empirically been shown to have unintended 
consequences in semi-authoritarian regimes with democracy promotion (Jamal 2007). Those 
with weaker links to the regime who oppose or resist incumbents’ policies, are more likely to be 
marginalized and grow increasingly distrustful as their networks become impoverished and 
disconnected. Rewards, or inducements, that go to those loyal to the regime, and punishments, 
restrictions, or isolation of those who oppose the regime, promote trust and engagement among 
those loyal to the regime as they become more central civic actors (Jamal 2007; Sarkissian and 
Ozler 2009).  
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2.2.2 Addressing Challenges From Within and Below 
Governments in semi-authoritarian polities have also adapted in order to be resilient to 
challenges from within their political organizational systems. Through information manipulation, 
control, and exchange, incumbents use constitutional change processes to engage the public, gain 
information, and quell collective action from below. Over the last decade, adaptive semi-
authoritarian regimes mimicked “popular constitution-making” within an insulated, impartial, 
“constitutional convention,” but simultaneously shifted it into parliamentary politics (Arato 
1995; Elster 1993; Partlett 2011). In post-Communist Eastern Europe, constitutional change 
became synonymous with political change, losing its fundamental difference in character (Arato 
1995). From Latin America to the Middle East to Africa, “irregular popular mechanisms like 
referendums and constitutional conventions … [have] helped charismatic presidents unilaterally 
impose authoritarian constitutions on society” instead of “limiting concentration of power and 
promoting individual liberty” (Arato 1995; Partlett 2011).  
Instead of being conceptualized as ordinary politics, constitutional change is more 
adequately conceptualized as policy change for semi-authoritarian resilience. Identifying 
political leaders’ credibility despite excessive use of legal discretion and selective enforcement at 
all levels of law, uncovers a mechanism of authoritarian learning in which constitution-making 
has simply become policymaking, defined as a mechanism to achieve a single intended course of 
action (Parsons 1995). Losing its insulated position as higher politics over sacrosanct values, and 
at times losing its political possession by multiple stakeholders in Parliament, constitutional 
change becomes an intended course of action to reach a goal for a single political force – the 
regime. Yet the participatory nature and information exchange and control with the public 
remain essential components of the strategy, and make outcomes uncertain. 
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Incumbents still benefit from constitutional reform through institutional self-dealing and 
the generation of legitimacy. Their innovation is the manipulation of opposition or public 
participation in the policymaking process to effectively quell or utilize collective action against 
the regime as it diverts public attention from the violation of the norms of democratic 
constitutionalism. In essence, the authoritarian regime has learned how to manipulate the 
vocalization of opposition itself to weave a complex web of policies at the constitutional level 
that increase its durability. Yet in complexity, outcomes emerge that are unexpected by the actors 
involved. 
This complexity, as the regime has moved the process of constitutional reform from high 
politics to ordinary politics to policymaking, illustrates significant authoritarian learning in two 
respects. First, it shows that regimes have learned the importance of using communication and 
information to keep citizens controlled through participation. Second, it shows how semi-
authoritarian regimes have learned to mask a single course of action, a drive to concentrate 
power through policy, by packaging it inside both Parliamentary negotiations over reform of “the 
rules by which rules are made,” and inside a public participation process that is designed to 
appear inclusive. These public communication processes may have deliberate democratic effects; 
however, what occurs between citizens is likely used to only allow collective action that works in 
the regime’s favor, and the deliberative output has little to no authentic uptake into the 
policymaking process. 
2.2.2.1 From Within: Information Exchange 
The literature on how authoritarian regimes use public communication, or information 
transfer, to serve authoritarian ends, focuses on its complex impact on collective action outcomes 
by citizens in the polity (Chen and Xu 2014; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). This scholarship on 
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nominally democratic communication processes assesses use of new tactics information 
manipulation, control, and exchange, such as the controlled public communication analyzed in 
Chapter VII, to generate legitimacy. Analysis of this normative component requires an informed 
use of discourse analysis methods to understand how controlled public communication both 
encourages and discourages collective action by citizens, creating semi-authoritarian resilience 
by allowing the stealth autocrat to maintain a manageable level of legitimacy under the influence 
of international democracy promotion, despite utilizing authoritarian methods of repression. 
To prevent political opposition from mobilizing, regimes may manipulate political 
participation. One new tactic of manipulation is controlled public communication or citizen 
deliberation processes. The term “deliberation” here in the same sense as public communication, 
to signify discussion among citizens that occurs in a public arena, not in exactly the same sense 
as the concept of “democratic deliberation,” which, in the context of constitutional change 
processes, can mean one of several things: first, that citizens submit their opinions to the central 
constitution-making body, which responds to them individually or en masse; second, that citizens 
submit their opinions via an intermediary, such as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or 
union to which they belong; third, that citizens have face-to-face discussions with the 
constitution-making body or their representatives; or fourth, that citizens converse among 
themselves about constitutional change.5 Some of the deliberative processes that authoritarian 
governments use in this sense act as valves to release pressure and frustration for citizens 
through public protest or participation, for instance, “regularizing rioting” when grievances are 
neither too high nor too low (Lorentzen 2013).  
                                                 
5 Thanks to Professor Ozan Varol for these specific comments. 
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The incumbent authoritarian government benefits from controlled participation in several 
ways. First, it improves its appearance as democratic rather than authoritarian, for example, by 
allowing for countries in democracy promotion programs to “check off” quantifiable components 
of democracy (Scheppele 2013). Participatory processes also reduce incumbents’ risk of losing 
office to opposition by reducing the opposition’s drive for an overthrow as some policy 
concessions are made and discontent is aired in the political arena (Lorentzen 2013; Gandhi 
2010). Finally, it allows for regimes to control the organization of collective action by 
“discontents” around the regime (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).  
Politically, opposition is allowed to vocalize dissent without engaging in an authentic 
democratic process as defined by standards of inclusive democracy (Young 2002). In recent 
game-theoretic scholarship on the use of deliberation in authoritarian regimes, the process is 
modeled as one in which the government gains information about citizens, and in which citizens 
gain information about each other (Chen and Xu 2014). Chen and Xu write: 
 
“Specifically when the government knows that citizens are very likely to share opposite policy preferences, 
public deliberation makes it better off. This is because public deliberation serves as a commitment device, 
ensuring that the government fully responds to problems that spur popular anger, which in turn benefits the 
government. Under public communication, because citizens’ preferences are publicly revealed, they are 
discouraged from joining a protest when they are themselves split over the policies,” (Chen and Xu 2014). 
 
Citizens have a strategic choice in the public expression of their policy preferences in which they 
learn horizontally about each other’s preferences. The regime chooses policy adjustments based 
on this expression, as information travels vertically from citizens to policymakers. Then, citizens 
choose whether or not to act collectively for their preferred policy after the regime’s policy 
adjustments. Horizontal information flows give the regime and citizens information about 
citizens’ preferences and conflicts within the citizenry that both coordinate and discourage 
collective action. As the regime tracks the process, or the vertical information flow, leaders 
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choose how to respond to citizens in order to prevent collective action against them through 
adjusting policies. However, the regime’s strategic response to vertical information mitigates the 
cost of horizontal learning, making participation of net value to the regime (Chen and Xu 2014).  
2.2.2.2 From Below: Evolution of Opposition 
The evolution of actors making self-determination claims under semi-authoritarian 
dynamics brings the entire model of semi-authoritarian constitutional dynamics into a theoretical 
synthesis. I define constitutional authoritarian dynamics and their observable implications by 
distinguishing between Overt and Stealth constitutional semi-authoritarianism, with the potential 
for dissent or opposition to evolve into self-determination movements in these contexts. Overt 
constitutional authoritarianism (OCA) is a variant of constitutional authoritarianism similar to 
mere rule-of-law constitutionalism, or one in which the “decision-maker conforms with general 
procedural requirements and implements decisions through, among other things, independent 
courts, but is not constrained by any substantive rules regarding, for example, civil liberties” 
(Tushnet 2013, 8). Stealth constitutional authoritarianism (SCA) is a variant of constitutional 
authoritarianism in which a normative commitment to constitutionalism is apparent. Similar to 
Tushnet’s authoritarian constitutionalism, a façade of nominally-democratic institutions is 
created as “liberal freedoms are protected at an intermediate level and elections are reasonably 
free and fair” (Tushnet 2013, 8). 
Cycles of Overt and Stealth constitutional authoritarianism can give rise to self-
determination movements, groups that have overcome barriers to collective action and struggle 
for self-determination against the constitutional regime. Self-determination movements strive for 
self-organized governance within semi-authoritarian regimes, with varying degrees of autonomy 
as their goal. These groups’ utilization of legal tools for self-organization of governance is 
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dependent on the regime structure, constitutional environment, and repression employed within 
the larger system. Whether or not support for democracy is authentic, regimes’ toleration of 
dissent must increase, so more emerges. Opposition policymakers may grow weaker in their 
allegiance to the regime as more dissent emerges, and greater numbers are reached, causing 
collective action barriers to be overcome for the opposition. If the opposition cannot mobilize 
within the system, it will develop a movement for self-determination outside of it. 
Previous research models the relationships between authoritarian regimes, political 
opposition, and external actors promoting democracy as single- or multi-level transition or 
democratization games (Przeworski 1992; Yilmaz 2002; Thiel 2010). Most games or action 
situations of democratization involve two players, the regime and the opposition, on a single 
level. Scholars have modeled these interconnections as “iterative cycles of conflict” fluctuating 
between levels, in repeated interactions on the international level between the regime and 
external actors, and on the domestic level between the authoritarian regime and political 
opposition (Thiel 2010).  
In this model, groups organizing for self-determination interact with government or 
regime actors, as well as opposition actors, who are subject to the influence of international 
democracy promotion, making the system composed of multiple levels. Embedding the local 
self-determination movements’ system within the domestic system and subjecting both to the 
influence of international democracy promotion changes actors’ optimal strategies (Thiel 2010). 
The scenario is most appropriately modeled as a dynamic system of systems, which allows for 
actors’ preferences to adapt over time. A multi-level model nests the interactions between self-
determination movements, political opposition, and the regime within the influential system of 
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democracy promotion, showing how the interactions within and between levels of the system 
produces emergent outcomes from the entire system of systems. 
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN 
The goal of this dissertation is to draw policy implications for the wider universe of semi-
authoritarian cases in the confounding intersection where ostensibly democratic processes of 
constitutional change are used for non-democratic ends under the pressures of democratization. 
Interrogating contestations over political and constitutional change with an abductive research 
strategy – by identifying the phenomena of interest, examining it in depth, and then drawing 
generalizable conclusions where possible – allows novel insights to be drawn for further research 
(Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). In designing research for explanation by conceptual 
breakthrough, the research “…serves not to confirm or disconfirm a causal hypothesis … but 
rather to clarify a hypothesis. More specifically, the case study serves to elucidate causal 
mechanisms” (Gerring 2007; George and Bennett 2005; Eckstein 1975).  
The CASoS model conceptualizes the complex adaptive system of systems as 
undergirded by institutions, or rules, norms, and shared strategies. Because constitutions form the 
structure of the state and therefore the division of power, but also are normative documents that 
formulate national identity and the legitimacy of those who claim to lead the nation, 
constitutional change cannot be explained without addressing two factors. First, it must address 
the understanding of the interests that drive that change. Second, according to the historical 
conditions of possibility, research must address the constitution of the meaning of interest as it 
changes according to leaders’ and citizens’ understandings of and commitments to the tenets of 
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constitutional democracy. This meaning is particular to the context, but the mechanisms behind 
its change are generalizable. 
3.1 ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH 
This dissertation’s unique ontological approach combines concepts from complexity science, or 
complex adaptive systems, with principles of pragmatism, creating a theoretical framework that 
is delineated through the syntax of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework and then inferred, through abduction, using multiple methods. The methods include 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Structural Topic Modeling (STM), and structured, 
focused comparison. In the final empirical chapter, the entire CASoS model is also analyzed 
using aninter-organizational network visualization. These methods are discussed in the last 
section of the chapter.  
3.1.1 Concepts from Complexity Science 
Studies generally model actors as strategic and political and legal processes as stochastic, 
therefore constitutional change events are random, non-deterministic, and can be understood in 
terms of probabilities. On the other hand, complex adaptive systems (CAS) or systems of 
systems (CASoS) theory studies how agents interact and produce an aggregate of their 
interactions, suggesting that the two processes are inseparable and the system is irreducible (J. B. 
Ruhl 2012, 889). CAS or CASoS theory is most appropriate for models with a moderate number 
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of actors, between the very small, like two actor games, or the very large, as in an infinite 
number of actors, used in most social science models (Miller and Page 2007).  
The paradigm of complex systems allows us to understand legal systems as evolutionary 
(J. B. Ruhl 2012). While a complex system can seem ill-defined, nearly all scholarship points to 
the importance of concepts of initial conditions, system structure, information exchange, and 
emergence, or “why dynamical forces will inevitably lead to unpredictable, unanticipated 
behavior” (J. B. Ruhl 2012, 1410; Katz and Stafford 2010, 465). These outcomes are similar to 
games with more than two actors and circular outcomes, like the Cordocet paradox, in which 
individual voting preferences yield an entirely different systemic voting outcome (Holz 2007). 
Ruhl summarizes the application of complexity theory to law, society, and politics (J. B. Ruhl 
2013). This summary is not intended for novices or experts of complexity theory, but rather to 
unpack some familiar concepts from the paradigm and apply them to a new area of social, legal, 
and political phenomena. 
In a CASoS, dynamic, adaptive, heterogeneous actors abide by deterministic rules, 
creating nonlinear relationships. These relationships have network connectivity; therefore, flows 
of information or energy are important and have both direct effects and system-wide indirect 
effects. Feedback (mutual influence), path dependence (historical influence), self-organizing 
structures (evolution), and critical states (thresholds) are important mechanisms of change within 
complex adaptive systems. These components and mechanisms create system-level outcomes 
like power law event distributions, adaptive capacity, resistance, resilience, and phase transitions. 
Emergence, as noted before, is the appearance of “unforeseen qualities from the self-organizing 
interaction of large numbers of objects, which cannot be understood by studying any one of the 
objects” (John B. Ruhl 1996, 1439). 
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3.1.2 Principles of Pragmatism 
Studies using the paradigm of complex systems seek to simplify the interactions within a system 
for explanation that more closely approximates reality. Ontologically, this dissertation draws on 
the ideals of pragmatism to assess constitutional change between democracy and 
authoritarianism as a complex adaptive system. Pragmatism grounds the research in empirics and 
constrains the model by iterating between theory and evidence. Pragmatism developed 
principally by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who “believed that ‘ideas do not 
develop according to some inner logic of their own, but are entirely dependent … on human 
carriers and the environment’ … the pragmatist ‘turns away . . . from bad a priori reasons, from 
fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.’ Pragmatism was not 
intended, however, to reject the pursuit of truth or even complex belief systems … Pragmatic 
truth evolves for a thinker as his or her beliefs are either reinforced or discouraged through 
interaction with their environment” (Holz 2007, 326).  
Pragmatism allows for the use of theories and methods with different epistemologies, 
given the research design produces reliable and valid results; the methodologies are used 
accurately, and the conclusions drawn are based on the presented evidence (James 1995; Morgan 
2007; Rescher 1977; Rorty 1982). The dissertation escapes epistemological deadlock by 
embracing pragmatism and utilizing a strategy of abduction, or reasoning at an intermediate level 
between deduction and induction (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). Embracing a consensus 
theory of knowledge allows social scientists to cross ontological boundaries by using 
epistemological instrumentalism (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 709). This allows research to 
simultaneously utilize both positivist and social constructivist logics of inquiry. 
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3.1.3 Theory Development: Explicit IAD Syntax, Implicit CASoS 
As briefly summarized here, the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) is a 
systems approach, and provides an overarching theoretical framework for institutional change, 
including the study of constitutional change in semi-authoritarian regimes under the influence of 
democracy promotion.  Theories of institutional change in which constitutional rules, or the rules 
by which rules are made, require a systems approach to the underlying structures within them. 
The IAD framework can be decomposed into five different structures, as shown in Figure 2 
below (Ligtvoet, Ghorbani, and Chappin 2011). This design emphasizes the collective, 





Figure 1. System Structures in IAD Framework 
 
As a systemic approach containing these five structures, the IAD framework is a meta-theoretical 
conceptual ma. That conceptual map identifies an action arena, patterns of interactions and 
outcomes, and an evaluation of these outcomes for a particular action situation at the 
constitutional or collective levels (Ostrom 2011). Action arenas or action situations are the social 
spaces where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one 
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another, or fight, among other things (Ostrom 2011, 11). More importantly, the IAD models 
mutually dependent interactions, as it “not only demonstrates how varied institutional structures 
affect agent decisionmaking, but also how agent decisions affect (change) the institutional 
structures themselves” by combining the “use of rational choice theory and game theory 
explanations for social behavior with the ideas that agent choice is bounded by both the decision-
making capacities of individual agents and a surrounding structure of political, economic, and 
cultural rules (institutions)” (Collier 2002, 170–1). 
Action situations are framed according to ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about how actors view and value the world, acquire and use knowledge, and make decisions 
within the game. This research uses “game,” in the same sense as action situation, and not to 
indicate formal theory. Action situations take place within an action arena, which models multi-
level or nested games. More specifically, these are defined as the resources actors bring to a 
situation; the valuations actors assign to states of the world and to actions; the ways in which 
actors acquire, process, retain, and use knowledge contingencies and information; and the 
processes actors use for selection of particular courses of action (Ostrom 2011, 11). 
The framework assumes that individuals have bounded-rationality, the ability to learn, 
and initial norms depending on their circumstances. Just as actors may be reciprocally-motivated 
if cooperation results in higher payoffs, they may also be opportunistic under conditions of 
controlled or limited information (Ostrom 2011, 15). In the action situation of constitutional 
politics in authoritarian regimes, as in research on social dilemmas, where initial norms of 
fairness can limit overuse of common resources, initial norms of revenge or distrust may lead to 
opportunism. In semi-authoritarian constitutional systems, political leaders opportunistically 
employ excessive use of legal discretion for selective enforcement of the law, even at the 
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constitutional level. While the IAD framework is most widely known as a way to study problems 
of “governing the commons,” or polycentric governance systems, collective action problems, and 
social dilemmas, the framework can also be used to diagnose problems to identify sources of 
dysfunctional performance, like the use of international democracy standards and constitutional 
change to promote semi-authoritarian resilience (McGinnis 2011, 170).  
Because the IAD assumes that actors “pursue goals but do so under constraints of limited 
cognitive and information-processing capability, incomplete information, and the subtle 
influences of cultural predispositions and beliefs,” the framework allows us to focus on the 
adaptive learning capacity of individuals: “fallible individuals are capable of learning from their 
mistakes but these processes of learning do not operate perfectly” (McGinnis 2015, 5). The 
theory developed in this dissertation emphasizes two variables in the IAD framework that impact 
the development of institutions such as those created in constitution-making processes: 
information and control. A visualization can be seen in the Figure below, which is a general 
heuristic for the IAD’s action situations (McGinnis 2011). First, the research explores the 
distortion of communication and restriction of information, and second, it explores the degree of 
autonomy or equal participation in policy-making processes, or the degree of control or 
domination of the policy-making process. Conversely, control and domination are the 
counterparts of repression of or resistance by other actors in the action arena according to social 
constructivist theories of language, which is used both in law and in discourse over legal reform. 
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Figure 2. Components of IAD Action Arena 
 
 
Action arenas and situations within the IAD framework, shown in Figure 3 above, have the 
following components: the set of actors, specific positions to be filled by actors, the set of 
allowable actions and their linkage to outcomes, potential outcomes that are linked to individual 
sequences of actions, the level of control each participant has over choice, information available 
to participants about the structure of the action situation, and costs and benefits—which serve as 
incentives and deterrents—assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom 2011). Actors are roles or 
positions with a choice of actions, which are linked to specific outcomes through the level of 
information available to them, the level of control over choice, and the costs and benefits of each 
choice (Ostrom 2011). 
Action arenas and situations within the IAD framework have a syntax for rules or 
institutions called ADICO, or Attributes (positions, roles), Deontic (obligation, prohibition, 
permission), aIm (action, outcome), Condition, and Or else (explicit, unique consequence). 
Different ADICO statements can be written for Rules, Norms, or Shared Strategies. Rules have 
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all five ADICO variables defined. Norms have no consequence for not taking action, and 
therefore are defined by ADIC. Finally, Shared Strategies, also called situated norms, social 
norms/ conventions, or collective intentions, are defined by Attributes, Aims, and Conditions 
(Ghorbani, Dignum, and Dijkema 2012). In this framework, I define institutions as Rules or 
Norms, or Shared Strategies. Figure 4 below shows the components for operationalization of the 
model at the constitutional level: Roles, Institutions, Groups, and Dependencies (the link 
between the action situations and the overall action arena). I use the implications of the 
theoretical framework developed to implicitly model a complex adaptive systems of systems 
model for the resilience of constitutional semi-authoritarianism. The CASoS model incorporates 
disaggregated actors on three levels with adaptive preferences that interact across space and over 




Figure 3. Constitutional Structure in the IAD Framework 
 
I use the IAD system structure and ADICO syntax to delineate the theory of constitutional semi-
authoritarianism resilience under the influence of international democracy promotion (IDP). 
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While IDP is conceptualized in the model as a unitary actor with an aggregate, or composite, 
positive or negative influence that challenges semi-authoritarian resilience from above, in 
delineating this theory, IDP is a set of institutions that create the action arena, initiating the 
different actions situations of semi-authoritarian constitutionalism. 
3.2 EMPIRICAL FOCUS AND MULTI-METHOD DESIGN 
Semi-authoritarian resilience, addressing challenges from above, from within, and from below, is 
explored in this dissertation in the former Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq. First, the semi-authoritarian political systems of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria are historically 
rooted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore have similar historical 
antecedents with identifiable differences in initial conditions. The Republic of Turkey today lies 
in between a democratic and an authoritarian political system. Throughout its history, it has 
meandered back and forth between categories, at times defying typical categories altogether. 
The Republic of Turkey is a fiercely anti-imperialist, parliamentary republic with strong 
nominally-democratic institutions. Atatürk was a “benevolent dictator” in transforming the 
Caliphate and the Sultanate of the Ottoman Empire into the Parliamentary, secular Turkish 
Republic in 1924 (Rustow 1968).  The Turkish military performed a “democratic coup d’etat” in 
1960 to prevent democracy from being sidelined by the rise of a dominant civilian party, the 
Democrat Party (Varol 2012). The AKP regime has “liberalized” politics and society – at least 
bringing freedom of religious expression to majority Sunni Muslims – through its propagation of 
conservative values (Heper 2005). The organization of the political system has taken many 
different configurations in Turkey, whose conceptualization is contested.  
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Turkish nationalism held a uniform mono-nationalist ideology until the early 2000s, 
when the AKP began the “Kurdish opening” (Kürt açılımı). In Turkey, international democracy 
promoters have taken little to no action in support of the Kurds’ self-determination struggle, but 
rather have given moderate amounts of aid to the Turkish government to promote democratic 
governance and reform. No “sticks” such as sanctions have been used against the Turkish state, 
which has had a moderate level of international aid for democratic governance and rule-of-law 
reform and high military support to fight the PKK. In Turkey, the political movement of the 
Kurds is highly organized and effective, and receives moderate support from civil society. The 
armed Kurdish movement, the PKK, was exiled to Iraq when its leader Abdulluah Öcalan was 
imprisoned. 
Iraq is a post-colonial, highly decentralized, federal parliamentary republic with a recent 
past of international intervention. Iraqi nationalism held a uniform mono-nationalist ideology 
until 1992. In Iraq, the first military intervention occurred in 1990-1, and was followed by 
economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990s. International democracy 
promoters performed a second extensive intervention from 2003 to 2011, and had a highly 
influential role in the promulgation of Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which reaffirmed the Kurdistan 
Regional Government’s autonomy. A high level of international aid was given to Iraq for 
democratic governance and rule of law reform, after extensive military interventions in 1990-1 
and from 2003 to 2011. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government established political 
autonomy in 1992, which was re-affirmed in 2005. Armed groups in Iraq include the PKK, 
Peshmerga, PUK, and PYD. 
Syria is a post-colonial, anti-imperialist, parliamentary single-party republic with ongoing 
civil conflict. Syrian nationalism held a uniform mono-nationalist ideology until 2011, when it 
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became a fragile state. In Syria, international democracy promoters are currently becoming more 
heavily involved in a humanitarian intervention, but are not involved in the negotiations over 
governance structure at all. Syria has had low aid for democratic governance and rule of law 
reform; it has been targeted with economic sanctions; and the political opposition in Syria is now 
funded and armed by external actors. In Syria, the political movement of Kurds has established 
the Autonomous Cantons of Rojava, but Kurdish political parties are banned by the Syrian state.  
They exist covertly, but are not highly organized. The armed groups include the YPG/J, and the 
PKK. 
The autonomy struggles of Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey provide an opportunity to 
compare the evolution of political opposition, self-determination movements, and commitment to 
constitutional democracy in self-determination struggles under the dynamics of Overt and Stealth 
constitutional authoritarianism. The Kurds are a group that was divided into states with similar 
historical antecedents but which evolved into very different nation-states. These initial conditions 
range from Turkey’s secular republican semi-authoritarianism, to Syria’s brutal dictatorship and 
civil war, to Iraq’s ruthless autocracy turned democratic federal republic created as a result of an 
international military intervention. Since the end of World War I, Kurds have been seeking self-
determination. Within the states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, the Kurdish self-determination 
movements have variance in their normative commitments to the higher laws of their political 
organizations. Each self-determination movement has declared constitutional preferences 
regarding their national identity, governing principles, and governance structure. 
Turkey was chosen as the empirical focus for Chapters 5, 6, and 7 for several reasons; 
first, scholars have found that authoritarian regimes with more linkages to the West, and where 
the West has more leverage, are more likely to fail, making Turkey a less likely case for the 
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survival of authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002; Krastev 2011, 11). Due to its geographical 
placement close to Europe and its historical relationship with the United States, the Ottoman 
Empire and Republic of Turkey have long been subject to Western influence. While it has 
democratized to an extent, Turkey maintains some elements of its semi-authoritarian foundation. 
Second, the Turkish regimes constituting the semi-authoritarian political system, over 
time, range over the “typologies” of authoritarianism characterized in the literature. Scholars 
initially problematized authoritarianism through type, for example, in the monarchy, the military 
ruler, the party machine, and the charismatic authority (Geddes 2003). Regimes are 
conceptualized as evolving systems of ties between political leaders, political support 
organizations, and interest groups in communication networks. Each is characterized by a 
“distinctive power base and structure for resolving internal conflict, controlling regime outsiders, 
and coordinating action” that also incorporates aligned and opposing interest groups in semi-
authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Law and Versteeg 2013; 
Levitsky and Way 2002; Ginsburg and Simpser 2013). 
A further defining characteristic of the regimes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, that 
makes them worthy of in-depth investigation, is the degree of grievance, or how the formal, 
written constitutional system differs from observations of constitutional commitments (Law and 
Versteeg 2013; Tushnet 2013). From development of the Ottoman Empire into the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic, the continuum of sham to weak constitutions is exemplified over time in 
the Republic of Turkey, and across regimes, in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Figure 1 below shows 
the percent change in levels of de jure constitutional clause indices coded from all constitutional 
documents from 1876 to present. Details about data sources and coding for this Figure are 
reported in Chapter 5 and 6. 





Figure 4. Change in De Jure Constitutional Clauses, 1876-Present 
 
As Turkey has shifted between dimensions of strength in its semi-authoritarian regimes at the 
time of constitution-making, each regime has modified the parchment constitution substantially, 
most notably in the Young Turk/Early Republican period that produced a weak constitution, the 
first military coup d’etat in 1960 that produced a sham constitution, and the military coup d’etat 
of 1980, which produced a sham constitution with a high level of rights that were severely 
limited. This dissertation builds a theory, based on complexity, of constitutionalism under semi-
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3.2.1 Heuristics and Hypotheses from QCA 
Chapters 5 and 6 model incumbent and opposition political leaders as de jure reformers that 
initiate, bargain, and conclude reforms of the parchment constitution. In Chapter IV, these 
leaders are embedded within Hierarchical and Opinion-Leader communication network 
structures. With Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), several analyses may be performed 
for several outcomes, using multiple steps, or a nested analysis. Chapter IV utilizes the QCA 
method on the conditions identified through the literature review for heuristic generation 
regarding constitution-writing processes under varieties of semi-authoritarian regime structures. 
The analyses are performed with the R package QCA (Dusa and Thiem 2014). Chapter V uses 
QCA to confirm the hypotheses generated using heuristics from Chapter IV, with data from 
1981-2011. 
Using QCA, each case in the analysis is represented as a combination of causal 
conditions and an outcome. The methodology is especially appropriate for cases in which 
different combinations of causal conditions may lead to the same outcome. Through set-theoretic 
evaluation algorithms, the combinations are then logically simplified. QCA was created for the 
purposes of set-theoretic analysis of medium-n cases to simplify causal pathways among 
complex linkages between dimensions not suitable for operationalization as variables in 
probabilistic analyses using stochastic methods. QCA utilizes Boolean minimization for 
“‘reduction’ of a long, complex expression into a shorter, more parsimonious expression” to 
identify causal pathways between variables among cases In QCA methodology, the terminology 
for this process is identification of the “prime implicant,” while cases that cannot be minimized 
into the simpler solution are known as the “logical remainder” (Rihoux and De Meur 2009). 
QCA is well-suited for this research as the original aims for QCA were “to summarize data; to 
  55 
check the coherence of the data with claims of subset relations; to overview quickly the basic 
assumptions of the analysis; and to develop new theoretical arguments” (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2010, 3–4). 
The QCA method has both strengths and limitations. QCA addresses many problems 
associated with complex, “thick” cases. QCA addresses issues like asymmetric causality, where 
the presence of a designated outcome does not imply that the absence of the conditions leads to 
the absence of the same designated outcome (Wagemann and Schneider 2010); multicollinearity, 
or issues that arise from interaction effects between variables (Skaaning 2011); and equifinality, 
or when different causal processes can lead to similar outcomes of a given dependent variable 
(Grofman and Schneider 2009).  However, QCA lacks consideration of probabilistic processes 
within cases and is more appropriately used within a multi-method analysis as a hypothesis-
generating tool rather than as one to empirically test hypotheses derived from the literature 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Chapters IV and V generate heuristics and hypotheses as that 
are assessed qualitatively and using different methods in subsequent chapters. 
Qualitative methodologists of this comparative method now differentiate between three 
strands of QCA: crisp-set QCA, fuzzy-set QCA, and multi-value QCA. In crisp-set or csQCA, 
conditions – similar to independent variables – were binomial: the case either “belonged” fully or 
it did not, similar to the on-off switch logic the method originated from (Rihoux and De Meur 
2009). QCA then evolved into analyzing fuzzy-sets, or fsQCA, where each dimension of each 
case could be calibrated according to a degree of belonging or not, evaluations made according 
to theoretically-driven choices made by the analyst (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Multi-
valent or multi-value QCA (mvQCA) was created to use the same procedure where each 
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dimension can have multiple values (Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2009; Thiem 2014). This 
research utilizes fsQCA. 
Chapter 5 includes data on major constitutional change episodes from 1876 to the 
present. The major conditions in the first fsQCA are: 1) regime consolidation, 2) network 
structures, 3) levels of repression, 4) de jure constitutionalism, and 5) processes of constitutional 
change. The data for regime types and processes of constitutional change were collected from 
historical and historiographical secondary sources on the regimes in power before, at the time of, 
and after major constitutional change episodes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Regimes, 
network structure heuristics, and processes were coded according to variables identified in the 
literature in the next chapter and in Chapter IV (Svolik 2012; Young 2002; Siegel 2009; Siegel 
2011; Wright, Honaker, and Geddes 2014). The data on de jure constitutionalism was obtained in 
large part from the Comparative Constitutions Project and supplemented where necessary 
(Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2011). It was coded according to nearly 250 codes of de jure 
constitutionalism according to Versteeg’s codebook of constitutional rights and freedoms, 
policies, and provisions (Law and Versteeg 2013).   
The conditions for Chapter 6 are: 1) regime consolidation, 2) international democracy 
promotion (from aiddata.org), 3) repression, and 4) the gap between observed de facto levels of 
constitutional rights (from CIRI dataset) and de jure constitutional rights. The enactment of the 
Overt and Stealth dynamics depends on international democracy promotion, assessed in the 
second fsQCA and coded as targeted assistance for international democracy promotion aid for 
democratic governance reform. The qualitative case descriptions assess the enactment of either 
overt constitutionalism or stealth constitutionalism through the exercise of civil liberties; 
exercise of free but nor fair elections; and exercise of excessive selective enforcement of the law. 
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Repression of dissent and the use of extrajudicial tactics are coded as repression and also as de 
facto observation of constitutional clauses in the model. The nature of the reform process, in 
utilizing legal but non-democratic constitutional reforms in secretive and exclusive processes, or 
legal but non-democratic constitutional reforms in transparent, semi-inclusive processes with 
some public communication, is addressed in the condition for reform process and negotiations. 
3.2.2 Topic Modeling of Public Communication 
Chapter 7 I also analyzes in depth the contemporary constitutional change process in Turkey 
under the AKP to understand how the semi-authoritarian leaders control public communication 
over constitutional reform. Chapter VI analyzes interest groups and the public, in their 
relationship with political leaders in a regime-sanctioned process of public communication over 
constitutional change in a stealth authoritarian constitutional setting. In this chapter, a central 
group of integrated interest groups, in cooperation with the Constitutional Reconciliation 
Commission created by the AKP regime, engaged in a large effort to collect public opinions and 
control limited public communication about the constitutional reform. Through control of 
information in a network that is prone to persuasion and cooptation through intermediaries, this 
Chapter assesses how incumbents may repress dissent through targeting collective action, using 
control over the exchange of information between policymakers, citizens, and between citizens, 
and other legal means; and how public participation may be channeled through polarized 
networks and distorted and controlled information media to give civil society and the public 
voice with no uptake into the process. 
Public communication can be summarized through topic modeling, but communicative 
acts can best be understood through the ontology of social constructivism and the interpretation 
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of performative word acts and their evidence of linguistic struggle for power in politics.  I draw 
on analytic techniques including everyday language acts as struggles in the language field by 
Bourdieu to derive the meaning of the communication, within the chapter, Wittgensteinian 
ordinary language use analysis, and Foucauldian analysis of power and possibility is touched 
upon in the conclusion chapter (Wittgenstein 1958; Foucault 1994; Hanks 2005; J. Everett 2002). 
From consolidated democracies to dictatorships, sources of political content are growing 
worldwide. The digitization of standard media sources such as newspapers, and the birth of new 
forms of digital political content such as blogs and tweets, contributes to this growing content. 
Countries that fall in between, in non-consolidated democracies or limited authoritarian 
countries, with some form of “democratization process,” have growing sources particular to their 
political state as well, due to their need to show progression toward democracy. In these 
countries, participatory political events generate content in the form of polls, surveys, minutes 
from focus groups, meetings and assemblies, and organizational statements or policy proposals. 
The digital outputs are generally available freely as part of the publicity component of the 
democratization campaigns.  
The global explosion of new sources of political data has been met by the “rapid 
development of new statistical tools for meeting the challenges of analyzing ‘big data’,” and 
rigorous scholarly review of these new techniques for automated text analysis (M. E. Roberts, 
Stewart, and Tingley 2015; Grimmer and Stewart 2013). These bodies of text are so large, they 
presented challenges for pre-existing methods designed for textual analysis, such as analogue 
content analysis, thematic analysis, semiotics, or intertextualism – which can also be used in 
conjunction with these new techniques. Reviewers of the new methods call these “manual coding 
and scalability issues” (Chuang et al. 2015). The large size of the corpora makes simply reading 
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the documents impossible. Size also makes thematic analysis without machine assistance an 
inefficient methodological choice that creates challenges to validity, due to the heavy burden on 
one researcher, and reliability issues as well, due to the difficulty inherent in replication of 
analogue analyses (Chuang et al. 2015). Fortunately, interdisciplinary teams are rapidly 
developing new methodologies, while also addressing their limitations, to enable social scientists 
to gain knowledge in an appropriate timeframe from the outputs created by these processes (M. 
E. Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2015). 
New text analysis methods based on machine learning and natural language processing, 
such as topic modeling, have an additional advantage in reducing researcher bias (Lucas et al. 
2013). Scholars avoid the preliminary application of their own cognitive schema or predefined 
frameworks on these texts. Unsupervised techniques of machine learning allow the texts to first 
“speak for themselves” before analysts apply knowledge to the results. The possibility of 
replicating the coding and modeling enhances both validity and reliability, as researchers can 
rerun the coding and the modeling. Moreover, the interpretation of the analysis, since it is post 
hoc, is more transparent. However, researchers must exercise caution about the use of these tools 
without a real understanding of their limitations (Chuang et al. 2015). As Chuang, et al., argue, 
the 
“… true strength of computer-assisted content analysis should be enabling users to explore multiple 
subjective interpretations about their source documents. In order to support real-world deployment of and 
engage users in human-in-the-loop machine learning, we must first establish users’ trust in the techniques.” 
 
The limitations, as mentioned above, include the quality of computer-assisted coding, coding 
reliability to identify key factors that contribute to model variations, and understanding model 
sensitivity and model design, including intra-model sensitivity, pre-processing of text corpora, 
post-processing of topic models, auxiliary measures, and model designs (Chuang et al. 2015). 
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The dataset for this chapter was obtained from a group of interest organizations, both 
regime-affiliated and regime-opposed, that performed a large-scale, nation-wide public 
communication process in thirteen cities across Turkey in 2012. These data included a large 
survey with both closed- and open-ended responses, the latter in focus group format. The 
analysis is also supplemented with data from newspaper articles, think tank reports, and semi-
structured interviews performed or collected across Turkey from 2011 to 2014. 
3.2.3 Comparative Analysis of Evolution of Opposition 
Chapter 8 uses the method of structured, focused, comparison within the complex adaptive 
systems of systems framework to examine the constitutionalism and the struggle for self-
determination by Kurdish groups within semi-authoritarian environments in Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq. This chapter addresses the interaction among external actors promoting democracy, 
regimes, and political opposition, using the case of Kurdish self-determination movements, or 
citizens or interest groups that have mobilized within the larger constitutional environment, to 
use constitutional tools of their evolution as political opposition.  According to George and 
Bennett, structured focused comparison involves three research phases: the formulation of the 
objectives, design and structure of the research; the implementation of the case studies in 
accordance with their design, and assessing the findings of the case studies for their contribution 
in achieving the research objective (George and Bennett 2005). I assess the following nested 
actions situations of Kurdish self-determination movements in Iraq, Syria and Turkey by groups 
of Kurdish citizens according to the following conditions for comparison. 
Turkey is a case of semi-authoritarian constitutionalism with no action by international 
democracy promoters in support of the autonomy of the Kurds. The armed struggle for autonomy 
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in Turkey has ebbed and flowed since the early 1900s, from brutal response by the Turkish 
government to the Rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925, to the rise of the PKK in the 1970s-1990s 
and the growth of political support for the Kurds throughout the 2000s, though the civil conflict 
between the Turkish regime and the Kurds continues. Currently, the political organization of the 
Kurds in Turkey does not seek autonomy, and not only just recognition of their minority rights 
and adequate political representation, but a broadened democratic agenda for all Turkish citizens. 
Iraq is a case of semi-authoritarian constitutionalism with international democracy 
promoters performing an extensive and ongoing intervention in the country that was responsible 
for the promulgation of Iraq’s constitution. The Kurds in Iraq have had autonomy for decades, 
after an international intervention contained and then dissolved Saddam Hussein’s regime. The 
Kurdistan Regional Government has been drafting and negotiating its own constitution since its 
recognition as an autonomous region under a federal structure. Due to ongoing violence in the 
region, the struggle has been, and is still, armed. The KRG seeks more autonomy in their 
constitution than is granted to them by the current constitution of the Iraqi state. 
Syria is a case of constitutional semi-authoritarianism with international democracy 
promoters performing a limited humanitarian intervention and self-determination struggle with 
radical democracy in the Northern Region of Rojava, which includes not just Kurds, but other 
minority groups as well. The struggle for autonomy is armed, but constitutionally, the group does 
not seek separation from the Syrian state, but rather a recognition of their constitutional rights 
under the structure already granted to them in the existing Syrian Constitution. 
Data for the chapter on Kurds’ struggles for autonomy in Turkey and Syria were 
collected from semi-structured interviews with diplomatic officials for the Kurdish party in 
Turkey, the autonomous region of Syria, called Rojava, in Washington, DC. The data for the de 
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jure constitutional environments of the official Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian governments was 
collected from the Comparative Constitutions Project and the Cingranelli-Richards Human 
Rights dataset (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2011; David L. Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 
2015). Finally, the data on cooperation for the network visualization between Kurdish groups 
comes from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Project (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dyadic dataset 
(UCDP 2015); UCDP External Support to Armed Actors dataset (UCDP 2011); Minorities At 
Risk Org Behavior dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); and the Self-Determination 
Movements Organizational Behavior dataset (Cunningham 2014). 
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4.0  A MODEL OF SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE 
Chapter 4 builds an explicit theoretical framework using the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. Rules, norms and shared strategies delineate the actions taken to 
develop two action situations of authoritarianism under the influences of democratization. The 
Chapter then, assuming emergent adaptive preferences, develops an implicit CASoS model of 
semi-authoritarian resilience. The CASoS framework is used to model the interaction between 
semi-authoritarian regimes and their challenges from above, from within, and from below, over 
time, to generate semi-authoritarian resilience. Under the positive and negative influences of 
democratization, regimes, opposition, and external democracy promoters create an incentive for 
those with commitment to deeper democratic norms to form and cooperate transnationally in 
self-determination groups. 
4.1 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT SYNTAX 
The actors and roles in semi-authoritarian constitutionalism take place in an international system 
of democracy promotion (IDP). In this theory, political systems are composed of actors, 
including: political leaders who become incumbent or opposition leaders, and political 
organizations. Political organizations may include kinship networks, military hierarchies, and 
party apparatuses, and can also be integrated with interest groups, which may include civil 
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society organizations, political parties, other organized interests, and the public, or citizens. 
These groups, when they are polarized, and when they overcome barriers to collective action, 
may evolve into a group seeking autonomy from the existing constitutional environment, or a 
self-determination movement. 
4.1.1 Actors, Roles, Actions, and Resources 
Within the IDP action arena, semi-authoritarian constitutionalism is split into the two variants 
defined in Chapter II. These variants are modeled as action situations: Overt Constitutional 
Authoritarianism (OCA) and Stealth Constitutional Authoritarianism (SCA). The latter Stealth 
action situation includes a process in which political leaders achieve a minimum of democratic 
norms and rule-of-law standards within the IDP action arena, to prevent consequences, while the 
Overt authoritarian arena, the political leaders sufficiently violate these norms and standards. 
Both action situations also embed the process in which dissent evolves into mobilization in 
struggles for autonomy or self-determination (O-SDM and S-SDM). The actors, roles, actions 
and resources are described below. The next section defines the actors, roles, and actions in these 
action situations. 
4.1.1.1 International Democracy Promotion Influences 
International democracy promotion occurs through international organizations, 
international financial institutions, and foreign investors, or supranational organizations, such as 
the United Nations, and the European Union, with a commitment to democratic 
constitutionalism, but with limited information regarding the incumbents’ behavior. International 
democracy promoters must have sufficient information regarding the leaders’ actions of a semi-
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authoritarian political system to take action. Political leaders’ actions also have to pass a 
threshold of violating rule-of-law standards and democratic norms for the action situation to be 
initiated. The overall aim within the IDP action arena is the promotion and monitoring of 
constitutional democracy in participating polities. If IDP actors obtain enough information that 
political leaders are violating the standards of constitutional democracy, the overt constitutional 
authoritarianism (OCA) action situation is initiated, and the polity may face consequences: 
having its membership revoked, the imposition of economic or political sanctions, loss of 
financial aid, loans, or capital, or a humanitarian military intervention. If requirements for IDP 
are met to a high enough degree to avoid consequences, the stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism (SCA) action situation is initiated. The OCA action situation is initiated when 
there is violent repression of dissent to maintain order, or frequent use of extrajudicial tactics to 
hold on to power in the IDP action arena, which allows for the possibility that IDP actors may 
enforce consequences, but do not necessarily do so. The SCA action situation is initiated when 
standards are met and violations are not severe enough to draw consequences within the wider 
IDP action arena; therefore, IDP actors may not enforce consequences. 
 Within both action situations, the self-determination movement (SDM) action situations 
are initiated when opposition overcomes barriers to collective action in seeking autonomy, under 
the Overt (abbreviated as O-SDM) and the Stealth (abbreviated as S-SDM) action arenas. In the 
S-SDM and O-SDM embedded action situation, incumbents MAY take up arms against the 
groups starting civil conflict in the name of “fighting terrorism.” Second, incumbents MAY be 
held to account for their existing de jure constitutional rules supporting civil liberties and 
political freedoms. Third, public dissent MUST increase and opposition MAY become more 
vocally less supportive of the regime. Finally, groups MAY take up arms against the regime but 
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under the S-SDM action situation they will do this WITHOUT external support from 
international democracy promoters, while under the O-SDM action situation, actors from IDP 
organizations may come to the aid of opposition, clearly showing the disadvantage that IDP 
gives to political opposition under the conditions of stealth authoritarian constitutionalism. 
4.1.1.2 Political Leaders and Political Support Organizations 
Political leaders’ organizations can engage in “repression” or “support” of the opposition, 
“dissent” or “protest” (organized dissent), or “inaction.” Political support organizations, being 
the agents for the principal – political leaders, in a principal-agent relationship – can facilitate the 
“control and exchange of information” up and down the levels in the network. The resources 
available to and within political leaders’ organizations are: 1) motivation, which has two 
characteristics, the degree of uniformity, and level; 2) agency, or acting on behalf of political 
leaders (whether they are correct in identifying leaders’ desires or not; 3) information control 
throughout the network, which is more prone to domination or persuasion strategies; and 4) 
arms, whether the organization is the incumbent-aligned and armed forces are aligned with it, or 
if the organization is opposition-aligned and has taken up arms. 
Political leaders’ overall aim, in the model, is to gain office, and in semi-authoritarian 
systems, to hold onto power. Political leaders run for office or are elected into office, or are the 
leaders or majority or minority political parties. If parties are not allowed, then they are the 
leaders of opposition groups. This research identifies both an “overt” and a “stealth” strategy for 
incumbent and opposition political leaders. Political leaders under Overt or Stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism may take the role of “incumbent” through winning a majority of votes in an 
election, though those elections may be free, they may not necessarily be fair. Incumbency 
provides elites and their affiliated organizations with the resources of public office, including 
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public contracts, public sector jobs and public funds. Incumbents, regardless of their 
organizational type – have, in general, the most dominant share of control over the use of force. 
Incumbents in authoritarian regimes also usually have a higher degree of control over the media 
and the flow and accuracy of information.  
Incumbents have the intrinsic capability to apply excessive legal discretion, whether 
unilaterally, or through subordinates or agents. The concept of discretion used stems from the 
legal scholar H.L.A. Hart’s conceptualization utilized by comparative constitutional scholars to 
identify stealth autocrats’ strategies: it is a “just” tactic used for “unjust” purposes. Hart defines 
discretion as a “choice to be made…which is not determined by principles which may be 
formulated beforehand” (p. 652, 661). Shaw writes “Hart argued that discretion is a special mode 
of reasoned, constrained decision making that occupies a middle ground between arbitrary 
choice and determinate rule application… [which] soundly exercised, provides a principles way 
of coping with legal indeterminacy that is fully consistent with the rule of law” (p.666). 
However, selectively-enforced, it is consistent with the rule-of-law but not the principles of 
democracy or constitutionalism (Varol 2014). Discretion is found in all legal systems, including 
those in democracies, but has taken on a new function in contemporary “stealth” authoritarian 
regimes because of the values it maintains or prevents. “Opposition” leaders take their role when 
they do not win elections or are not allowed to run. 
In the Overt and Stealth action situations, political leaders within political support 
organizations gain office, lose office, or seize power; coopt or tolerate opposition; encourage or 
discourage political participation; control or distort information; and repress or tolerate dissent, 
and reform de jure constitutions. Within both the Overt and Stealth action arenas, political 
leaders choose to enact constitutional change processes, including their negotiations and 
  68 
concessions over policy changes, and their engagement of society in these processes through 
participation in deliberation, bargaining, and approval of formal constitutional changes, or their 
domination and control of the process through exclusivity and secrecy. Constitutional reform 
under stealth conditions allows incumbents to marginalize, weaken, or coopt the political 
opposition, solicit and maintain public support, claim legitimacy in the domestic and 
international spheres, and, ultimately employ social control, domination, or coercion within their 
societies to hold onto power, without the possibility of consequences from IDP actors. 
Incumbent political leaders can “initiate or conclude” de jure constitutional reform processes, in 
which the incumbents and opposition political leaders both enact policy change or receive policy 
concessions. Political leaders take these positions through negotiation and bargaining of policy 
proposals in the reform process, in which they may solicit cooperation from civil society and the 
public. Opposition political leaders may also boycott participation overall. The resources 
available for political leaders are: 1) public office and its resources; 2) public arms or the ability 
to direct the armed forces unless there is a military coup d’état; 3) organizational support; and 4) 
control of information and the media, through persuasion or domination. 
4.1.1.3 Opposition Groups and Self-Determination Movements 
For other interest groups and the public, interest groups are organizations that may be 
aligned with incumbent, or aligned with the opposition. Citizens engage in politics through 
existing organizational structures in civil society that may determine the development of 
democratic political participation depending on their relationship to the government. Research 
has shown that it is naïve to expect that organizations working as appendices to governments in 
authoritarian systems can effectively enact social change in the context of these altered state-
society relations (Jamal 2007). Civil society under authoritarian conditions generally becomes 
  69 
polarized and specific network mechanisms take place that marginalize the opposition and 
centralize the incumbents’ support. 
Interest groups may become more centralized, or more marginalized in the network, 
according to Jamal’s theory and Özler and Sarkissian’s evidence from Turkey (Jamal 2007; 
Sarkissian and Özler 2013; Sarkissian and Özler 2013). The organizations can engage in 
participation or deliberation processes, or they can seek autonomy. Depending on the presence of 
elites in the network structure, there may be rabble-rousers or wet blankets that create 
mobilization despite low motivation, or prevent mobilization despite high motivation. 
The resources available to civil society organizations are: 1) level of motivation; 2) 
exposure to repression; 3) regime-alignment, 4) ideological congruence, and 5) arms. Interest 
groups or the public may take the positions of “political participant, dissenter/ protestor, inaction/ 
mobilization, or autonomy-seeker” largely in response to the level and technology of repression 
and their regime-alignment. Citizens take these positions through protest, through engaging in 
the surveys or public opinion gathering in the process, through approving a referendum, or 
voting a leader into office or out of office, or through inaction. The resources available to 
citizens are: 1) votes, and 2) motivation. 
Self-determination movements are organizations that have overcome barriers to 
collective action to seek self-determination within an authoritarian regime. Their characteristics 
are an aim for self-organized constitutionalism, or political struggle for autonomy, or armed 
struggle for autonomy. They may take the roles and actions of peaceful resistance, political 
autonomy struggle, or armed autonomy struggle. The resources available to them are: 1) 
motivation; 2) collective action; 3) external support, or 4) arms.  
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4.1.2 Overt Constitutional Action Situation 
Within the IDP action arena, with the embedded Overt Constitutional Authoritarianism (OCA) 
and Overt with Self-Determination Movement (O-SDM) action situations, there are the 
following rules and norms. The following actions are institutions with consequences or rules. 
First, incumbents MUST conform with legal procedure, or face increased dissent. Second, 
incumbent MUST employ extrajudicial tactics to hold on to power, or face increased dissent. 
Third, incumbents MUST reform constitutions according to “whim” but following legal 
procedure, or face increased dissent. I use “whim” as shorthand for excessive selective 
enforcement of the law that abides to legal procedural requirements. Finally, reform process 
negotiations MUST be secret and exclusive, or incumbents will face increased dissent. Within 
the action situation of Self-Determination Movement, groups MUST overcome barriers to 
collective action in the struggle for autonomy, or become dissenters. 
The following are institutions without explicit consequences, or norms. Incumbents MAY 
violently repress dissent to maintain order. International democracy promoters MAY remove 
memberships, impose sanctions, withdraw investment, or have a humanitarian intervention. In 
the Self-Determination Movement action situation, groups MAY take up arms against the regime 
WITH external support of international democracy promoters. Incumbents MAY take up arms 
against the group starting civil conflict, and finally incumbents MAY be held to account for 
existing de jure constitutional rules. In order, the implications of the IDP action arena with 
embedded OCA and O-SDM action situations: 
 
 Implication OCA-1: Incumbents MUST conform with procedural requirements and 
implement decisions through appropriate agencies (“rule-by-law” constitutionalism); 
 Implication OCA-2: Dissent MAY BE violently repressed to “maintain order” 
(domination); 
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 Implication OCA-3: Extrajudicial tactics MUST BE used frequently to hold on to power 
(domination); 
 Implication OCA-3A (IDP): International democracy promoters MAY remove the 
country from membership, impose sanctions, withdraw investment, or intervene 
militarily; and 
 Implication OCA-4 and 4A: Constitutions may be amended or rewritten according to 




Observable implications of O-SDM action situation is: 
 
 Implication OCA-1 through OCA-4A; and 
 Implication O-SDM-1 and 2: Groups MUST overcome barriers to collective action in 
struggle for autonomy, and may or may not take up arms against the regime with external 
support or international intervention; 
 Implication O-SDM-3: Incumbents MAY take up arms against the group, starting civil 
conflict; 
 Implication O-SDM-4: Incumbents MAY be held to account for their existing de jure 
constitutional rules supporting civil liberties and political freedoms. 
4.1.3 Stealth Constitutional Action Situation 
In the IDP action arena with the embedded action situations of Stealth Constitutional 
Authoritarianism (SCA) and Stealth with Self-Determination Movement (S-SDM), actors have 
the following rules and norms for action. The Stealth action situation is embedded within the IDP 
action arena and comes into play after incumbents conform to legal procedures with a moderate 
commitment to normative constitutionalism, and protect of civil liberties at an intermediate level 
with free, but not fair, elections. The following actions are institutions with consequences or 
rules. Incumbents MUST conform with legal procedure with a moderate commitment to 
normative democratic constitutionalism, or face increased political opposition. Incumbents 
MUST protect civil liberties generally and MUST hold elections that are free but not necessarily 
fair, or face increased political opposition, dissent, and/or protest. Incumbents or their agents 
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MUST exercise “whim” to consolidate power, sideline opposition, and maintain legitimacy, or 
incumbents will face increased political opposition, dissent, and/or protest. Incumbents MUST 
reform constitutions according to “whim” but following legal procedural requirements, and 
reform processes MUST be semi-transparent, semi-inclusive, or have controlled deliberation, or 
incumbents will face increased political opposition, dissent, and/or protest. In the Self-
Determination action situation, groups MUST overcome barriers to collective action in their 
struggle for autonomy (mobilization), or become dissenters. 
The following are institutions without explicit consequences, or norms. Incumbents MAY 
repress dissent through targeting collective action in which they MUST use legal means, or face 
increased dissent or protest. Third, public participation MAY be channeled through polarized 
networks and using distorted/ controlled information media WITHOUT uptake into the 
policymaking process, or incumbents will face increased political opposition, dissent, and/or 
protest. The S-SDM action situation is initiated when groups overcome barriers to collective 
action, and there is repression of dissent and controlled political participation, or the inaction of 
international democracy promoters due to an intermediate level of civil liberties being upheld 
and free but not fair elections being held.  
In the international democracy promotion action arena with embedded stealth 
authoritarian constitutionalism and self-determination movement action situations, are more 
easily maintained by political leaders through following the strategies of persuasion and 
cooptation: 
 
 Implication SCA-1: Incumbents MUST conform with procedural requirements and 
implement decisions through appropriate agencies with a moderate commitment to 
normative constitutionalism, to meet opposition, public dissatisfaction, and international 
democracy requirements (cooptation); 
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 Implication SCA-1A: Incumbents MAY repress dissent through targeting collective 
action, using control over the exchange of information between policymakers, citizens, 
and between citizens, and other legal means (persuasion or cooptation); 
 Implication SCA-1B: Public participation MAY BE channeled through polarized 
networks and distorted and controlled information media to give civil society and the 
public voice with no uptake into the process (persuasion or cooptation); 
 Implication SCA-2: Civil liberties MUST BE protected at least periodically, and 
elections are generally free but not necessarily fair (cooptation); 
 Implication SCA-2A (IDP): International democracy promoters MAY NOT remove the 
country from membership, impose sanctions, withdraw investment, or intervene 
militarily; as enough constitutional democratic requirements are met; 
 Implication SCA-3: Incumbents or their agents MUST exercise excessive selective 
enforcement of the law by relying on legal discretion and use it to consolidate power, 
sideline opposition, and to maintain legitimacy (persuasion or cooptation); and  
 Implication SCA-3A and 3B: Constitutions MUST BE according to leaders’ whims but 
following procedural requirements in processes that are somewhat transparent, semi-
inclusive and have controlled deliberation (persuasion or cooptation). 
 
 
Observable implications of stealth authoritarian constitutionalism with self-determination 
movements are: 
 
 Implications SCA-1 through SCA-3B; and 
 Implication S-SDM-1: Public dissent MUST increase and opposition policymakers 
MAY become less supportive of regime; 
 Implication S-SDM-2 and 3: Groups MUST overcome barriers to collective action in 
struggle for autonomy; and MAY take up arms against the regime WITHOUT external 
support or international intervention; 
 Implication S-SDM-4: Incumbents MAY take up arms against the group starting civil 
conflict in the name of “fighting terror”  
 Implication S-SDM-5: Incumbents MAY be held to account for their existing de jure 
constitutional rules supporting civil liberties and political freedoms. 
 
4.2 INFERRING A MODEL OF SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE 
Based on the above institutional syntax, the theory of semi-authoritarian constitutionalism 
delineated above, operationalized as a multi-level system, across iterations over time, produces 
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the following complex adaptive system of systems model of semi-authoritarian resilience under 
the influence of international democracy promotion. Scott and Page write: “Complexity arises 
when the dependencies among the elements become important … removing one such element 
destroys system behavior to an extent that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular 
element that is removed,” (2007, 9). Each actor in the system is mutually influential on the 
others, who can learn or change. Removal of any of them may change the properties of the entire 
system in an essential way. The CASoS actors’ adaptive preferences over time create transitions 
between different system dynamics. These dynamics, when applied to semi-authoritarian 
resilience under international democratization influences, evolve into cyclical transitions from 
overt constitutional authoritarianism with a weak constitution, to overt constitutional 
authoritarianism with a sham constitution, to stealth constitutional authoritarianism.  
This model shows the emergent outcomes of a complex system of systems of 
international democracy promotion, national constitutional change, and self-determination 
movements. Under overt constitutional authoritarianism, initially, influence by external actors 
strengthens the position of political opposition. Democratization theorists anticipated this 
strengthening of political opposition and the impact it had on semi-authoritarian regime 
strategies. First, a more powerful opposition makes the costs of suppression exceed the costs 
toleration of opposition for the authoritarian regime (Dahl 1971). Authoritarian regimes are also 
more threatened by the successful collective action of opposition than they are by their own loss 
of legitimacy (Przeworski 1992). Finally, the benefits the opposition receives from external 
actors makes enduring repression worthwhile, and repression becomes more costly than 
tolerance for the authoritarian regime, making power-sharing arrangements more attractive to the 
authoritarian regime (Yilmaz 2002).  
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Yet despite strengthening political opposition relative to the regime over time, repeated 
interactions yield political opposition, which prefers moderate democratic reforms to revolution 
and full constitutional democracy. Overt autocratic rule also makes the regime prefer moderate 
reforms, because of the regime’s risk of complete revolution and overthrow. This accounts for 
the increasing attractiveness of power-sharing and/or tolerance of political opposition by the 
authoritarian regime (Thiel 2010). The more frequent interactions are, the more the regime will 
prefer a more immediate resolution that values power-sharing with the opposition over 
repression, and the sooner the regime will reform. International actors also value more highly a 
stable but protracted transition, than an “uncertain, radical outcome which could plummet the 
country into chaos or into an extended period of instability” (2010). In the “democracy 
promotion dilemma,” the political opposition and the external actors promoting democracy avoid 
radical demands and are satisfied with a lesser degree of reform, setting the stage for SCA. 
External actors transitively value the preservation of the state over the implementation of 
institutions or processes that express the inherent values of constitutional democracy. The 
domestic and international actors begin to value more highly immediate partial reforms toward 
democratization.  
Some democratization theories make the assumption that external actors have full 
information regarding the regimes’ aggregate activities. If regime activities are disaggregated 
into de jure legal reforms and maneuvers, and de facto observations of rights and freedoms, 
external actors receive partial information about regimes’ activities that allows them to abide by 
rule-of-law and democracy standards while simultaneously using repression when necessary to 
destabilize politics and weaken the political opposition. At times, regimes must also increase 
these observations of those de jure reforms. SCA regimes abide by the rule-of-law and 
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democracy but act against the spirit of democracy by demonstrating a moderate commitment to 
the norms of constitutional democracy that may be violated at their whim or discretion (Tushnet 
2013). Overcoming the barriers to collective action then becomes more difficult for political 
opposition as the costs of dissent and opposition rise while democracy promoters support 
regimes rather than opposition despite semi-authoritarian behavior. Consequently, an alternate 
dynamic, Stealth Constitutional Authoritarianism (SCA), emerges with different incentives for 
establishing self-determination movements. 
Modeling this situation as a complex adaptive system of systems explains the emergence 
of stealth constitutional authoritarianism and of self-determination movements despite 
constraints to mobilization. Under the stealth dynamic, external actors’ pressure for 
democratization has confounding effects on political opposition, as the semi-authoritarian regime 
maintains a legal and normative position that allows it to avoid sanctions and still reap the 
benefits provided by the international democracy promotion program. Political opposition is 
disadvantaged, increasing their incentive to establish a movement for self-determination. SCA 
emerges from iterations of the OCA variants, in which interactions on multiple levels over time 
create a more robust semi-authoritarianism that can shift phases.  
Over time, in repeated iterations of overt authoritarianism with weak or sham 
constitutions, democracy promoters challenge the authoritarian regime with sanctions and 
punishments, while strengthening the political opposition through channeling support and 
rewards to them, thereby increasing the costs of repression for the authoritarian regime. 
Conversely, under SCA, the regime maintains IDP “carrots,” which disadvantages the 
opposition, increasing the incentive to establish a cross-border self-determination movement 
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with groups in countries that exist under overt authoritarianism, because those SDMs benefit 
from the governments in those countries being subject to IDP’s “sticks.” 
In essence, the CASoS is a non-equilibrium state of phase-shifts between OCA and SCA 
in which the dominant preference is a moderate commitment to constitutional democracy, rather 
than an overthrow of the state with a full commitment to the norms of constitutional democracy. 
Due to the repeated reforms it makes as concessions to external actors and opposition, semi-
authoritarian regimes become more resilient, or able to adapt to perturbations in the system. On 
one hand, adaptive preferences for more immediate limited reform toward democratization, 
rather than an uncertain, but full, democratization at some time in the unknown future, emerge as 
the status quo outcome. To overcome the “wet blanket” effect that the relationship between 
grievance and repression has on mobilization under stealth semi-authoritarian regimes, there is a 
greater incentive to seek self-determination through cross-border alliances with groups in other 
authoritarian regimes. By understanding these dynamics as a complex adaptive system of 
systems, the model generates an explanation for the mobilization of self-determination 
movements “against all odds” that overcome what should be insurmountable barriers to 
collective action. 
4.2.1  CASoS of Semi-Authoritarian Resilience 
The complex adaptive system of systems model of self-determination movements under 
constitutional semi-authoritarian dynamics has three major components. The components are, 
first, the influence of international democracy promotion that can enact either positive influence 
“carrots” or negative influence “sticks”. Second, the government or semi-authoritarian regime, is 
subject to the influence of IDP, and can make reforms, observe rights, or repress public 
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expression, while the political opposition can dissent, mobilize, or create a self-determination 
movement (SDM). The SDM is the third major component. The model has Overt and Stealth 
constitutional semi-authoritarian dynamics within a complex adaptive system of constitutional 
authoritarianism influenced by international democracy promotion.  
The impact of the external actors under OCA or SCA gives different incentives to the 
political opposition to form a self-determination movement for self-governance or democratic 
constitutionalism, while simultaneously accepting the partial reforms toward democracy in a 
power-sharing agreement with the regime, extending the longevity of the semi-authoritarian 
nation-state, while simultaneously increasing incentives for cross-border self-determination 
movements. Self-determination movements can be peacefully resistant, engage in political 
struggle for autonomy, or engage in armed struggle for autonomy. Under the Overt dynamic, 
groups must overcome barriers to collective action in their movement for self-determination, and 
may or may not take up arms against the regime with external support or international 
intervention. Incumbents may take up arms against the group, starting civil conflict. Incumbents 
may be held to account for their existing de jure constitutional rules supporting civil liberties and 
political freedoms. Under the SCA dynamic, public dissent increases and opposition 
policymakers may become less supportive of regime. Groups must overcome barriers to 
collective action in their movement for self-determination, and may take up arms against the 
regime without external support or international intervention, and the regime may receive aid to 
fight the group. Incumbents may take up arms against the group starting civil conflict in the 
name of “fighting terror.” Finally, incumbents may be held to account for their existing de jure 
constitutional rules supporting civil liberties and political freedoms. Figure 5 below shows the 
actors and components in the CASoS model. 





Figure 5. Actors and Components in the CASoS Model 
 
4.2.2 Overt and Stealth Authoritarian System Dynamics 
In Overt constitutional authoritarianism, leaders generally abide by the principle of “rule by law” 
rather than “rule of law” (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). Leaders may face increased public 
dissatisfaction, but, because they cannot obtain assurances that they would not suffer losses if 
they lost power, they utilize strategies to consolidate their power in order to hold onto it. Overt 
authoritarianism stems from leaders taking these actions without commitment to the international 
standards of democracy, despite the criticism or dissent of domestic political leaders, citizens, or 
international organizations or foreign countries, affirming their commitment to constitutional 
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norms, if one exists, is a “sham;” otherwise, they hold “weak” commitments. Overt authoritarian 
leaders differ from stealth authoritarian leaders in that their tactics are blatant, yet masked under 
a democratic façade. Often their tactics are justified by referring to opposition as terrorism or by 
claiming the right to sovereign action within their borders. Yet many of these regimes – 
including those as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia – have constitutions that claim a differing degree 
of rights. 
Under the first dynamic, OCA, if groups overcome barriers to collective action to work 
toward self-determination, they may take up armed struggle against the existing regime and be 
supported by international democracy advocates, human rights defenders, or supranational, 
regional, or coalition-based military forces in a possible humanitarian intervention. In this case, 
the regime may organize an armed response to the opposition and/or to the intervention, further 
increasing the costs of repression of the opposition rather than tolerance. While international 
democracy promoters’ (IDP) overall aim is to promote constitutional democracy through 
persuasion, they also have “sticks,” or sanction-type actions to use against non-abiding regimes. 
These sanctions are activated in OCA regimes that blatantly violate standards of constitutional 
democracy, and include removing the country from membership in international organizations or 
economic institutions, the imposition of economic or political sanctions, the withdrawal of 
foreign investment, or military intervention.  
In Stealth constitutional authoritarianism, the regime’s potential for longevity is 
increased, in legal, seemingly democratically legitimate ways. In this outcome, authoritarian 
policymakers utilize existing legal strategies, or create new ones, to consolidate their power. The 
leaders utilize constitutional reforms as policy compromises to the opposition, and the public.  
SCA political leaders use reform processes to consolidate power through coordination of 
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governance organizations, cooptation of opposition, and control or distortion of information 
among civil society and the public.1 Coordination and cooptation sidelines opposition, solicits 
popular support, and strengthens operating procedures for efficient governance. Dissent is not 
simply discouraged; it may be manipulated in order to increase the impenetrability of the regime. 
Dissent may be violently repressed to “maintain order” but not to an extent high enough to draw 
international condemnation. 
Under the second dynamic, SCA, the major difference is groups acting for self-
determination will not receive any kind of support from external actors promoting democracy. 
Rather, the regime receives support due to its rhetoric and de jure legal and constitutional 
reforms supporting human rights and political freedoms. If opposition takes up arms against the 
SCA regime, the regime may respond militarily in the name of domestic stability, public order, 
or fighting internal terror. However, the payoffs to the opposition make internal conflict with the 
group and the regime a more costly alternative than accepting partial reforms, unless the group 
seeking self-determination has a commitment to constitutional democracy that makes it act 
despite a cost/benefit calculus. In SCA, external actors promoting democracy generally use only 
“carrots” for seeking compliance with international democracy promotion standards, including 
loans, aid, and legitimacy, for the existing regime. 
4.2.3 Emergence of a Cyclic Dynamic 
In the complex adaptive system of constitutional authoritarianism, mechanisms move the system 
from one phase to another. Overt authoritarian regimes with weak constitutions make reforms 
under demands from IDP, shifting to an Overt-sham environment. 
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OCA-weak (dictators)  de jure reforms  OCA-sham (dictators with laws) 
 
Under continued influence of IDP and strengthened political opposition, the OCA-sham 
constitution begins observing some constitutional commitments, shifting to SCA. 
 
OCA-sham  some de facto observations of de jure reforms  SCA (stealth) 
 
From a Stealth environment, the regime can be overtaken by a coup with repression, leading 
back to an OCA-weak environment; the regime can consolidate its power and increase 
repression, shifting back to an OCA-sham environment, or can increase political competition, 
shifting toward a fragile Democracy (DEM). 
 
SCA (stealth)  coup  OCA-weak (dictators) 
SCA (stealth)  consolidation of power  OCA-sham (dictators with laws) 
SCA (stealth)  political competition  DEM (democracy) 
 
 
Overall, the entire system is an out-of-equilibrium, complex adaptive system that contains 
multiple actors with preferences that change over time and in which the outcomes are dependent 
on interactive effects. Shifts in phases are summarized below. 
 
OCA-weak  increase in de jure  OCA-sham  increase in de facto  SCA 
SCA  increase in use of force  OCA-weak 
SCA  decrease in de jure  OCA-sham 
SCA  increase in de facto  DEM 
 
 
Next, I elaborate the emergent effect this cyclic dynamic has on political opposition and SDMs 
within the complex adaptive system of constitutional authoritarianism under the influences of the 
international democracy promotion program. 
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Formal modeling has shown that the relationship between mobilization, grievance, and 
repression in semi-authoritarian constitutional environments can have unintended consequences, 
or the surprise or emergent outcomes characteristic of complex adaptive systems (J. B. Ruhl 
1996; J. B. Ruhl 2012). The gap between constitutional commitments and constitutional 
observations, and citizens’ perceptions of that gap, are conceptualized as political grievance. 
Different variants of constitutional authoritarianism generate different levels of grievance, 
measured as the distance between the ideal policies of the state and its citizens and citizens’ 
sentiment toward that grievance (Shadmehr 2014, 623). 
Beginning on the left-hand side of the graph, the blue mobilization curve first represents 
an overt-weak dynamic, or regimes’ adoption of low or very limited levels of rights. Under this 
dynamic, more pressure from external actors promoting democracy benefits political opposition 
and increases the costs of repression. In OCA-weak constitutional environments, grievance is the 
distance between citizens’ ideals and a low level of commitment to constitutional rights in legal 
reforms. External actors’ pressure is more effective in this dynamic, because regimes prefer 
moderate reforms to revolution. On the right-hand side is the overt-sham environment. Under the 
OCA-sham dynamic, grievance and repression can give opposition focal points for coordination 
of dissent and possible overthrow, if the regime does not observe in practice the commitments to 
human rights written in their constitutions (Law and Versteeg 2013). Within the OCA-sham 
dynamic, citizens must work endogenously within the existing system to see the regime actually 
observe constitutional commitments, which is costly for regime and opposition when trying to 
maintain an authoritarian regime. In OCA-sham constitutional environments, grievance is the 
distance between citizens’ ideals and the regime’s observation of already existing legal rights 
that are being violated. 
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In the middle of the curve is the stealth constitutional authoritarian dynamic. This is the 
“status quo” outcome due to repeated iterations of the OCA dynamics under the influences of 
international democracy promotion that create resilient SCA regimes with partial democracy, 
moderate repression, and a weakened political opposition with a “wet blanket” on its motivation 
to mobilize. In SCA environments, legal rights exist, and are sometimes observed in practice and 
sometimes violated. The influence of international democracy promotion benefits the regime. If 
graphed as a relationship between repression and potential of mobilization, citizens have a u-
shaped incentive to respond to claim their rights, so mobilization drops to nearly zero for the 
political opposition, except for the self-determination movement. As shown in the Figure below, 
a cyclic dynamic (red line) develops between t=1, t=2, t=3, and t=4 (SDM) for a self-
determination movement (Shadmehr 2014).6 Outside of OCA environments with sham or weak 
constitutions, a “stealth” category, with a “wet blanket effect,” explains a lack of national 
political mobilization, as all parties prefer moderate democratic reforms to other alternatives 
(Siegel 2011; Thiel 2010; Shadmehr 2014; Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). Political opposition’s 
incentive to cooperate with other groups in overt authoritarian regimes, to overcome barriers to 
collective action, and mobilize for self-determination, increases, as the green curve represents in 
the Figure 6 below. 
                                                 
6 This figure is a graph of the relationship that emerges in Shadmehr’s model of mobilization, 
repression, and inequality (which substitutes for grievance). This model shows how, repression 
occurs in response to some mobilization against the state given the level of grievance, he argues 
that, anticipating repression, opposition may not mobilize at moderate levels of grievance, but 
only when the grievances outweighs the cost of repression, or a non-monotone relationship 
(Shadmehr 2014, 631). 




Figure 6. 3-Dimensional Representation of Grievance, Repression, and Mobilization 
 
 
Under stealth constitutional authoritarianism, there is a wet blanket effect (Siegel 2011). The 
costs of facing repression are higher than the driving motivation of grievance for political 
opposition; the costs of future uncertainty of being replaced or overthrown are greater than the 
costs of making short-term moderate democratic reforms as concessions for the government or 
regime; and finally, the costs of political instability are greater than the benefits of democratic 
revolution for international actors. Most importantly, under stealth semi-authoritarianism, there 
is a low likelihood of an available remedy for political opposition to the government or regime 
within the existing system, on domestic or international levels, so in order to overcome the “wet 
blanket” effect, they must cooperate to seek recourse outside the nation-state system.  
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International democracy promoters receive only partial information about regime 
activities that allow these regimes to still remain on the “carrots” side of the international 
democracy promotion program. When a regime can claim democracy while still practicing legal 
repression, political opposition is inactive, and semi-authoritarian regime longevity increases. In 
essence, under SCA, political opposition will not overcome barriers to collective action unless 
they cooperate with other groups seeking self-determination who do not face regimes under the 
stealth dynamic. Cooperation allows SDMs in stealth regimes to endure the costs of continuing 
repression without receiving benefits from external actors. Under semi-authoritarianism, political 
opposition will seek radical democratic reforms in two situations only: when external actors 
support them, such as in Iraq, or when the SDM can cooperate with other SDMs to mobilize. 
Using the above, inferred CASoS model as a framework, this dissertation utilizes 
multiple methods for the empirical chapters. These multiple methods – including Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, Structural Topic Modeling, and Structured, Focused, Comparison – are 
combined in nested analyses within this overarching theoretical framework modeled using a 
systems theory approach. Overall, the dissertation undertakes the task of theory development for 
semi-authoritarian constitutionalism to generate hypotheses and elucidate evidence for them. 
Grounded in pragmatism, the research conceptualizes the complex adaptive system of semi-
authoritarian constitutionalism under democracy promotion. Following Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, 
the evidence from each of the chapters is then synthesized to draw policy recommendations for 
constitutional change experts, international democracy promoters, and human rights defenders. 
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5.0  SYSTEM STRUCTURE: OTTOMAN AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 
How does regimes’ system structure impact the dynamics of constitutionalism under 
authoritarianism? Authoritarian regime structures are comprised of rivalries and relationships 
within the ruling entity: the officer corps of the military regime, the single-party regime and its 
cadre, and the clique surrounding the personalist ruler, family, kin, or cliques also surround 
dynastic or non-dynastic monarchies (Geddes 1999; Weeks 2008). Recent scholarly work has 
further disaggregated these regimes, and examine how they strategically use institutions in their 
states to persevere despite generally lacking popular consent (Boix and Svolik 2013; Fjelde 
2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2010; Smith 2005; Svolik 2012). In line with this 
literature unpacking authoritarian regimes where they coexist with nominally democratic 
institutions, this dissertation conceptualizes semi-authoritarian regimes as communication 
network structures with elites under repression.  
By conceptualizing semi-authoritarian regimes as communication networks with elites, 
transfer between nodes – of ideology, or of information, and more – becomes possible through 
attributing ties in the network, creating an opportunity to pragmatically unite different strands of 
research and methodologies.vii It also allows us to treat the characteristics of different 
authoritarian regimes as having non-overlapping, distinct characteristics, rather than 
characteristics identified as important in democracies. An empirical analysis of the latent 
structures within regime types since 1945 identified three dimensions of authoritarianism, 
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military strength, party strength, and personalism, which can all occur in varying degrees 
(Wright, Honaker, and Geddes 2014). Below I review the literature on these specific regime 
types or dimensions while paying specific attention to where that literature defines 
communication network structure characteristics, in order to understand how and why strategies 
in different network structures could lead to different policy outcomes in constitutional change 
processes. Ultimately, I relate these to two ideal-types of communication networks: those 
utilizing persuasion or cooptation, and those utilizing dominance or control, which are discussed 
are implications for further research in the conclusive chapter. 
5.1 REGIMES AS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS  
How do regimes, as political organizational network systems with elites and repression, impact 
collective action within the network? Siegel’s work concludes that the factors affecting actors’ 
strategies and network performance for collective action include, inter alia, the network structure 
of the semi-authoritarian political system and of the public, leaders’ uniformity of preferences, 
citizens’ internal and external motivation, and repression technology (Siegel 2009; Siegel 2011). 
Broadly, there are four types of political networks in which network structure can reliably be 
drawn from qualitative data that have major implications for institutional change. These are the 
Small World, the Village, the Hierarchy, and the Opinion Leader networks. Two network 
structures, Village and Small World networks, do not incorporate elites. The latter two network 
structure typologies incorporate elites and therefore are useful for categorizing regime structure. 
Siegel writes: 
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Small World networks stand in for suburban/urban societies, in which information flows quickly and 
connections are made widely. Village/Clique networks mirror rural/less well-developed societies or tightly 
insulated cliques, in which most people respond to their immediate (largely non-overlapping) social circles. 
Opinion Leader networks possess social leaders—those with great social influence—who drive behavior 
directly via their numerous connections to followers. Hierarchical networks transmit leaders’ influence 
downward through deputies to the followers at the bottom (Siegel 2011). 
 
The conceptualization of regimes as networks for collective action with elites under repression in 
this research take the dual forms of the opinion leader network, and the hierarchy network 
(Siegel 2009; Siegel 2011).7  
When repression also is incorporated into the model, the uniformity of leaders’ 
preferences and motivation becomes more significant. Mobilization occurs according to variation 
in the dimensions of leader influence (the number and stated importance of leaders); leader 
motivation or unity; repressive technology (targeted removal of leaders versus random violence), 
and then repressive strength (weak or strong); motivation (public opinion or dissatisfaction, or 
propensity to participate), and in the hierarchical network, follower influence (level of 
socializing of subordinates). Leader motivation or uniformity of preferences greatly decreases 
the efficacy of repression or violence, meaning factionalized networks with repression are prone 
to instability, while the importance of leaders and public dissatisfaction also decreases the 
efficacy of repression to a lesser extent. The socialization of subordinates at the same level 
greatly increases the efficacy of repression (Siegel 2011). Siegel finds that a “society whose 
leaders are unified in their desire for mass participation will be highly resistant even to 
repression targeted directly at these leaders,” but when leaders are factionalized or their 
preferences not uniform, “the same repressive technology can swiftly crush participation in 
                                                 
7 The measures for operationalization of these types of networks with quantitative network data 
are given in the endnotes to the conclusive chapter in suggestions for further research. 
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Opinion Leader and Hierarchical networks that lack unified leaders” (Siegel 2011).  Figure 7 
below shows the general difference between Opinion-Leader and Hierarchy network topologies. 
In the Hierarchy, the power of elites lies in their advantaged placement at its top of a 
series of levels. Within each level, individuals are likely to be spatially closer to each other 
(Sandell and Stern 1998) but do not necessarily have a high likelihood of influence on each 
other. However, motivation may or may not be correlated with position, and is at least as 
influential in predicting strategic outcomes as position. In the hierarchy network, the number of 
elites and conformity of motivation are important for participation and mobilization, with one 
unexpected finding: ties between people in the same level can alter outcomes when elite 




Opinion-Leader Network Hierarchical Network 
 
 
Figure 7. Visualization of Hierarchical and Opinion-Leader Network Structures 
 
 
When elite motivations are uniformly low, highly interconnected followers can still produce high 
levels of activity that produce the “proletariat” revolt. When uniformly high, highly 
interconnected followers can reduce the level of expected participation to very low values, or 
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have the “wet blanket” effect, similar to the u-shaped finding of popular inaction based on 
moderate levels of repression and grievance (Siegel 2009; Shadmehr 2014).  
Due to the levels of authority in a hierarchical network, there is less flexibility in the 
short-run, but this inflexibility is overcome by long-run sustainability with a tendency to reach an 
agreement with compromise (Lilja 2012). The key variables then are the cohesiveness of elite 
preferences and the length of the negotiating period to understand policy outcomes. The 
identification heuristics for a Hierarchy are: 1) a rigid chain of influence, with 2) few superiors 
and many subordinates, and a 3) defined organizational structure. 
Opinion leader networks are also called core-periphery, or star, networks. In opinion 
leader networks, very few people have many connections, while the “opinion leaders” at the core 
have many. The power of leaders lies in the highly centralized nature of their position and 
betweenness of their ties. Previously in the literature, these networks have been called star or 
wheel networks (Gould 1993). Research has also found that star networks occur when one high-
value person exists (or others are taken out); they are made over time rather than being “born” 
(Goeree, Riedl, and Ule 2009). Therefore, they are sensitive to repressive tactics that remove 
leaders.  
Unlike the hierarchy, more highly motivated elites motivate followers, while uniformly 
low motivated elites decrease participation. In Opinion Leader networks, the number of elites 
and the conformity of elite preferences are more important in determining the activity of the 
network than are the strength of ties, the size of the network, or even the motivation of the 
participants (Siegel 2009). However, the activation of the network is dependent upon the 
motivation level, and the uniformity of motivation, of the elites. Furthermore, up to a point, 
increasing the number of elites tends to increase participation. Behavior spreads outward from 
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motivated elites to followers. When elites have uniformly low motivations, there is little 
participation; when their motivations are uniformly high, participation is near total (Siegel 2009). 
Opinion leader networks, relative to Small World, Village, or Hierarchical networks, 
contain dyadic and non-reciprocal ties that make participation more unlikely (Siegel 2009), and 
make flexibility in policy negotiations difficult and a conclusion or compromise more unlikely 
(Lilja 2012). The identification heuristics for an Opinion-Leader Network are: 1) a few leaders 
drive opinion, 2) information that comes from common sources, and 3) a skewed distribution of 
connections (Siegel 2009).  
5.1.1 Operationalizing Political System Networks 
Political leaders, incumbent or opposition, are actors embedded in an organizational network. 
Political leaders’ organizations are the organizational systems from which political leaders come, 
whether kinship network, military organizations, or party apparatus. These organizations may 
integrate traditional interest groups such as political parties and regime-funded organizations. 
These communications networks with elites are likely to take different structures given their 
characteristics. In this model, they can take on the roles of “Hierarchy” or “Opinion-Leader” 
network structures. The next section of this chapter reviews regime types – monarchy, military, 
civilian party, and personalistic – and summarizes the literature on network structure, 
factionalism/ motivation, repression, and de jure and de facto constitutional change for 
operationalization in the following analyses. 
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5.1.1.1 Military Regimes, Network Structure, and Following Orders 
According to political science and organizational studies literature, military regimes have 
a high number of elites on multiple levels with uniform preferences about the survival and 
efficacy of the military, including “maintenance of hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness within 
the military; autonomy from civilian intervention; and budgets sufficient to attract high-quality 
recruits and buy state-of-the-art weapons” (Bienen 1978; Geddes 1999; Janowitz 1977; Morris 
1960; Van Doorn 1975). More recent research has added professionalism and adaptability to 
these norms (Finnerty 2013; Serena 2011). Officers agree to join coups if they believe the 
military itself as an institution is threatened, but do not want to risk civil war; therefore, they will 
only join if many officers do. In this sense, there are generally strong intra-level ties within the 
intermediate levels of the military hierarchy.  
In transitioning from the military regime, all but the highest level of elites may agree that 
a transition to civilian rule is better than a highly polarized military, which could lead to a civil 
war and destroy the military itself. The military’s position in the regime is coded through its 
degree of involvement in politics, as democracies require a strict separation between the civilian 
government and the military. Therefore, following Svolik, in the Regime variable (REG), I code 
one component of the regime’s integration as military involvement in politics, which can take 
one of four forms: none, indirect, personal, or corporate involvement. Military regimes or 
military-run political parties should take the shape of Hierarchical communication networks 
because they have defined organizational structures, a rigid chain of influence, and few superiors 
and an expanding number of subordinates over multiple levels (Siegel 2009). 
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5.1.1.2 Party Regimes, Network Structure, and Cooptation 
Political parties have stronger incentives to cooperate with one another than military or 
monarchical regimes. Factions form in single-party regimes around policy differences and 
competition for leadership positions; however, all are better off if all factions remain united and 
in office. Therefore, cooptation, rather than exclusion, is the rule in established single-party 
regimes (Geddes 1999). Depending on the structure of the party, there may be a high number of 
elites, which decreases as personalization of politics grows. While elite preferences may not be 
uniform, they will appear to be because all in the party are better off if all factions remain united 
and in office. Therefore, there are moderately strong ties within levels of the organizational 
structure, as external and internal preferences may conflict.  
Single parties generally adopt a cooptation rather than exclusion strategy for opposition 
to maintain unity. Single parties are resilient in politics, but sensitive to external events like 
economic crises. Following Svolik, in the Regime variable (REG) I code party strength or 
integration as (a lack of) restrictions on political parties, on one of three levels: parties can be 
banned, one party is allowed, or multiple parties are allowed. Political parties should take the 
shape of Opinion-Leader networks due to having a few leaders that drive opinion with 
information coming from common sources, unless the party was founded by and is run by the 
military, If the party has been in power long enough to assume a non-dynastic personalistic or 
monarchical position around a single leader, it should then take the shape of a Hierarchy with or 
without Factionalism. 
5.1.1.3 Monarchies, Network Structure, and Control 
Monarchies, given their limitation to family members, or the choice of one ruling family 
member, have a lower number of elites. Preferences are uniform within a dynastic monarchy to 
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keep the family in a prestigious and authoritative position, as family members will keep their 
privileged positions regardless of whether a single family member remains in power. In dynastic 
monarchical regimes the family forms a ruling institution (Weeks 2008). Members of the family 
share an interest in maintaining the continued health of the dynasty, and cooperate to keep the 
leader in check.  
Non-dynastic monarchies’ preferences more closely resemble personalist regimes. 
Therefore, a crucial determinant in the network structure of monarchies is whether the monarch 
rules alone, or with the assistance of the extended ruling family. The existence of a powerful 
ruling family creates a more diffuse power structure, while centering power on one ruling family 
member creates a network structure with less reciprocal ties. Leaders of dynasties face an 
accountability that leaders of non-dynastic monarchies do not, due to the existence of a ruling 
family. Monarchies should take the shape of Hierarchical Networks with a high degree of 
Factionalism if the monarch rules with competition from within the ruling family rather than 
assistance, as occurred in the Ottoman Empire, from the extended ruling family. This is due to 
maintaining a defined organizational structure, a rigid chain of influence, and having a few 
superiors and an expanding number of subordinates over multiple levels, yet having competing 
factions within the organizational structure. 
5.1.1.4 Personalism, Network Structure, and Persuasion 
Personalist regimes rely extensively on control of communication and information 
exchange, as leaders’ fear of potential rivals leads them to undermine decision-making that might 
serve as power bases for challenges. As personalization of politics grows, the number of elites 
shrinks, and the preferences become uniform to mimic the leader’s preferences. However, this 
occurs through a skewed distribution of ties throughout the network, as the regime limits 
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information exchange to maintain the appearance of control of potential successors and 
opposition. As the leader consolidates power, the network becomes more like a “star” network. 
As in single party regimes, factions form around potential rivals to the leader, but even during 
normal times they have “strong reasons to continue supporting the regime and leader” (Geddes 
1999). Membership in the network with elites is fluid, informal, and unstable, as members are 
rotated frequently to prevent them from developing autonomy.  
Personalism allows one individual to dominate the state apparatus, and therefore access 
to office and the fruits of office depend more on personal discretion. However, the base that the 
leader needs to keep supporting is relatively narrow compared to single-party regimes, and the 
group of beneficiaries is more likely to be dominated by a single familial clan, or ethnic or 
regional group. With both rewards for loyalty and penalties for unsuccessful defection very high, 
internal splits become more unlikely. However, the connections in the personalist ruler’s 
network, as compared to the military or monarchical leaders’ networks are less dense, and more 
reciprocal. The personalist ruler severs relationship ties between supporters so that they cannot 
cooperate to challenge him, whereas the military or monarchical rulers control their supporters so 
that they do not want to challenge them, as summarized above. For this reason, personalism is 
coded in the analysis as factionalism, if personalism is occurring in an already existing 
Hierarchical network such as the military, due to maintaining a defined organizational structure, 
a rigid chain of influence, and having a few superiors and an expanding number of subordinates 
over multiple levels. Otherwise, elements of personalism should take the shape of an Opinion-
Leader network, if the personalistic leader is the founder of the political organization system in 
power, due to having a few leaders that drive opinion with information coming from common 
sources.  
  97 
5.2 HEURISTIC-GENERATING ANALYSIS, 1876-1981 
For the de jure constitutional clauses across history, constitutional documents were gathered on 
constitutional changes from the Tanzimat through 2014, and each document was coded that 
occurred during a major constitutional change episode from 1876, the first Ottoman constitution, 
to 1981.8 Each constitution and its major amendments were coded using Versteeg’s extensive 
coding scheme for constitutional rights and policies, which includes 224 different codes for each 
constitutional change.9 I aggregated these codes into six indices of constitutional change: 
personal integrity, equality rights, civil and political rights, socio-economic and property rights, 
judicial review, and government structure.10  Figures 8 and 9 below show the aggregate data on 
                                                 
8 The documents were gathered from a variety of sources, in both Turkish and in English. The 
major source of data was the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 
2011). I also gathered background documents on discussions, deliberations, and negotiations on 
constitutional change in each period, and supplemented the CCP’s database with documents 
from the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s databases when a major change was referred to in 
a text but not included in the CCP’s database. The Comparative Constitutions Project, hosted at 
the University of Illinois’ Cline Center for Democracy, granted me access to their constitutions 
from 1876 to the present, for which I owe much gratitude for allowing me access to their portal, 
is a major cross-national time-series endeavor to capture comparative constitutional change over 
the last two centuries across the globe, and therefore minor changes in just one country/region 
may have not met their criteria. 
9 I am grateful to Mila Versteeg for sharing her constitutional coding scheme. For rights, 
Versteeg’s coding scheme includes general rights, including equality rights, women’s rights, the 
right to life, torture, negative liberty rights, fair trial rights, privacy rights, civil and political 
rights; rights for particular groups, including children, family, minorities, disabled, etc.; socio-
economic rights and policies, including the style of socio-economic rights, work, freedom of 
enterprise, social security, health, and education; property rights; natural resources, and 
environmental rights. For policies, Versteeg’s coding scheme includes good governance, or the 
quality of government provisions; structure provisions; judicial review provisions; and human 
rights commission/ ombudsman provisions. 
10 The “personal integrity” index includes 37 codes pertaining to the right to life, torture, 
negative liberty rights, fair trial rights, and privacy rights. The “equality rights” index includes 
also includes 37 codes on general rights, including equality rights, women’s rights, and rights for 
particular groups, including children, family, minorities, disabled, etc. One negative right is 
included. The “civil and political rights” index includes 34 codes pertaining to civil and political 
rights. Three negative rights are included. The “socio-economic rights” index includes 60 codes 
  98 
the de jure constitutional indices over time, and then grouped by major change period for the 
indices from 1876 to 2015. Large jumps in the equality index that are literally “off-the-chart” are 
preceded by large dips in almost all of the indices, most notably the personal integrity rights 
index. Figures 8 and 9 show the indices plotted over time, between 0 (less support for 
democracy) to 1 (more support for democracy), and grouped by change period. With this data 
visualization, it is easier to grasp how the constitutions of Turkey cover the range of the 
continuum of “weak” to “sham” constitutions, as the number of rights grows, while judicial 
review and governance indices stay relatively low. Figure 9 shows the percent change in the 
indices, which normalizes for the phenomenon of “rights creep,” in which constitutions tend to 
gather rights over time due to constitutional stickiness (Varol 2015). The regime leaders in 
Figure 8 from left to right are Sultan Abdülhamid (monarchy), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (military/ 
single party), Adnan Menderes (political party), General Cemal Gürsel (military), General Kenan 
Evren (military), and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (political party). However, constitutional reform 
under the AKP is not included in this analysis but is used with observational data in the next 
empirical chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
pertaining to socio-economic rights, work, freedom of enterprise, social security, health, and 
education; and property rights. Fifteen negative rights are included. The judicial review index 
includes 20 codes on judicial review provisions. Three negative provisions are included. The 
“government structure” index includes 38 codes on good governance, or the quality of 
government provisions; structure provisions; and human rights commission/ ombudsman 
provisions; natural resources, and environmental rights. Three negative rights are included. 
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The conditions assessed in the analysis include the level of de jure constitutional commitment 
(sham, weak, or in between) regime types (civilian/personalist, monarchy, military), 
communication network structures (hierarchy, opinion-leader) and factionalism (low, high), and 
the use of repression (low, moderate, high). I divide the periods into Ottoman Constitutionalism 
(1876 to 1918), the first constitutional period (1909 to 1960), and the second constitutional 
period (post-1960 to 1981), as shown in Table 2 below. The unit of analysis is an episode of 
constitutional change. In the conclusion, I highlight the dynamics that give insight into how the 
network structure and consolidation of the regime, the uniformity of the regimes’ elites’ 
preferences, and repression technologies interact. 
 
Table 2. Regime Structures and Repression During Major Constitutional Episodes 
 
 
Time Period Ottoman Era: 1876 
Ottoman Constitution and 
1878 Suspension; 1908 
reinstatement and 1909, 
1914, 1916, and 1918 
amendments 
First Period, 1909-1960: 
1921 Constitution, 1923 
amendment, 1924 
Constitution and  
 1927, 1928, 1931, 1934, 
1937, 1945, 1952, and 
1960 amendments 
Second Period, 1960-
1981: 1961 Constitution 
and 1969, 1970, 1971, 




Monarchy and Revolutionary 
(from low to highly 
motivated) 
Revolutionary; Single-
party backed by the 
military; civilian party 
Military regimes; return 
































  101 
The heuristics of conditions found within the time periods are presented with their narrative case 
histories, which follow. To draw general heuristics of constitutional authoritarian environments, 
the solutions are aggregated following the case histories. In the presentation of Boolean 
solutions, capital letters imply presence (or closeness to “1”) while small letters indicate absence 
(or proximity to “0”), and the * symbol implies an intersection of the conditions. The conditions 
are as follows, and the data were coded and the calibrated using the following set-theoretic 
conditions, which can also be found in Appendix A, the coding for the analyses in Chapter IV.  
For the Regime variable, absence (reg) indicates centralized power over military, 
legislative, executive, and party consolidated, while presence (REG) indicates that power 
between military legislative, executive, and party is diffuse. For the Process variable, absence 
(pro) indicates a reform process held in secret, with no public involvement, and no representative 
body, while presence (PRO) indicates a transparent, public negotiation over an extended period 
with a representative body. For the Network/ Factionalism variable, absence (net) indicates 
cohesion in a hierarchical network, while presence (NET) indicates the highest level of 
factionalism in an opinion-leader network. For the Repression variable, absence (rep) indicates a 
high level of repression with high technology, while presence (REP) indicates a low level of 
repression with low technology. For the Equality Rights variable, absence (eqa) indicates no 
equality rights, while presence (EQA) indicates equality rights in constitution. For the Personal 
Integrity Rights variable, absence (pin) indicates no personal integrity rights, while presence 
(PIN) indicates a higher level of personal integrity rights in constitution. Finally, for Political and 
Civil Rights, absence (civ) indicates no political and civil rights, while presence (CIV) indicates 
a higher level of political and civil rights in constitution. 
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5.2.1 Ottoman Constitutionalism, 1876-1908 
Solution: reg*pro*NET*rep*eqa*pin*civ 
 
The late Ottoman Period, as evidenced by renewed vigor of historians recently taking on the 
subject, remains a fascinating period for students of state-building, nationalism, and revolution 
(Zürcher 2010; M. Sükrü Hanioglu 2011; Doumanis 2012; Matossian 2014; M. Sukru Hanioglu 
2001). Broad themes can be derived for the purposes of understanding the structure of the elite 
groups, their impact on negotiation processes, repression, and constitutional outcomes in the 
period of the decline of the Empire, and the rise of the Young Turks. 
The period from 1839 to 1876 is known as the Tanzimat in Turkish historiography, 
though historians’ opinions on the timeline of the Tanzimat and factors behind the initiation of 
the reforms differ (İnalcık 1976; Faroqhi et al. 1997). The term Tanzimat-i Hayriye, or beneficial 
reforms, had been used as early as 1834 when the imperial order establishing the Supreme 
Council for Judicial Regulations was issued (Meclis-i Vala-ı Ahkam-ı Adliye) (Zürcher 2004, 42, 
50). The driving forces behind these reforms were both internal and external, though underlying 
both were the transfer of European ideas of rationality and bureaucracy, international concern 
over minority rights, and domestic management of minority communities within the Empire. 
Domestically, within the Empire, factionalization occurred when “exposure of members 
of the Ottoman ruling class to European ideas … [resulted] notably in the tendency of the 
younger bureaucrats to look for rationally motivated solutions instead of traditional ones, and 
hence to new legislation,” (Zürcher 2004, 26). Externally, “pressure was an important incentive 
for the internal administrative and legal reforms … especially …for… reforms to do with the 
position of the Christian minorities of the empire. The European powers pressed for 
improvements in the position of these communities, which in the classical Ottoman structure had 
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been that of second-class subjects,” (2004, 56). To simplify, elites within the Empire had 
factionalized into those preferring the status quo and concessions to international pressure, and 
groups preferring radical reforms and what was to become nationalist revolution. 
In 1876, the constitutional revolution was carried out by “a group of leading Ottoman 
politicians … [who had] carried out a coup d’état, deposing Sultan Abdülaziz on 30 May 1876. 
In his place, Crown Prince Murat, who was close to the Young Ottomans… came to the throne 
as Sultan Murat V,” (Zürcher 2004, 73). The Young Ottomans had been in touch with Ottoman 
politicians Mithat Pasha through Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha, who would be influential in the 
Committee for Union and Progress; at this point, Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha became palace 
secretaries. The leaders of the coup d’etat included the provincial reformer Mithat Pasha, the 
Minister of War, Hüseyin Avni Pasha, the director of the military academy, Süleyman Pasha, and 
the Şeyhülislam Hayrullah Efendi. To their dismay, however, at the advice of Rüştü Pasha, who 
cautioned Murat V against a full constitution, the Sultan gave only a “vague statement of 
reforms”, which were included in the Hatt-ı Humayun, or imperial decrees, after his accession to 
the throne. Soon after, a series of dramatic events, in which the former Sultan Abdülaziz 
committed suicide, and then an aggrieved army captain murdered Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Reşit Pasha and Minister of War Hüseyin Avni Pasha, leading Sultan Murat V to have a nervous 
breakdown, the deposition of Murat V became inevitable, and he was replaced by Abdülhamid II 
on 1 September 1876 (2004, 73). 
The remaining Ministers had an eventful first meeting with the new Sultan and delegates 
in Istanbul on 23 December 1876. A new constitution had been drafted and promulgated based 
on the Belgian constitution of 1831 and the Prussian constitution of 1850, and,  “number of its 
articles (or omissions) gave it a more authoritarian character and left the sultan important 
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prerogatives, which [the Sultan] was later to use to the detriment of the constitutional 
government” (2004, 74) The constitution, from the Ottoman standpoint, made all discussions of 
reforms in the Christian areas of the empire “superfluous,” since all subjects were now granted 
constitutional rights, and elections were to be held. Notably, the “Provisional Electoral 
Regulations,” would remain en force throughout the next five decades, including the early years 
of the Republic. These Regulations prescribed a nominated senate (Hayat-i Ayan), an elected 
chamber of deputies (Hayat-i Mebusan), and also detailed the exclusive qualification 
requirements of delegates (Kayali 1995). Every Ottoman male above the age of thirty with 
ability in Turkish and enjoying civil rights could be elected deputy, unless he had accepted 
citizen-ship or employment in the service of a foreign government, was bankrupt or a domestic 
servant, or was stigmatized by “notoriety for ill deeds” (Kayali 1995). 
Although some scholars may connect this turn toward constitutionalism with a turn 
toward democracy or liberalism, others historians note that the amorphous political organizations 
known as the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, the Committee for Union and Progress, the 
Ottoman Freedom Society, the Defense of Rights Group, and finally, the People’s or Republican 
People’s Party, were more concerned with gaining power to implement their ideas than with 
democratic constitutionalism. 
After five hundred years of dynastic monarchy, in 1876, a small group of elites, who, 
similar to the Sultan and his dynasty, utilized violence and repression when they saw fit, who 
were by no means united or cohesive, drafted and promulgated the first “constitutional” 
document, turning the Empire into a semi-constitutional monarchy. The Young Ottomans were 
“never tightly organized and the ideas of the individual members of the group differed widely,” 
(2004, 70). Hanioğlu notes the authoritarian nature of both the process and its outcome: 
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“As a rule, historians have penned Young Turk activities as a ‘constitutional movement.’ The reason for 
this is that the Young Turk revolution proclaimed the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. 
However, the notion of a constitution, based on the constitutional history of the European and North 
American governments, had little affinity with the direction that Ottoman bureaucrats took while drafting 
their 1876 constitution or with the thinking of the Young Turk intellectuals of the succeeding generation” 
(M. Sukru Hanioglu 1995, 28 emphasis mine). 
 
Even though the 1876 Constitution was by no means liberal or democratic, it did give rise to 
vocal opposition in the elected Parliament, and for this reason, Sultan Abdülhamid II suspended 
the Constitution after just two years in 1878.  
While it was en force, however, the 1876 Constitution established the first bicameral 
General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire, in which the Senate replaced the Sublime Porte and 
the Grand Vizier became the speaker of the Senate. The writers of the 1876 Constitution sought 
to replace the Ottoman millet system, or political organization by religious identity of Muslim or 
non-Muslim, with a system based on Ottoman citizenship, which would be the precursor of the 
Turkish national identity that evolved into the characteristics of citizenship for the new 
nationalist Republic of Turkey. 
Throughout the next thirty years, the Empire struggled to redefine itself in the 
international order as the notorious “sick man” of Europe subject to international legal treaties 
such as the Capitulations. In the Capitulations, “privileges and concessions originally granted by 
the voluntary action of the Turks to foreigners and non-Moslem subjects alike became 
transformed through successive wars, interventions and diplomatic intrigues into irksome 
exactions that formed the basis of a kind of international suzerainty over Turkey” (P. M. Brown 
1924, 291). The Empire stood geographically and geopolitically at the crossroads of World War 
One, and the Entente and the Central powers could spare no dignity for their “sick” counterpart. 
The members of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, and their many political organizations, 
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including the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), splintered into factions under changing 
leadership and in different groups in the multiple apparatuses of the palace, the Parliament, and 
the military. Contrary to the hierarchical structure of the dynastic monarchy in which motivations 
were low, but uniform, in this opinion-leader network structure, motivation was high, but so was 
factionalism. 
One offshoot of the CUP, the Ottoman Freedom Society, spread rapidly in Macedonia. 
This occurred with the involvement of officers from the Third (Macedonian) and Second 
(Edirne) armies, in which Major Enver of the staff of the Third Army played a leading role. In 
1907, the Salonica group decided to merge their group with the reformers’ group in Paris, once 
they established contact with them. Ahmet Rıza and Prens Sabahattin were reformers in Paris. 
After several name changes, the newly confederated organization reverted to the traditional name 
Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) (Zürcher 2004, 76). In 1908, in a 
coordinated campaign, these officers of the newly organized and confederated Committee for 
Union and Progress (CUP) in Macedonia, including Enver Pasha, staged a coup d’état and 
demanded the constitutional order be restored. The Sultan unsuccessfully tried to quell this revolt 
by sending his officers, and then troops, to Macedonia, but the officers were murdered, and the 
troops abandoned the cause, due to influence from the CUP. The sultan capitulated, and 
announced that the Constitution would be reinstated and applied in full, reconvening the 
Ottoman Parliament after an interval of thirty years on the night of 23 July 1908 (2004, 90). 
Sultan Abdülhamid II was forced to restore the constitutional monarchy after the Young 
Turk Revolution. Still, scholars disagree regarding the real incentives behind the CUP leaders’ 
interest in participating in Parliamentary governance. Lybyer writes that there “lay hidden some 
precedent, much preparation, and a strong desire, for a parliamentary government,” indicating 
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the desire for constitutional separation of powers (Lybyer 1910, 66). On the other hand, Zürcher 
writes that politics were left in the hands of the existing Cabinet, and the CUP became a “secret 
society exerting pressure and holding political power without any formal responsibility” and a 
“watchdog with a mission to guard the newfound constitutional freedom, interfering in politics 
whenever it saw fit” secret society,” which greatly destabilized politics (Zürcher 2004, 99). The 
Ottoman cabinet was under the influence Grand Vizier Sait Pasha. 
5.2.1.1 Reform Processes: 1876 and 1909 
 
The Ottoman and CUP’s negotiation processes were short and inflexible. Eight statesmen and 
intellectuals drafted the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, and according to one historian, none of them 
were educated in constitutional theory or law (M. Sukru Hanioglu 1995). The entire constitution 
was a product of mimicry of the Belgian and Prussian Constitutions, and therefore in no way 
represented the subjects of previous Ottoman rule. The 1876 Constitution did not give the right 
to establish political parties or peacefully assemble, even though political organizations at this 
time were well versed in establishing themselves underground and abroad. Although it did 
establish a Parliament, the Ministers and the Cabinet still bore no formal responsibility to the 
Parliament, therefore undermining any foundation of a real parliamentary system of government.  
While the 1876 Constitution was drafted and promulgated by elites in the Ottoman ruling 
class rather than the Ottoman Parliament, the 1909 Reinstatement took place after the Sultan 
capitulated to the Young Turk insurrection. The subsequent constitutional government existed on 
paper, but in practice, the CUP was no more a democratic constitutional system than the Empire. 
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5.2.2 First Constitutional Period 
1921 Solution: reg*pro*NET*rep*eqa*pin*civ 
1924, 1927, 1937, 1945 Solution: reg*pro*net*REP*eqa*pin*CIV 
 
The factionalized, opinion leader network structured group most widely known as the CUP 
continued its evolution over the next constitutional period, until the introduction of multiple 
party politics and the rise of the Demokrat Partisi, or Democrat Party, in the 1950s, morphing 
from a factionalized star network into a cohesive hierarchy in the RPP, which then factionalized 
again under the newly-introduced electoral competition. 
In this period of constitutionalism, the Ottoman constitution of 1876, amended in 1909, 
the National Pact, written in 1920, and the Fundamental Law of Organization, acted as 
constitutional documents through the Turkish War of Independence. The National Pact was a 
“fundamental statement of the nationalist programme” advocating sovereignty for all Muslim 
Ottomans, and not just Turkish national sovereignty, therefore significantly including Turks, 
Kurds, and smaller groups like the Laz and Circassians (Çerkez) (Zürcher 2004, 139). The 
National Pact stated that the territory inhabited by this Ottoman Muslim majority formed an 
indivisible whole, and that the Arab majority territories, the Armenian provinces, and western 
Thrace should be determined by plebiscite (2004, 139). International forces should secure the 
capital and the Straits for shipping, and the rights of minorities would be established in 
conformity with the treaties concluded between the Entente and European states;” furthermore, a 
return of the Capitulations would be unacceptable (2004, 139). 
The January 1921 Fundamental Law of Organization (Teşkilât-I Esasye Kanunu) was the 
de facto constitution of the resistance movement, which had allowed it to function as a republic 
within the legal framework of the Ottoman Empire. As constitutional texts, these documents 
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opposed the internationally negotiated Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, which gave 
France, Britain, Italy, and Greece substantial parts of formerly Ottoman territory, made the 
Armenian provinces of Eastern Anatolia independent, and internationalized the Dardanelles 
Straits, leaving what would be Turkey with “…only a rump state in northern Asia Minor with 
Istanbul as its capital … Kurdistan to the north of the province of Mosul was left with the 
Ottoman Empire, but was to receive autonomy and the right to appeal for independence” 
(Zürcher 2004, 147). 
The nationalist forces, called the Unionists for the CUP, at this time had Mustafa Kemal 
generally leading their armed forces, and were victorious in their war against the Greek 
occupation of Western Thrace, which had moved toward Ankara. Subsequently, the Greeks, 
French, and Italians withdrew their forces, and the Entente decided that the Treaty of Sèvres, 
which had left Turkey disgraced, would need to be revised. Negotiations began for the Treaty of 
Lausanne, in which the nationalists were tougher in their bargaining and Turkey regained most 
of the territory it had lost, sans the Arab majority territories.  
From the Treaty of Sèvres, in 1920, to the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923, Turkey had 
fundamentally changed its position in the international order (P. M. Brown 1924). Among the 
clauses were those creating a Commission chaired by a Turk that would oversee the 
internationalized Straits, and the abolition of the Capitulations, making all citizens of Turkey 
subject to Turkish courts, including foreigners (Zürcher 2004, 162; P. M. Brown 1923). 
Foreigners would be allowed to decide only matters of personal status according to their own 
courts and customs. 
Turkey “bound itself to protect its citizens, regardless of creed, nationality or language;” 
however, there was to be no international supervision of Turkey’s handling of its minorities 
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(2004, 162). Domestically, policy towards minorities had been changed drastically, by removing 
all references to “Armenia” or “Kurdistan,” reflecting the past genocide against Armenians and 
the suppression of the Kurds. Turkey proceeded with a population exchange program that 
removed larger Greek and Armenian Christian communities, making Anatolia an approximately 
98 percent Muslim territory that largely spoke Ottoman Turkish and Kurdish, with the remaining 
smaller groups (Greek, Armenian and Syriac-speaking Christians, Spanish-speaking Jews, and 
Circassian, Laz and Arabic-speaking Muslims) as well as immigrants from the Balkans, making 
up the final two percent (2004, 164). 
In March and April of 1922, Mustafa Kemal consolidated his power in several steps. 
First, the “Gazi,” or victorious soldier, turned his Defense of Rights Group into the Republican 
People’s Party; then called simply the People’s Party (Halk Firkası). In his next move, Mustafa 
Kemal made campaigning for the Sultanate or Caliphate illegal through an amendment to the 
High Treason Law. He then dissolved the existing assembly, tightly controlled the following 
elections for the new assembly, and controlled the People’s Party through his existing 
hierarchical organizational structures, which were increasingly kept cohesive through repressive 
tactics (2004, 158, 166).  
Still, the constitutional order was unclear, as the “Assembly” elected according to the 
Ottoman election laws still ruled the country, and also directly elected the President and every 
other Minister. While the Sultanate had been abolished, the Caliphate had not. Many continued 
to see the Caliph as head of state, and in theory, as head of the whole Muslim world, leaving the 
relationship between the Assembly and the Caliph unclear (2004, 166). 
Next, Mustafa Kemal made a proposal to “proclaim a republic, with an elected president, 
a prime minister appointed by the president and a conventional cabinet system … the majority in 
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the assembly accepted the proposals and, on 29 October 1923, the Turkish Republic was 
proclaimed, with Mustafa Kemal as its first president and İsmet İnönü as its first prime minister 
(2004, 167). Following, immediately after the opening of the new parliamentary year, the 
Caliphate was abolished and the Ottoman dynasty exiled. After extensive discussions, a new 
republican constitution was adopted in April 1924.  
Zürcher notably draws a parallel between the constitutional movements of the Young 
Turks and the constitutional period establishing the Republic. Both began as campaigns for the 
restoration of the constitution, or a movement for national sovereignty, gained that power, shared 
that power for a certain period with others in a pluralistic and relatively free environment for a 
short period, and finally established their own power monopoly or authoritarian regime, and used 
it to push through a radical program of reforms. While the Unionists brutally repressed the 
Armenians to do so, the Republicans repressed the Kurds. He notes: 
 “…when the choice was between a democratic system with a slower pace of reform and an authoritarian 
one with more opportunities for radical measures, the second alternative won out because what counted for 
the Young Turks in the end was the strengthening and survival of the state, democracy (or 
‘constitutionalism’ or ‘national sovereignty’) being a means to that end, not an end in itself.” (2004, 173, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Indeed, Mustafa Kemal’s first acts in the Republic were those of an authoritarian leader, and 
included banning any organization or publication the regime considered to cause a disturbance to 
law and order for two years, by having the assembly pass the Law on the Maintenance of Order 
(Takrir-i Sükn Kanunu) or martial law (2004, 171).  
This consolidation of power decisively influenced political life in Turkey in an 
authoritarian sense until Turkey was forced to address its single party state as a precondition to 
benefit from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan after World War Two (2004, 209). The 
single-party regime, from 1924 until 1945, changed nearly every visible facet of the former 
Empire through reforms of its alphabet, language, dress codes, legal codes, and the relationship 
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between state and religion, in a far-reaching social and cultural reform program intended to 
remake the society and culture of Turkey. In many ways, this reform was intended to take place 
through rewriting the history of the Turks and their culture and language through his historical 
speech “Nutuk” and advancement of theories such as the Sun Language Theory (Zürcher 2004; 
M. Sükrü Hanioglu 2013; Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Mustafa Kemal then became “Atatürk,” or 
“father of the Türks,” through one of the reforms prescribing surnames for Turkish citizens.  
The Turkish regime of the latter half of the single-party period, in the 1930s and 1940s, 
resembled other authoritarian regimes in southern Europe in this era, most directly emulating 
Mussolini’s Italy. Zürcher writes that it differed from them; however, in that it uniformly did not 
want public participation, but rather, cultural reform: “…it was not culturally and religiously 
conservative, but on the contrary attempted a far-reaching cultural revolution in a conservatively 
religious society” (2004, 185). Kemalists also never attempted any large-scale or permanent 
mobilization of the population for its goals, and, while undoubtedly authoritarian and totalitarian, 
the existence of an all-powerful, personalist leader was not made into a guiding political 
principle with its own legitimacy. Moreover, the Turks were cautious, defensive, and realist in 
their military endeavors, rather than expansionist or irredentist, though they did not hesitate to 
use violence within the elite network to preserve its hierarchical, cohesive order (2004, 186). 
Most importantly, Zürcher writes, “…the semblance of a democratic system with a parliament 
and elections was carefully left in place” (2004, 186, emphasis mine). 
5.2.2.1 Reform Processes: 1921 and 1924 
 
The processes of constitution-writing were missed opportunities for democratic inclusion 
in the early Republic; processes were moderately short and mostly inflexible (Özbudun 2011). 
  113 
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was elected both as a Constitutional Convention and as 
an acting Parliament on April 23, 1920. The Assembly began debates for a new Constitution in 
November 1920, and ratified the Constitution in January 1921. Significantly, the 1921 
Constitution was the first to consecrate national sovereignty, rather than deriving sovereignty 
from the Ottoman Sultan, and it was amended once in 1923 to declare the Turkish Republic. In 
1924, the Constitution was replaced with one that included a Presidency. Negotiations were 
short, but did take place, and were deliberative, at least amongst those who were chosen to 
participate: 
“The Grand National Assembly devoted one day in each week from March 9 to April 20, 1924 to 
discussing the Commission’s draft. On March 11 it adopted a special rule of procedure which required, for 
the approval of an article or of the Constitution as a whole, a two thirds vote of the absolute majority of 
members elected to the Assembly, the absolute majority being the opening quorum for discussions” (Earle 
1925, 83). 
 
Unlike its predecessor, which had only 23 articles, the 1924 Constitution had 105 articles and 
served as the basis for Atatürk’s “revolution from above” to transform Turkey into a modern, 
secular, and democratic Republic. As Mead Earle wrote, the West looked quite favorably, if not 
hesitantly, upon the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution, with which Turkey established the 
foundations for a democracy (Earle 1925): 
“Turkey has provided herself with the machinery of a democratic republic. The operation of the machinery 
will require skill, patience and determination. She cannot be expected to achieve immediate perfection in 
the difficult task she has undertaken. Like other infant republics, she will make mistakes. If errors of intent 
and errors of judgment, however, are looked upon chiefly as occasions for self-improvement, the new 
Turkish Republic will win well merited respect.” 
 
The 1924 constitution was amended in 1928, 1931, 1934 (to include women in Parliament), 1937 
(to further define secularism), 1945 and 1952 (to allow for multi-party politics), and in 1960, 
before being replaced in 1961. Most notably, in 1945, the constitution was amended to allow for 
multi-party elections, drastically changing the terrain of Turkish politics by allowing the rise of 
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opposition parties to the Republican’s People’s Party to participate and succeed in politics, which 
led to the next constitutional period in Turkish history. 
5.2.3 Second Constitutional Period 
1960 Solution: reg*pro*NET*rep*eqa*pin*civ 
1961, 1971 Solution: reg*pro*NET*rep*EQA*PIN*CIV 
1972, 1974 Solution: REG*PRO*NET*rep*eqa*pin*CIV 
1981 Solution: reg*pro*NET*rep*EQA*PIN*CIV 
1982 Solution: reg*pro*net*rep*eqa*pin*civ 
 
The rise and decline of military influence or tutelage over the political system is the 
major theme of the second constitutional period of the Turkish Republic. Though the discourse 
generally attributes the military’s actions to the safeguarding the legacy the Kemalist revolution, 
there were also other incentives. During the period in which the first civilian political party ruled, 
the Democrat Party (DP), or Demokrasi Partisi, the military and bureaucracy that were the major 
benefiters of Atatürk’s reforms saw their privilege disappear. However, the means to achieve 
power used by the DP did include religious or ideological inducements to voters that were still 
by and large, conservative, religious, Muslims, and, in general, they were quite displeased with 
the ruling of the RPP throughout the 1940s.  
While guarding the Republican and secular legacy of Kemalism was indeed a driving 
factor for some, so too were regaining the economic benefits and political privileges that came 
with being associated with the RPP during the single-party period. Electoral competition greatly 
decreased the strength of the RPP, allowing discontent within the organization and the agencies 
it controlled to turn the party into factions, and even separate parties, before it regrouped into a 
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powerful informal influence over politics in what is sometimes referred to as the “deep state” 
through the military coup d’états of 1960, 1971, and 1980. 
The DP gained a controlling share of Parliamentary seats in the 1950 elections in the first 
multi-party elections allowed in Turkey. However, despite the democratization that had taken 
place at the behest of President İnönü through the initiation of multi-party Parliamentary politics 
in 1945, the democratically elected civilian regime that was overthrown by military forces on 
May 27, 1960, was no longer democratic and used repression as a tactic to stay in power.  
The ruling DP had won fair elections in 1950 and 1954, but it had resorted to non-
democratic tactics such as vote rigging, gerrymandering, limiting media access for the 
opposition, harassing the opposition, and outlawing assemblies by 1957. After allegations of 
election fraud, preparations were made for a recount, but the building that the ballot boxes were 
moved and burnt down before the recount could be started, and all seats in the contested area 
were awarded to the ruling party, lending further credence to the claims of fraud (Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz 2014). 
In 1960, a coup d’état planned by mid-level officers ousted the civilian government, 
ordered capital punishment for the regime’s highest executives, dissolved the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, and established a military group to rule. The group was called the 
Committee for National Unity (CNU), and it consisted of a 38 officers (Haddad 1965). The 1961 
Constitution they promulgated is widely known as Turkey’s most democratic constitution, and 
created a classic parliamentary structure (Gönenç 2008), although it by no means rested on 
democratic, or participatory, foundations (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009). It did, however, offer 
opportunities for much more political diversity and participation in Turkey, which led to growth 
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of political parties, trade unions, and right-wing organizations that engaged in increasing 
amounts of political violence through the 1970s and 1980s. 
The 1961 Constitution also established a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu, or NSC) that formalized the military’s prominent political role (W. M. Hale 1994). 
Although the regime turned the state back over to civilian rule in 1961, over the next twenty 
years, the Council “gradually extended its influence over government policy and became a 
powerful watchdog, sometimes replacing the cabinet as the center of real power and decision-
making” (Svolik 2012). This influence can be seen in the growing, constitutionally-mandated 
positions and appointment and nomination procedures the military obtained for the executive and 
the judiciary within the governance structure of the Turkish Republic in the constitutional 
revisions of the 1970s through 1982. 
On the 12th of March in 1971, the military high command handed the Prime Minister a 
memorandum in Turkey that “demanded that a strong and credible government be formed that 
would be able to end the ‘anarchy’ and carry out reforms ‘in a Kemalist spirit’. If the demands 
were not met, the army would ‘exercise its constitutional duty’ and take over power itself,” 
culminating in a “coup by memorandum” (Zürcher 2004, 258). Throughout the 1970s, the 
military, through the NSC, became a major political player in an unstable decade of coalition 
governments and, as mentioned earlier, an environment of extreme societal left-right political 
violence. In this position of influence, the military enacted a third coup d’état on the 12th of 
September in 1980, due to “ increasing law and order problems, Kurdish separatism, a political 
system that seemed completely deadlocked and an economy in tatters … and the threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism” (2004, 268). 
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On September 12th, 1980, the military, led by General Kenan Evren and the rest of the 
military high command, issued a communiqué that it had taken over political power because 
state organs had stopped functioning. Therefore it dissolved Parliament, deposed the Cabinet, 
lifted the immunity of members of the Assembly, dissolved all political parties and trade unions, 
arrested political party leaders, dismissed mayors and municipal councils, closed newspapers, 
radios, and television stations, prohibited political discussion, and declared a state of emergency 
allowing no one to leave the country (2004, 278). Within weeks after the coup d’état, repression 
was at the highest level since the Young Turk revolution: “11,500 people were arrested; by the 
end of 1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests had been made. 
By September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still in prison, 30,000 of them 
awaiting trial” (2004, 279). The generals saw their work as undoing the work of the National 
Unity Committee of 1960, and saving democracy from the politicians by concentrating all power 
in the hands of the military. The formation of the National Security Council was changed to 
include only members of the military. 
The 1982 Constitution in Turkey, as opposed to that of 1961, is Turkey’s most draconian 
constitution, one in which the state is protected from the people, rather than the people protected 
from the state. The 1982 Constitution strengthened the National Security Council, which became 
composed of the commander of the gendarmerie and the armed services chiefs. The 1980 regime 
formally passed power back to civilian opposition in 1983, when the Parliamentary elections 
were won by the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, or ANAP), a party not allied with the 
military, but its informal influence extended into the early 2000s (Ahmad 1985). 
 
  118 
5.2.3.1 Reform Processes: 1961, 1970 
 
On May 27th, 1960, the day of the coup d’état, “five law professors from the University 
of Istanbul … were summoned to Ankara and given the task of drawing up a new constitution,” 
on the 28th, they issued a “modern-day fetva” or fatwa, justifying military intervention on the 
grounds that the DP government had acted unconstitutionally (2004, 242). In June, the NUC 
issued a provisional constitution to give a legal basis to the coup and to itself as a legitimate 
governing body, guided by an executive cabinet of technocrats, and legally assisted by a team of 
professors. However, all important policy decisions were made by the NUC itself (2004, 242). 
The process was short and inflexible; the commission of professors charged with drawing up a 
new constitution exceeded its one-month deadline, because of differences of opinion among the 
experts, submitting a draft to the NUC in mid-October. Three of its members, led by the 
chairman, Onar, had little faith in the politicians and were in favour of a detailed document that 
would bind them hand and foot, while two others (Tarık Zafer Tunaya and İsmet Giritli) favored 
a constitution that would leave maximum scope to the political parties to develop the system. 
Early in September, Onar had Tunaya and Giritli removed from the commission. 
A separate group of professors from Ankara University had also drawn up a draft 
constitution. Professor Yavuz Abadan headed this group. This group insisted on semi-public 
involvement in the constitutional reform process, resulting in the convening of a Constituent 
Assembly in January of 1961, which had an upper house consisting of the NUC and a lower 
house consisting of the 272 remaining representatives of the political parties, professional 
groups, and of the provinces. The Constitutional Committee then grew from the original five to 
twenty, chaired by Professors Enver Ziya Karal and Turhan Feyzioğlu, whose “main aim [as] the 
authors of the new constitution was to prevent a power monopoly such as the DP (and the RPP 
  119 
before it) had held, by counterbalancing the national assembly with other institutions” (Zürcher 
2004). 
The 1961 Constitution was remarkably different from the 1924 Constitution, among the 
major points worth noting here are the following (2004, 247): full bill of civil liberties; the 
introduction of proportional representation; the creation of a second chamber, the Senate, 
partially appointed and partially elected, which could overrule the lower, elected, chamber’s two-
thirds majority with a veto; the creation of an independent Constitutional Court which had 
jurisdiction to find legislation unconstitutional; a fully autonomous judiciary and university 
system, and freedom of the press; a constitutionally guaranteed position of influence for the 
military through the creation of the NSC, chaired by the President or in his absence, the Prime 
Minister, with the Chief of General Staff and ministers as ex officio members, which advised the 
government on internal and external security; and the prohibition of the political use of religion, 
which had been incorporated into the High Treason Law in 1925 and into the penal code in 1949; 
were all incorporated in 1961 into the new constitution. 
The 1961 Constitution was amended in 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1980, and 1981, 
until a new military regime, led by General Evren, passed a new constitution in 1982. These 
amendments, between the NUC’s 1960 coup d’état, and the NSC’s 1980 military coup d’etat, 
made Turkey a hybrid parliamentary system with a strong executive, which, along with the 
judiciary, were heavily influenced by the military. Amendments to articles 61, 64, 110, 111, 114, 
120, 124, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 151, 152, and temporary articles 
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, and 20 restructured the governance system to move from Parliamentary 
and inclusive, to military tutelage and draconian. The military also found its insulated place of 
influence within the government through separating its finances (article 127) the establishment of 
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State Security Courts (article 136), and allowing those previously convicted of a crime to be 
elected (article 148 and removal of temporary article 11). The amendments made to the 1961 
Constitution in the 1970s also limited the basic rights of Turkish citizens to a degree where the 
rights could be limited in almost any case that those in power deemed necessary, while due 
process and personal security rights were restricted. This occurred through amendments to 
articles 30 and 32. Freedoms established for association and assembly and freedom of speech 
and the press were severely limited. This occurred through amendments to articles 11, 15, 19, 22, 
26, 29, 46, 57, 119, 121, and temporary articles 16 and 22. These limitations were slowly lifted 
over the next two decades. 
5.3 GENERATING HEURISTICS 
In this section I aggregate the heuristics generated in the analysis to create the two dynamics of 
overt constitutional authoritarianism with sham and weak constitutions, and stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism. First, the overt constitutional authoritarian dynamic is characterized by 
consolidated regimes, weak or sham constitutions, and repression. The other dynamic, stealth 
constitutional authoritarianism, is characterized by an increase or decrease in civil and political 
rights, and a decrease in repression. The heuristics characterize constitutions, authoritarianisms, 
and system structures, including elite cohesion and repression. 
To characterize constitutions, the following heuristics were generated. The 
summarization of the case solutions show that the equality, personal integrity, and civil and 
political constitutional rights can indicate a sham constitution, while the absence of them 
indicates a weak constitution; 




An intermediate category also exists, in which sham and weak constitutions may or may not 
occur with civil and political rights, indicating that civil and political rights may be an important 
policy concession for persuasion or tool for authoritarian dominance or control: 
 
eqa*pin*CIV = weak with policy concessions 
EQA*PIN*civ = sham with tool for control of political participation 
 
To characterize varieties of authoritarianism, the following heuristics were generated. 
Authoritarian consolidation or integration of political institutions with repression and no public 
involvement or transparency indicates overt authoritarianism (reg*pro*rep), while decreasing 
authoritarian consolidation or integration of political institutions with inclusive processes, 
transparency, or participation in an environment of repression indicates stealth authoritarianism. 
The latter without repression indicates a “democratic interlude” or stealth authoritarianism 
without repression: 
reg*pro*rep = overt authoritarianism 
REG*PRO*rep = stealth authoritarianism 
REG*PRO*REP = democratic interlude/ stealth with no repression 
 
To characterize system structures, elite cohesion, and repression, the following heuristics were 
generated. Combined with strength of repressive tactics, the following equations represent strong 
or weak repressive or non-repressive states according to their degree of cohesion or factionalism 
among hierarchical or opinion-leader networks. 
 
net*rep = cohesive with repression (strong repressive state) 
net or NET*REP = cohesive or factionalized without repression (strong/ weak state) 
NET*rep = factionalized with repression (weak repressive state) 
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In all cases of constitutional change examined here, from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the 
present day constitutional reform under the AKP, the negotiations of constitutional reform 
processes were missed opportunities for advancing authentic constitutional democracy through 
democratic deliberation or political participation. As the examination of cases of constitutional 
change show, the legal development of Turkish constitutionalism was, over time, used more and 
more explicitly to serve the purposes of different regimes’ intentions to look democratic or 
utilize democracy as a means to other ends, for the purposes consolidating power or increasing 
the longevity of their regime.  
The tactics used by the regimes became more nuanced and evolved over time, resulting in 
a democratic façade that was to serve as the “model of democracy in the Muslim world. This 
learning by different regimes to use constitution-making as policy change for authoritarian 
longevity, I argue, shows the evolution of political leaders’ ability to manipulate legal tools to 
transform “overt” authoritarianism into “stealth” authoritarianism, depending on the increasing 
ability to adapt to and even utilize the requirements of international democracy promotion to 
their own advantage. As Turkey established more linkages to, and more democratization aid 
programs from, Western interests – the Marshall Plan, NATO, the European Communities, and 
the European Union – over time, regimes learned to use policy reforms to meet external demands 
and internal goals. 
The cases of constitutional change examined here across centuries of rule in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Republic of Turkey also potentially show how the dynamics of factionalization 
within different network structures with elites under repression lead to authoritarian instability or 
longevity as they destabilize the network, as well as how regime leaders use the tools of 
constitutions and constitutional change to effect that longevity, or not. First, the low-motivated, 
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highly cohesive hierarchical network structure of the Ottoman dynastic monarchy broke down 
into factions and developed into a high-motivated, but highly factionalized, opinion-leader 
network that was the Young Turk and CUP movement.  
This movement then further evolved, through military experience, and the organizational 
prowess of Atatürk (Rustow 1968) into the highly-motivated, and forcibly cohesive hierarchical 
structure of the Republican People’s Party, which remained in power with moderate repression, 
until the advent of multiple party politics and the rise of the DP in the 1950s. Atatürk’s regime is 
said to emulate fascist Italy under Mussolini with the exceptions of discouraging “leader 
worship” and popular mobilization; however, electoral competition greatly reduced its 
organizational power and allowed pre-existing conflicts to birth into factions, and eventually, 
into multiple political parties, in the 1950s.  
The political parties in Turkish politics from that point forward took the shape of highly-
factionalized opinion-leader network structures, until the military regrouped through its many 
formal, and sometimes armed, interventions in politics in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and through 
informal interventions in politics through the early 2000s. The military may or may not have 
created a “deep state” – conspiracy theories are not provable – but political leaders from the 
armed forces did consolidate power through taking executive and judicial agencies and powers 
under their control. Further, the agents of “military tutelage” did not hesitate to use violence and 
repression when they saw fit, which decimated political participation in Turkey through the 
1980s, and repressed the Kurdish minority extensively in the 1990s, in order to “save democracy 
from politics” and to save the idea of “Turkishness.” 
This chapter operationalized semi-authoritarian regimes as political organizational system 
networks, with varying degrees of institutional or regime consolidation, through integration by 
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the monarchy, military, or party organizations over what should be separated branches of 
government, including the executive’s leadership functions, the assembly’s function for popular 
representation, and the judiciary’s role in preserving legal impartiality or neutrality (Wright, 
Honaker, and Geddes 2014; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013). Comparative constitutional 
scholars have argued that authoritarian regimes utilize constitutional changes to supplement 
regimes’ needs for legitimacy at domestic and international levels. Therefore, incorporating 
varieties of regimes into the analysis is vital to understanding why regimes make the 
constitutional choices that they do. Further abstracting the mechanisms underlying 
communication in these regimes according to their topological network structure adds a new 
dimension to the literature on semi-authoritarian regimes (Law and Versteeg 2013). These 
heuristics are used to generate hypotheses in the next chapter. 
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6.0  SYSTEM DYNAMICS: REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, 1982 TO 2011 
Political leaders in semi-authoritarian regimes have developed the capacity to use legal 
processes, such as constitutional change, to make their political systems more impenetrable to 
criticism and dissent. These regimes are increasingly difficult to oppose due to their enactment of 
rights clauses in constitutions and observance of rule-of-law polices that are selectively applied – 
according to incumbent political leaders’ discretion – but still exist for the purposes of claiming 
democratic standards, allowing the regimes to escape condemnation. How did regimes develop 
this capacity? Through a comparison of evolving regimes in Turkey, since the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, the last chapter showed how semi-authoritarian regimes have built this 
capacity by generating heuristics about system structure and system dynamics over the history of 
constitutional change in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. This chapter assesses the 
cases with a greater degree of detail, for the period 1982 to 2011.  
This chapter, using the logic of abduction, applies the heuristics generated in the last 
chapter, on constitutional change under semi-authoritarian regimes that have existed behind 
democratic façade in Turkey from 1876 to present, to elucidate hypotheses with an analysis that 
includes a dataset of observations of international democracy promotion and human rights 
standards from 1982 to 2011. Abduction infers hypotheses from observations that “should 
economize explanation for plausibility in terms of the feasible and natural,” to find the simplest, 
most likely, best explanation (Peirce 1935).  
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As noted in Chapter III, several characteristics make Turkey a “pathway case” for this 
comparison. Gerring defines a pathway case as “an intensive analysis of an individual case is to 
elucidate causal mechanisms (i.e., to clarify a theory) rather than to confirm or disconfirm a 
general theory” (Gerring 2007, 233). Joining together the literature on communication networks, 
semi-authoritarian regimes, and constitutional change, this research uses nested analyses of set-
theoretic cases utilizing the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method to generate 
hypothetical system dynamics of constitutional change under semi-authoritarianism. QCA 
assesses cases as “configurations of causally-relevant conditions” and therefore analyzes how 
different combinations of international democracy promotion, repression, and constitutional 
dynamics co-occur. Second, I use the conditions of institutional or regime consolidation, and 
repression to determine how to specify the constitutional semi-authoritarian dynamic, by 
measuring the difference between de jure constitutionalism and de facto observation of 
constitutional rights.   
6.1 THE 1982 TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 
In drafting and promulgating the 1982 Constitution, methods and procedures were again 
designed to be inclusive but occurred in an environment of absolute repression. Following the 
model of the NUC, the NSC established a consultative assembly (danıyşma meclisi) of 160 
members of which the NSC directly appointed 40 members, and indirectly appointed 120 after 
their nomination by NSC-appointed governors. The Consultative Assembly elected a 15 member 
constitutional committee, headed by Professor Orhan Aldıkaçtı, which produced the first 
constitutional draft in July of 1982. 
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While the methods and bodies were similar to those used in 1960 and 1961, the outcomes 
were nearly polar opposites, or a “reversal of the constitutional developments of 1960” (Zürcher 
2004, 281). Among the notable outcomes of the 1982 “tutelage” constitution were a further 
concentration of power in the Executive, through increased powers for the President and the 
NSC. Second, while something similar to a bill of rights was included, there were such severe 
limitations on the rights and freedoms of the individual that they could be annulled, suspended or 
limited for nearly any reason based on the grounds of the national interest, public order, national 
security, danger to the republican order and public health. These limitations affected, in 
particular, freedom of assembly, association, speech, and the press. Furthermore, some rights 
were banned, including the freedom to form trade unions, through the banning of political 
strikes, solidarity strikes and national strikes (2004, 281). The high number of rights with high 
limitations created something in between a “sham” constitution and a “weak” constitution 
because while rights were present, they were also legally limited for almost any reason. The 
Constitution was promulgated through a public referendum in which the public was forced to 
vote, and the vote was coupled to a provision that also made the leader of the coup, General 
Kenan Evren, the President for a seven-year term. 
Over the next decade, over the gradual return to civilian politics and political 
liberalization, the 1982 Constitution was amended to reflect liberalization. Turkey also began to 
harmonize its legislation with the acquis communitaire of the European Union on its road to 
accession, resulting in several harmonization packages in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
resulting amendments took place in 1987, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011. 
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After winning elections in large majorities in 2002, 2007, and 2011, from its entry into 
politics in 2002, and forming a cohesive opinion-leader network structure for governance, the 
ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) began a process in 
earnest to create a new Turkish constitution in 2007. In 2007, the party commissioned a panel of 
experts, led by Professor Ergün Özbudun, to write a draft that was condemned in many circles as 
being pro-AKP and not participatory. The process then slowed, until it again resurged with a 
government commissioned Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, or Constitutional Reconciliation 
Commission (AUK or CRC), in 2010. Civil society actors were encouraged to participate. 
However, the Commission’s work from 2011 to the present has not resulted in successful 
negotiations due to an inability to reach unanimity among the four political parties represented 
on the Commission. The process has not yet come to a definitive end though the results of the 
June 2015 elections suggest the AKP will not be able to unilaterally reform the constitution 
(Baburoglu and Göker 2014).  
Under the AKP, the Constitution has been amended in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2010, and 2011. In 2007, there was a controversy over the overturning of the ban on wearing the 
headscarf for females in public institutions, which was annulled by the Constitutional Court. The 
position of the President was also made into a directly-elected position after the political 
controversy generated when a non-military aligned politician, Abdullah Gül, a founder of the 
Justice and Development Party that currently holds power, was nominated to the Presidential 
position. As President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, another founder of the AKP, succeeded Gül in 
2015, as Turkey’s first directly elected President. In 2010, a constitutional referendum was also 
held that reduced the military’s influence over the judiciary, among other rights-enhancing 
amendments such as a human rights commission and an ombudsman. 
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6.1.1 Summary of Constitutional Changes of 1982 Constitution 
The 1982 Constitution of Turkey has been amended 17 times with changes affecting 113 articles 
so far (Ansay and Wallace 2011; Atikcan and Öge 2012; COŞKUN 2013; Gönenç 2004; 
Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009; Roznai and Yolcu 2012; Yüksel 2007). The changes are 
summarized on the following timeline in Table 3: 
 








1987 Lowered the voting age, changed the constitutional amendment procedure, increased the 
number of the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) and via 
referendum eliminated the provision than banned former politicians from practicing 
politics 
1988 Attempted to change the constitution to have early local elections, but was defeated in 
referendum 
1993 Abolished the state monopoly on radio and television broadcasting 
1995 Product of intense negotiation, resulted in significant changes that eliminated the 
rationale for the 1980 coup from the preamble; eliminated the bans on political 
activities of trade unions, associations, foundations, cooperatives and public 
professional organizations; allowed for cooperation between these organizations and 
political parties; increased the number of members of the TBMM; lowered the voting 
age further to 18; provided for right to vote to Turkish citizens living abroad; provided 
for the right to unionize for civil servants; lowered the age to become a member of the 
political party; allowed the instructors and students of higher education institutions to 
become members of political parties; allowed political parties to establish women and 
youth branches, foundations and organizations outside of Turkey; changed the 
conditions where one loses membership to TBMM and changed the consequences to 
members of an outlawed political party 
1999 Reorganized the functions and composition of State Security Courts and eliminated 
military judges from these courts. Another amendment in 1999 allowed for the 
privatization of public enterprises and made concession contracts subject to arbitration 
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Table 3 continued 
2001 This was the most comprehensive reform package; 33 articles and the preamble were 
modified. The bulk of these amendments were on fundamental rights and freedoms: 
eliminated the general restrictions on rights and freedoms; improved political and civil 
rights; enlarged the scope of social and economic rights; shortened the pre-trial 
detention; eliminated the phrase of "language prohibited by law;" restricted the death 
penalty to time of war and for crimes of terrorism; increased the quorum for political 
party prohibition cases, clarified the conditions of anti-constitutional activities and 
provided for gradual punishment system for political parties; altered the composition of 
the National Security Council to give numerical majority to civilians and highlighted 
the institution’s advisory nature and eliminated the ban on Constitutional Court’s power 
to review the laws passed under the military regime 
2002 Changed the clause that prevented Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election to the parliament 
and provided for an interim election. This amendment deviated from others as it catered 
to one individual and did not have democratization, liberalization or EU- conditionality 
motivation 
2004 Comprehensive constitutional change where the EU process primary driver: 
amendments eliminated all references to death penalty in the constitution; permitted 
affirmative action for women; abolished state security court; allowed for extradition of 
Turkish citizens in cases of offense under the International Criminal Court jurisdiction; 
eliminated the Chief of Military Staff’s right to appoint a member of the Board of 
Higher Education; allowed for Court of Account’s auditing of the Armed Forces; and 
most significantly established that international agreements take precedence in case of 
conflicts between international agreements and domestic law concerning fundamental 
rights and liberties 
2005 Reorganized the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) 
2006 Lowered the minimum age of holding public office 
2007-8 Crisis over the election of a new president; reactions to immediate constitutional crises. 
Taken to public referendum because of partisan deadlock. Approved by a popular 
referendum the 2007 constitutional amendment allowed for direct presidential election, 
shortened the legislative period to four years and established the quorum needed for 
parliamentary decisions as one-third of elected members. The early general elections, 
the Constitutional Court’s review of the amendments, the parliamentary election of the 
new president and the concurrent referendum for the 2007 amendments led to a 
discrepancy, which was resolved by another constitutional amendment in October 2007. 
While the AKP-initiated debate on fully revamping the constitution was ongoing, AKP 
and MHP agreed on another constitutional change on two articles regarding the 
principle of equality (Article 10) and the right to education (Article 42) 
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Table 3 continued 
2008-10 Taken to public referendum because of partisan deadlock; restructuring of judiciary 
embedded in reforms bolstering rights/ liberties/ rule-of-law. Intended to abolish the 
headscarf ban for female university students, annulled by the Constitutional Court on 
the grounds that it violated the unamendable principle of secularism. The AKP-
supported constitutional amendment package. While the most important provisions of 
the amendment were related to composition and appointment structure of the 
Constitutional Court (AYM) and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), 
these were embedded in a 26-article package that seemingly bolstered rights and 
liberties and rule of law. These included the introduction of the office of Ombudsman 
and the individual complaint mechanism; strengthening rights of children and other 
disadvantaged groups; establishing a separate secretariat and budget for HSYK; 
increasing the quorum of Constitutional Court in party prohibition and review of 
constitutionality of constitutional amendment cases; strengthening the right of collective 
bargaining for civil servants; introduced new rights such as personal data protection and 
right to become members of different labor unions at the same time, allowing judicial 
monitoring of the Supreme Military Council’s decisions and ending the judicial 
immunity of the 1980 coup-makers 
2011 Disciplinary process of sport federations was the final change to the 1982 Constitution 
 
6.2 QCA ANALYSIS 
I generate hypotheses in this chapter by connecting comparative constitutionalists’ insights about 
authoritarian political systems and constitutions with empirical implications drawn from the 
previous chapter. The hypotheses generated are that dynamics of constitutionalism under semi-
authoritarianism result from the structure of the interrelationships between external actors 
promoting democracy, regime actors within the political organizational structure, the uniformity 
of their preferences and motivation, or factionalism, the resulting process of negotiations at the 
constitutional level under semi-authoritarianism, and the repression utilized by the regime as a 
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response to their potential of losing power. The results of the hypothesis-generating analysis, 
using different observational data for further detail, are presented below. 
Data were gathered for each case from historical, historiographical, and contemporary 
sources on regimes, constitutional negotiation processes, network structures and factionalism, 
repression, international democracy promotion,11 and on the processes of constitutional change, 
in Turkey. 12  The detailed coding schemes are in the previous chapter, below, and in Appendix 
A.  In order to calculate the degree of belonging for each condition in the analysis, I calculated 
                                                 
11 To code international democracy promotion in the 1982-2011 period, I gathered data from 
regarding aid for these efforts specifically intended for democracy and governance within 
Turkey. From AidData.org, I calculated levels of aid to Turkey for Governmental and civil 
society (general) (Code: 151), Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security (Code: 
152), Support to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Government Organizations 
(Code: 920), Government and Civil Society (Code: 150). The data showed nearly 6 Billion 
dollars in international funding from 1980 to 2011 through 1,101 projects and 14 funding 
organizations including Australia, Austria, the World Bank, Belgium, Canada, European 
Communities, Denmark, Global Environment Facility, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Korea, United Nations, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, United States, Sweden, Switzerland. The top funders were the European communities, 
from 1997 to 1999, and from 2001 to 2012, with peaks in 2004 and 2006, and also the World 
Bank from 2004 to 2008. The World Bank and United States, also gave small amounts in 1995, 
with Sweden and Germany also contributing substantial amounts in small amount in 1996, and 
since 1999. 
12 Regime types were coded according to the dimensions used by Svolik in his coding of semi-
authoritarian political systems (Svolik 2012). Process conditions were coded according to 
characteristics found to be important under different network structures for negotiations (Lilja 
2012). Network conditions types were coded according to the characteristics found to be 
empirically important by Siegel in his research on network structures and collective action, and 
on collective action under repression under different network structures (Siegel 2009; Siegel 
2011). According to Siegel’s empirical results, Hierarchical communication network structures 
have the observable implications of 1) a rigid chain of influence, with 2) few superiors and many 
subordinates, and a 3) defined organizational structure, in which communication flows 
downward through the network; Opinion-Leader communication network structures have the 
observable implications of 1) a few leaders drive opinion, 2) information that comes from 
common sources, and 3) a skewed distribution of connections (Siegel 2009; Siegel 2011). 
Repression was coded as low, moderate, or high, according to data gathered from historical and 
contemporary sources of actions taken by regimes during major periods of constitutional change, 
as noted in the historical narratives previously presented. 
  133 
the threshold using a hierarchical clustering technique based on the squared Euclidean distances 
between cluster means (Murtagh 1985). However, thresholds derived for fsQCA are not to be 
confused with ordinal rankings of variables, unless the theoretical basis for the case assignment 
for that condition is a lower to a higher degree of belonging. In this analysis, the condition values 
assigned to each case were constructed in indices such that absence or “0” is pure or overt 
authoritarianism and presence, or “1,” is inclusive, constitutional democracy, with the exception 
of the network structure and factionalization variable, which extends from a cohesive 
hierarchical structure (“0”), to the highest degree of factionalization, or civil war.  
 
Table 4. Defining fsQCA Conditions and Outcomes 
 
 
Code Description What Presence and Absence Means 
REG regime, or authoritarian 
institutional configuration 
REG = maximum separation of powers 
reg = integrated control over political institutions 
PRO process, or negotiations PRO=more inclusive, transparent, public process, incl. 
referendums 
pro=more exclusive, secretive, elite process 
NET network, or network 
structure and uniformity 
of preferences 
NET=more factionalized opinion leader or hierarchical 
structure 
net=more cohesive opinion leader or hierarchical 
structure 
REP level of repression REP=lower strength/technology of repression 
rep=higher strength/technology of repression 
EQA equality EQA=constitutional equality rights 
eqa=no equality rights 
PIN personal integrity PIN=constitutional personal integrity rights 
pin=no personal integrity rights 
CIV civil and political rights CIV=constitutional civil/ political rights, including 
minority rights  
civ=no 
OUT Outcome 1=authoritarian stability 0=authoritarian instability 
 
Given the descriptive statistical analysis performed on the percent change indices in 
constitutional change, and the decreasing returns of including more conditions in the Boolean-
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based fsQCA analysis, I decided to perform the fsQCA with only the equality, personal integrity 
rights, and civil and political rights indices along with regime, network, process, and repression, 
yielding a total of seven conditions for this analysis. The fsQCA was performed using the 
enhanced Quine-McCluskey classic algorithm (eqmcc in the R package), an enhancement of the 
classical Quine-McCluskey minimization algorithm used to create QCA by Ragin (Thiem 2014). 
EQMCC can derive “complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions from a truth table object 
or a suitable dataset” (Thiem and Duşa 2013, 92). The conditions are summarized in Table 4 
above. 
First, regime type (REG) is calibrated on a scale from consolidated authoritarian to more 
democratic according to its institutional makeup (Svolik 2012). Second, negotiation processes 
(PRO) are calibrated on a scale from exclusive and secretive, to inclusive, deliberative, and 
transparent (Young 2002). Third, regimes’ network structures (NET) and the uniformity of elite 
preferences are calibrated on a scale from cohesive hierarchical (0)/ opinion leader networks 
(0.25) to factionalized hierarchical (0.5)/ opinion leader (0.75) networks, which are subject to 
and also enact various levels of repression (REP) with different strength and technologies on 
citizens (Siegel 2009; Siegel 2011). Finally, “sham” or “weak” de jure constitutionalism (EQA, 
CIV, PIN) is calibrated on three index scales from low levels of de jure rights/provisions to high 
levels of de jure rights/provisions for constitutional democracy (Law and Versteeg 2013; Varol 
2014). 
As in Chapter IV, each constitution and its major amendments were coded using 
Versteeg’s extensive coding scheme for constitutional rights and policies, aggregated into six 
indices of constitutional change: personal integrity, equality rights, civil and political rights, 
socio-economic and property rights, judicial review, and government structure. For the de facto 
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observation of democratic constitutionalism, I used the data available from 1982 to 2011 from 
the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset (David L. Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2015). 
The third and final period of constitutional change in Turkey, starting from the 1982 Constitution 
and its amendments before and under the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is analyzed 
below. 
6.3 QCA HYPOTHESIS-GENERATION, 1982-2011 
For the 1982 to 2011 analysis, I created an index of de facto observation of rights and de jure 
constitutional guarantee of those rights, to factor those conditions that led to the degree of 
“Sham” or “Weak” constitutional environment. The factors included were Regime (REG), 
Process (PRO), Network type (NET) and Factionalism or motivation (FACT). Although they 
were combined in Chapter IV, the latter two are separated in this analysis. Regimes’ network 
structures (NET) are coded as 1 or hierarchical (military, monarchy) or 0 or opinion-leader 
(party, personalistic); uniformity of elite preferences are calibrated on a scale from cohesive (0) 
to factionalized (1); and levels of repression (REP) with different strength and technologies on 
citizens are calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1. International influence is captured by the degree of 
international democracy promotion’s aid to Turkey. Figure 10 below shows the trend in aid 
specifically only for democracy and governance in Turkey from all donors, both North 
American, European, and bilateral, since much of Turkey’s aid has come from Europe in the last 
decade. 
 





Figure 10. Democracy Promotion Levels, Turkey, 1982 to 2011 
 
The gap between constitutional commitments and regimes’ practice of constitutional rights is 
represented on a continuum from sham (1) to weak (0) constitutions. For this outcome, I 
calculated the difference between the de jure level of commitment and de facto observation of 
equality rights, civil and political rights, personal integrity rights, and independence of the 
judiciary, as shown in Table 5. The outcome is constructed using Cingranelli-Richards Human 
Rights dataset (CIRI) and the constitutional coding described below (David L. Cingranelli, 
Richards, and Clay 2015). Torture, imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings are 
de facto observations of de jure constitutional commitments on the rights to life, the prohibition 
of torture, and fair trial rights, for example. Violations of freedoms to assemble, of free speech, 
and of free movement, are contrasted with the constitutional commitments for equality, women’s 
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Table 5. Coding Grievance: De Jure Rights vs. De Facto Observation 
 
 
 Personal Integrity Equality and Civil and 
Political Rights 
Independence of the 
Judiciary 
De Jure Level of 
Rights 
37 codes pertaining to 
the right to life, torture, 
negative liberty rights, 
fair trial rights, and 
privacy rights (Scale 0-
37) 
37 codes on general 
rights, including 
equality rights, 
women’s rights, and 
rights for particular 
groups, including 
children, family, 
minorities, disabled; and 
34 codes pertaining to 
civil and political rights  
(Scale 0-81) 
20 codes on judicial 
review provisions  
(Scale 0-20) 
De Facto Observation 
of Rights 









of Assembly and 
Association, Freedom of 
Speech, Freedom of 
Religion, Foreign and 
Domestic Freedom of 
Movement  
(Scale 0-14) 
Independence of the 
judiciary of control 
from other branches of 






Index ((De Jure – De Facto) + 1)/2 = score between 0 and 1 to be dichotomized as 




The next section goes into further detail based on the overt and stealth authoritarianism 
heuristics generated in the previous analysis to generate hypotheses about external influence, 
network structure, factionalism, and repression, as they relate to sham and weak constitutional 
environments.  
  138 
6.3.1 De Jure Constitutional Commitments, 1982 to 2011 
In this period, the de jure constitutional level of personal integrity rights, civil and 
political rights, judicial independence, and governance, gradually increased over time, while 





Figure 11. Turkish Constitutional Commitments 1982-2011 
 
6.3.2 De Facto Observations, 1982 to 2011 
On the other hand, de facto observation of personal integrity rights, equality, civil, and political 
rights, and independence of the judiciary is more complicated, as shown in Figure 12, in which a 



















































































Figure 12. Observation of Constitutional Rights 1982-2011 
 
 
Finally, Figure 13 shows the differences between the written commitments to de jure 
constitutional rights and the observed level of de facto constitutional indices for personal 
integrity rights, empowerment (equality, civil, and political rights), and independence of the 
judiciary. In Figure 13, a difference above zero suggests that the observed level of rights is 
greater than the written constitutional commitment to rights, or, more of a sham constitutional 
environment; while a positive difference shows constitutional commitments have been made that 
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Figure 13. Grievance: De Jure De Facto Constitutional Gap 
 
 
Regression lines to fit the data are a good visualization for these trends; however, the low R-
squared value for empowerment, which combines equality and civil and political rights, indicates 
that further evaluation is warranted. The data suggest that regimes are using more than just a 
semi-authoritarian strategy of “sham” or “weak” constitutionalism. Indeed, incumbent political 
leaders’ behavior regarding the observation of constitutional rights differs greatly from their 
constitutional commitment to those rights, and not always in the same direction of either 
exceeding or ignoring those constitutional commitments.  
In Turkey, an overall downward trend in judicial integrity, and complementary u-shaped 
curves “up” for personal integrity and “down” for empowerment, interact to create Stealth 
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across time, creates the Stealth dynamic. The data suggest that a moderate commitment by semi-
authoritarian leaders to these constitutional rights does exist but is exercised based on their 
discretion, and must be accounted for in a theory of authoritarian strategy for survival in a 
changing environment of international democracy promotion. Variance suggests that incumbents 
may use both de jure constitutional changes as policy concessions to international and domestic 
critics, while simultaneously using excessive selective enforcement of laws based on legal 
discretion that abides by rule-of-law in the de facto observation of those rights to achieve 
consolidation of power or other regime goals. 
6.3.3 Hypothesizing Semi-Authoritarian Constitutional Types, 1982-2011 
The outcome in this analysis is an index that represents the difference between the de jure level 
of commitment to constitutional rights, and de facto observation of these rights, in the areas of 
equality rights, civil and political rights (empowerment), personal integrity rights, and 
independence of the judiciary. Conditions predicting this outcome generate three scenarios: 
Overt constitutional authoritarian with weak or sham constitutions, and Stealth constitutional 
authoritarianism. Within Overt Constitutional Authoritarianism, different types of 
communication networks use different strategies that create sham or weak constitutional 
environments. Table 6 shows the Truth Table generated by the thirty cases, or years between 
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Table 6. Results In Truth Table for Hypothesis Generating QCA 
 
 




1982-1986  Low Hierarchy High/ 
Moderate 
More Weak (S1) 
1987-2005; 2009; 2011 Low Opinion-Leader Low/ 
Moderate 
Less Sham (S2) 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 High Opinion-Leader Moderate/ 
High 
More Stealth (S3) 
 
Overt with Weak Constitution: 
S1: ii*NET*rep*reg => low diff. between de jure/ de facto  (5 cases, with 1.0 inclusion score) 
 
Overt with Sham Constitution: 
S2: ii*net*REP*reg => high diff. between de jure/ de facto (21 cases, with .810 inclusion score) 
 
Stealth Constitution: 
S3: II*net*REP*REG => low diff. between de jure/ de facto (4 cases, with .5 inclusion score) 
 
The Stealth scenario is most closely associated with a high level of aid from international 
democracy promoters for democracy and governance reform programs in civil society. The 
conditions included in this analysis, for which the sources and data are described above, were 
international democracy promotion, the structure of the communication network, the level of 
repression, and the degree of consolidation of the regime over the exercise of power in each 
dimension of the political organizational support system, including military, executive, and party 
apparatuses.   
6.3.4 Overt Authoritarianism with Weak and Sham Constitutions 
Under the Overt constitutional authoritarian dynamic with a weak constitution, exemplified by 
the Turkish regime from 1982 to 1986, there is a low level of commitment to de jure 
constitutional rights (or a high level of commitment that is severely limited in text), and also a 
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low level of de facto observation of these constitutional rights by the regime. Under the Overt 
constitutional authoritarian dynamic with a sham constitution, exemplified by the regime in 
Turkey from 1987 to 2005, and 2009 and 2011, there is an obvious gap, and a greater 
quantitative difference, between de jure constitutional commitments and the de facto observation 
of human rights. These regimes do not have consolidation of institutional power over separate 
branches of government, and therefore must periodically engage in tactics of stealth authoritarian 
constitutionalism in an environment that has a moderate level of commitment to the norms of 
constitutional democracy to maintain their position of power, as is seen in the years 2006-2008, 
and 2010 of Turkish constitutional reform under AKP rule. 
In 2007, the AKP began consolidating power over these institutions utilizing 
constitutional reform resulting in a higher de jure commitment to constitutional rights, and a 
lower difference between the level of commitment and the level of observation than in a sham 
constitutional environment. However, their enactment of rights and commitments to rights are 
characterized by a puzzling lack of consistency. This lack of consistency indicates a strategy of 
stealth authoritarian constitutionalism starting in 2006 and continuing intermittently until the 
present day.  
6.3.5 Stealth Authoritarian Constitutionalism 
Under the stealth authoritarian constitutional dynamic, exemplified by the Turkish regime in 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010, there is no obvious gap between the stated de jure level of 
constitutional rights, and the observed level of de facto constitutional rights by the regime. This 
analysis supports the hypothesis that in stealth authoritarian constitutionalism, regimes uphold a 
moderate level of civil liberties, the exercise of mostly free but not necessarily fair elections, and 
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exercise excessive selective enforcement of the law based on legal discretion that sidelines 
opposition but maintains a façade of democracy. International democracy promotion is a “pull” 
factor for semi-authoritarian regimes to make de jure constitutional changes that seem 
democratic. Stealth authoritarian constitutional leaders may violate equality, civil, and political 
rights, but are less inclined to violate personal integrity through torture, disappearances, political 
imprisonment, and extrajudicial killings. Political leaders in this scenario conduct legal, but non-
democratic, constitutional reforms in transparent, semi-inclusive processes with some public 
communication that is controlled. This process is explored in-depth in the next chapter. 
Using the results from these Chapters IV and V, hypotheses are generated from empirical 
data to develop the complex adaptive systems model in Chapter III.  The results are in Table 7 
below. 
Table 7. Cyclic Dynamic and Phase Transitions, 1876 to 2011 
 
 
Time Period in Ottoman 




Mechanism of Change for System 
Dynamics 
1876-1924 Overt/weak Nominally-democratic reforms 
1924-1945 Overt/sham Increased competition 
1945-1960 Democratic/stealth Consolidation, coup 
1960 Overt/weak Nominally-democratic reforms 
1961-1970 Overt/sham Coup, observations of some rights 
1971-1981 Stealth Coup, observations of some rights 
1982-6 Overt/weak Nominally-democratic reforms 
1987-2005 Overt/sham Observations of some rights 
2006-2008 Stealth Consolidation of power and 
increased repression 
2009 Overt/sham Nominally-democratic reforms 
2010 Stealth Consolidation of power and 
increased repression 
2011 Overt/sham  
 
Overt authoritarian regimes with weak constitutions make reforms under demands from external 
actors, shifting to an Overt/sham environment. Under continued pressure from IDP and 
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strengthened political opposition, the Overt authoritarian regime with a sham constitution begins 
observing some of their constitutional commitments, shifting to a Stealth environment. From a 
Stealth environment, the regime can be overtaken by a coup with repression, leading back to an 
Overt/weak environment; the regime can consolidate its power and increase repression, shifting 
back to an Overt/sham environment, or can increase political competition, shifting toward 
Democracy. 
Overt/weak  (reforms)  Overt/sham 
Overt/sham  (some observations of reforms)  Stealth 
Stealth  (coup)  Overt/weak 
Stealth  (consolidation)  Overt/sham 
Stealth  (competition)  Democracy 
 
The next chapter explores the use of information exchange and control within the period 2007 to 
2013 as a mechanism for switching between these dynamics and prolonging authoritarian 
longevity. By utilizing public communication, regimes gain information necessary to appease 
political opposition and external democracy promoters while serving their own interests through 
constitutional change.  
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7.0  PUBLIC COMMUNICATION IN THE AKP’S REFORM PROCESS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the democratically-elected ruling Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), and its most widely known figure, Prime Minister-
turned-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, used the rhetoric of constitutional democracy to claim 
to have enhanced civil and political rights in Turkey over the last decade. Rights including 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the press, among others, have 
been touted in Turkey’s democratization process. The government publication entitled Silent 
Revolution: Turkey’s Democratic Change and Transformation Inventory, 2002 – 2012, details 
the government’s claims on the authenticity of its democratically-oriented regulation. While the 
AKP has made significant formal constitutional reforms enhancing some elements of 
constitutional democracy, its record of observation of those rights shows a different regime 
altogether. Many observers claimed democracy was in decline.  
Constitutional reform made up a large portion of the formal, de jure reforms the AKP 
regime passed in its democratization campaign. Moreover, historically, since the mid-20th 
century, constitutional change has been driven by an attempt to harmonize law with the acquis 
communitaire and meet the Copenhagen criteria to accede to the European Union (EU). Given 
the large gap between de jure reforms and de facto practice in Turkey, this research focuses on 
one component of the larger “democratization” campaign – public communication in the AKP’s 
constitutional reform process – to understand how, under the guise of democratization, a new 
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tactic of stealth constitutional authoritarianism, or the control of information exchange and 
public communication processes, works. This chapter therefore addresses the question, how do 
authoritarian regimes use public communication vis-à-vis participation in seemingly democratic 
processes, in this case, over constitutional reform, to control and exchange information to 
increase the longevity of constitutional authoritarianism? 
7.1 TOPIC MODELING OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 
Recent scholarship has shown how authoritarian governments control public communication or 
deliberation between citizens and states to work in favor of increasing the resilience of their 
regime (Chen and Xu 2014; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Some of this work focuses on the 
development of power-sharing between political leaders, through targeted policy adjustments or 
concessions to opposition parties or citizens (Gandhi 2010; Svolik 2012). Moreover, recent work 
in comparative public law has also shown how state actors also use overtly democratic, and 
legal, processes as well to consolidate power and increase their durability (Varol 2014; Landau 
2013). The analysis of public communication regarding constitutional reform processes provides 
an opportunity to bring together these two lines of research to investigate how regimes have 
learned to use public communication or deliberation among citizens, yet controlled 
communication between citizens and state actors, to enact legal reforms at the constitutional 
level under a democratic façade that abides by rule-of-law but violates the norms of 
constitutional democracy. 
As noted earlier in Chapter II, I use the term “deliberation” here in the same sense as 
public communication, to signify discussion among citizens that occurs in a public arena, similar 
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to Chen and Xu’s use of the term (2014). I do not use it in the same sense as the concept of 
“democratic deliberation,” which, in the context of constitutional change processes, can mean: 1) 
citizens submit their opinions to the central constitution-making body, which responds to them 
individually or en masse; 2) citizens submit their opinions via an intermediary, such as a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) or union to which they belong; 3) citizens have face-to-face 
discussions with the constitution-making body or their representatives; 4) citizens converse 
among themselves about constitutional change. However, all of these processes took place under 
controlled conditions in the recent constitutional reform process in Turkey. Notably, however, 
the AKP government did not respond except to accept the submissions of the proposals and to 
sanction the drafting and collection of such proposals, and the implementation of surveys of 
citizen preferences and citizen focus groups.  
To analyze these public communication processes, and as more extensively reviewed in 
the methodologies section of Chapter III, this paper employs a new methodology from natural 
language processing and machine learning called topic modeling, specifically the Structural 
Topic Model (STM). This method is most useful here because it allows the model to analyze 
large amounts of textual data from extensive focus group answers according to the answers given 
by the same respondents to dichotomous survey question answers before they engaged in 
deliberation with fellow citizens. These texts, due to their sheer size, would otherwise be 
impossible for one researcher to find such patterns of interaction within.  
A single case research design allows for the process tracing of observable implications of 
the theory generated in the previous chapters about what mechanisms may lay behind a semi-
authoritarian regime’s choice to employ public communication in their constitution-making 
processes, whether successful or not in creating new constitutions, and how they promote 
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authoritarian longevity by utilizing democratic discourse to make the regime impenetrable to 
dissent, opposition, and criticism. 
This paper uses survey and focus group data gathered from across thirteen cities in 
Turkey in 2012, amidst growing repression, to understand how public communication processes 
provide authoritarian policymakers with information about the potential for collective action 
among the opposition and the public. Because the Stealth authoritarian tactic of control and 
exchange of information in public communication processes is “scalable,” and can take place at 
all levels including the constitutional level, it is a way for authoritarian regimes to appear 
democratic, quell collective action against the regime, and sustain their power. As we observe 
the proliferation of stealth authoritarianism across the international system, in Hungary, Turkey, 
and Russia, for example, it is evident that the phenomenon is the new tactic for authoritarianism 
and the subject is an important one to study. It also presents an opportunity to identify issues that 
are potential weaknesses for the regime, as shown by the recent political change in Turkey 
stemming from proposed changes to executive authority. Therefore, by “stealth,” this research 
does not insinuate conspiratorial actions by regimes; rather, an attempt to create an 
impenetrability for regimes by those external to it, whether domestic opposition or international 
critics. 
7.2 AKP’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 2007 TO PRESENT 
This section describes in more detail the context of constitutional reform in Turkey since the 
current regime, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), came to power. The context provides 
important information for the analysis of the dynamics of participation in the constitutional 
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reform process in the period after the AKP began in earnest the process to write an entirely new 
constitution for Turkey.  
In Turkey, a military junta headed the 1980 coup in Turkey, beginning its current 
constitutional era, the 1982 Constitutional era. The junta dominated the drafting and writing 
process that created the 1982 Turkish constitution, headed by General Kenan Evren, then the 
Chief of General Staff and also included the commanders of the army, navy, air force and 
gendarmerie. The new Constitution strengthened the military’s influential position in Turkish 
politics through a strong Presidency, an influential National Security Council, and informal 
control over the judiciary (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009). The illegitimacy of the 1982 
Constitution stems from several factors: 
“… those who prepared it were appointed, not elected; the constitution-making process was closed to 
public debate; and there was a [sic] unilateral propaganda at the time. Moreover, the public was not 
presented with an alternative to the continuation of the military regime and the approval of the constitution. 
Finally, transparent envelopes damaged the secret ballot principle and the constitution was approved,” 
(Özpek 2012). 
 
Consequently, the 1982 Constitution has been condemned almost relentlessly since its inception 
(Times 1982). As Turkey’s most draconian constitution, promulgation of the 1982 Constitution 
took place alongside the decimation of Turkish civil society in the 1980s, when all political 
parties, unions, and other associations were banned (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009). Many 
citizens and activists politically active at the time were imprisoned and tortured, or executed, for 
which the coup’s leaders were just recently given life imprisonment sentences, which have now 
been suspended (Albayrak and Peker 2014). Civil society in Turkey has made a slow, and 
polarized, recovery (Özler and Sarkissian 2011; Sarkissian and Özler 2013). 
The 1982 Constitution has been amended multiple times, in 1995, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 
2010. The democratically-elected ruling AKP, in power since 2002, pledged during the election 
campaign of 2007 that it would “produce a new civilian constitution based on a social contract of 
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broad consensus” (Gunter 2012). In 2007, the AKP began a constitutional reform process to 
write an entirely new constitution. In 2015, a minister from the AKP said that the party’s goal in 
the July 2015 elections is simply to gain enough seats to unilaterally rewrite the constitution or to 
otherwise put the issue to public referendum (Denizli Haberleri 2014). The party lost its 
Parliamentary majority, and is currently still trying to form a new government. However, from 
2002 until 2013, the regime and its supporters employed discourse that framed their attempt to 
replace the 1982 Constitution as an intention to create a civilian, democratic constitution. 
The AKP’s initiative for a wholly new constitution involved several major phases, 
beginning with a draft commissioned by the government in private in early 2007. This occurred 
after a period of considerable conflict that took place when an AKP-aligned politician, Abdullah 
Gül, became President of the Republic in August of 2007, removing one of the informal 
conventions in which the military held its influence in politics. In response to these events, and 
as mentioned earlier, the constitution was amended in an October 2007 public referendum to 
allow for a popularly-elected President, which also lowered the term limit from seven to five 
years, and allowed for re-election to a second term. In 2012, the AKP further specified the rules 
for election to this office in President Election Law, Law Number 6271 Official Gazette entry 
number 28185. 
Earlier in 2007, a government-selected team of experts was selected without public or 
opposition input to create the inaugural draft (Gunter 2012). Then Prime Minister Erdoğan 
established a “small group of constitutional law professors headed by Professor Ergun Özbudun 
early in June 2007 to prepare a draft, which was presented to the AKP leadership at Sapanca 
following the party’s victory in July” (Gunter 2012). Commentary written about the draft by 
Özbudun attributes his draft’s negative reception to the conflict due to the secular-religious 
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divide in Turkey (Ozbudun 2007). Constitutional experts saw the constitution merely as a 
continuation of the 1982 Constitution with some rights – namely freedom of expression for 
religion – being enhanced. However, beyond the content of the draft itself, the lack of public 
participation in the process and the ruling party’s domination over selection of the group’s 
members was the AKP’s Achilles heel. In this stage the party first brought constitutional politics 
into the ordinary politics domain of Parliament. 
Political opposition to the AKP criticized the content of the draft for undermining 
secularism and Kemalist principles, most notably for removing the ban on women wearing 
headscarves in public buildings and universities, for weakening judicial independence, 
politicizing the judiciary, and creating unchecked majority rule which would pave the way for 
the gradual introduction of an Islamic government. In the draft, some presidential powers were 
eliminated making the system closer to a classic parliamentary model. The draft also proposed 
empowering the Constitutional Court by removing restrictions on judicial review, and giving it 
the power to annul laws that conflict with international human rights treaties of which Turkey is 
a party, and allowed Parliament to elect some members of the Constitutional Court. The draft 
made prohibition of political parties more difficult, and removed the five-year ban of individual 
members of banned parties from participating in politics. Finally, it also included affirmative 
action for women and other disadvantaged groups, rights for children, and put “protection of 
human dignity” in the Preamble text, and made religious education optional, not compulsory. 
The AKP seemed to add to this fear when it attempted a constitutional amendment to lift the ban 
on the wearing of headscarves in universities in 2007, which ended in a case in front of the 
Constitutional Court in 2008, where the Court annulled the legislation that would have lifted the 
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ban. This controversy also led to an attempt before the same Court to disband the party for 
unconstitutional activities, in this case, anti-secular activities, in the same year. 
Özbudun and his team’s draft drew out conflict over what a new constitution should 
contain, as well as concern for the process by which a new constitution should be decided. In 
September of 2007, the “Constitution Platform” (CP, Anayasa Platformu) was formed by 
citizens and civil society organizations, demanding a transparent constitution-making process 
and a “roadmap” from the government (Baburoglu and Göker 2014). In the meantime, the AKP 
initiated a popular referendum for specific constitutional reforms – that packaged judicial reform 
with other amendments creating a Human Rights Commission and an ombudsman, for example – 
that was approved in a popular vote in September 2010.  
The successful constitutional referendum of 2010 that restructured the judiciary, removed 
yet another informal mechanism by which the military junta of 1980 retained authority in 
politics. After again winning a majority in the elections of July 2011, but falling short of the 
super-majority it would need to unilaterally pass a new Constitution and put it to a referendum, 
the AKP continued its drive for a new constitution in 2011. In late 2011, the regime convened 
the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission (CRC, Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu). With 
eleven principles of operation that included unanimity among the members of Commission, the 
CRC was organized around the major parties represented in Parliament: the AKP, the historical 
opposition Republican People’s Party (Cümhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP), the nationalist 
conservative Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet Hareket Partisi, or MHP), and the then 
independent and Kurdish umbrella Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, or 
BDP), which is now the People’s Democratic Party (Halk Demokrasi Partisi, or HDP). 
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The principles of the CRC stated that the reform process should have four stages (Uçum 
2012).13 The principles for the CRC state this in Article 11. First, proposals from the public 
would be collected until April 2012. Next, a text of principles for the Constitution would be 
written based on these proposals. Third, the text of the principles would be presented to the 
public. Finally, the draft of the new constitution would be written. Instead, as the CRC began its 
work, it divided the process into several phases, in which public involvement ceased after the 
CRC stopped soliciting public input for the constitution. Only Parliament and representatives 
from the four parties were involved in drafting the articles, and negotiating and debating over the 
articles, a process which came to a standstill after several months (Batum Bedii 2014).14 As one 
participant described the interaction between the regime and the public throughout the process: 
 
… after collecting the ideas of the public, [the CRC] should have prepared the text of principles based on 
these proposals. However, [the CRC] started to write the constitution article by article. This is either an 
attempt to exclude the will of public on purpose or an illustration of ignorance. If [the CRC] continue[s] 
writing like this, they will not have taken public’s opinion into consideration in the end. They also didn’t 
make any report on the proposals came from public, NGOs or political parties. Or even if they prepared it, 
we have no information about it.  None of the political parties in the Commission did what they promised. 
They promised to take public’s views’ into account but they didn’t. Writing a constitution is not an issue 
where four political parties bargain. 
 
Indeed, before the negotiations began, the CRC solicited proposals from interest organizations 
about major societal preferences and public expectations regarding a new constitution in Turkey. 
Think tanks in Turkey performed wide-scale surveys and focus groups across the country, 
collecting public opinion data regarding preferences for a new constitution, including the 
                                                 
13 Mehmet Uçum (Constitutional lawyer and founder of Anayasa Platformu/ Constitutional 
Platform Project), personal communication with author in Istanbul, Turkey, September 13, 2012.  
14 Süheyl Batum Bedii (Parliamentary member of the Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu/ 
Constitutional Reconciliation Commission) personal communication with author in Ankara, 
Turkey, September 30, 2014. 
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Anayasa Platformu or Constitutional Platform, as well as the “Polling Conference” analyzed in 
this chapter throughout 2012 (Baburoglu and Göker 2014).  
While Turkish citizens were encouraged to participate in approved types of civic 
engagement, like voting, polling, and opinion-gathering, there was no character to the process 
that insulated it from the concerns of everyday politics or policymaking. Moreover, participation 
was constrained in such a way that while airing of viewpoints and submission of opinions to the 
CRC was encouraged, deliberation, as defined for inclusive democratic processes, was only 
encouraged on a limited basis or for particular issues between citizens, whose opinions were then 
delivered to the CRC en masse. According to the principles of inclusive democracy, uptake is a 
necessary condition (Young 2002). Deliberation did not take place on a large public scale similar 
to other commission-led or constituent-driven participatory processes, and therefore may better 
be described as public communication.  
However, within contained participatory units, civil society organizations gathered input 
that they then delivered to the government in a controlled public communication process; yet in 
some cases, there was fear of retaliation for undesirable input (Anonymous 2012). In this way, 
and as is discussed in the next section, the regime was able to retain and utilize the information 
exchanged and the deliberation it sparked in public, but control how such information about 
constitutional preferences was being exchanged among citizens. In 2013, the CRC could only 
find consensus on 59 out of 172 proposed articles for the new constitution (Baburoglu and Göker 
2014, 376). Deliberation and participation also dwindled as they took on new risk after the brutal 
repression of the public “Gezi” uprisings in Turkey in the summer of 2013. 
The next section theorizes strategic actions by incumbent- and opposition-aligned interest 
groups in public communication processes about constitutional reform under authoritarianism. It 
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complements existing research by adding theoretical insight drawn from interpretive scholarship 
on the practice of language acts under authoritarian regimes to address the normative nature of 
constitutional democracy in the conclusions to the Chapter (Wedeen 1999; Wedeen 2009). 
7.3 INTERPRETING RISK THROUGH LAW AND LANGUAGE 
The theory of public communication under “stealth” constitutional authoritarianism contends that 
regime incumbents would open a participatory process only if it could control the information 
exchanged among citizens to their advantage. However, the manipulation of public 
communication processes takes place within an existing context of power relations. Bourdieu’s 
practice theory of language, which takes into account the structural relations within state and 
society, is a useful heuristic, as these performative language acts occur as controlled discursive 
islands under deliberative authoritarianism. According to Bourdieu’s theory, as language is 
socially evaluated, legitimacy is accorded to those who speak or write in a way recognized by 
dominant classes, mass audiences, and other producers of language (Hanks 2005). In essence, 
Bourdieu’s theory states that to be effective, any speech act must draw on the social field for 
authority to be legitimate for those upon whom it has an effect, and, in so doing, reinforces that 
authority. 
The language generated in public, legal, political discourse also sets the standard and 
authorizes which speech is legitimate and which is not through the exercise of power relations, 
and, in this case, particularly through the enforcement, or, non-enforcement, of the law. This 
chapter theorizes that the variance in the cohesiveness of the “standard” of language acts, those 
that the regime is both competent in and also those that simultaneously challenge the standard, 
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can be operationalized as the “congruence” of regime policy positions, which are assessed again 
as de facto or de jure policy positions in the analysis. In the rest of this chapter I use “standard” 
to refer to the dominant language practice in the field of politics in Turkey. The AKP has 
challenged and changed the standard over its tenure in Turkey, most significantly, by changing 
the relationship that religion, national identity, and minorities have with the state and with the 
public. Also significant is the challenge to Atatürk’s legacy and the “Kemalist status quo,” in 
political discourse, and in its symbols, and the resurgence of a nostalgia or positive connotation 
for the Ottoman Empire and its language and symbols. 
There are several different points from which a regime can create risk of mobilization 
when it takes a policy position or makes a policy reform. First, from a strategic point of view, 
when there is less congruence between what the regime does in practice and what it proclaims its 
preferences are, it puts itself at more risk for being held to account, or for citizens to protest 
about the selective application of de jure legal mechanisms that exist to organize their 
government or protect their rights and freedoms (Law and Versteeg 2013). The regime can use 
public communication to prevent or encourage collective action; however, if the level of 
grievance is moderate, measured as the distance between citizens’ ideal policies and regime de 
jure and de facto policy positions, the regime should theoretically meet the opposition with 
repression, rather than information control or exchange tactics, based on the non-monotonic 
curve grievance, repression, and mobilization (Shadmehr 2014). However, the level of citizen 
conflict will determine whether and how the regime uses these strategies concurrently or 
sequentially, to utilize obtained information about citizen conflict to quell collective action 
(Chen and Xu 2014). For example, some policy adjustments for which the government knows 
there is a moderate to high level of citizen conflict are made to act as a “wet blanket” for 
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potential citizen collective action concomitant with policy adjustments to concentrate power for 
the regime. In a second example, for some policy changes where citizens have a high level of 
agreement, information is controlled or citizens are repressed to prevent collective action, while 
simultaneously some concessions are made, or a high- or medium-level conflict issue is 
deliberated over to prevent collective action by citizens on issues in which the barriers to 
collective action could be overcome.15 
The level of risk is also affected through the level and composition of citizen conflict, a 
variable important to all analyses of collective action. Olson’s logic of collective action showed a 
threshold of citizens must be incentivized to overcome obstacles to collective action (Olson 
1965). Citizens may be more or less unified in their desire for a new policy or to prevent a policy 
change, or they may be divided over a policy change. An issue is low risk when only a minority 
group of citizens is opposed to a policy position, or if citizens are divided into too many different 
groups in support or opposition of the policy position. When citizens are unified in opposition to 
a policy position, it is high risk, or when the majority opposes the policy position, and the 
minority supports it. Identification of citizen conflict allows the regime to promote public 
communication in issue areas where discourse will reproduce or alter the standard of language to 
the regime’s preference. According to Bourdieu, “individuals self-regulate their positions and yet 
reinforce the system of domination by the muting of critique and individual expression” (Hanks 
2005). However, struggle within the standard language of the field still reinforces the legitimacy 
of the standard itself. Through tracking citizen conflict, discourse can be manipulated by the 
                                                 
15 Both of these dynamics have occurred between the issues of minority rights for the Kurds and 
consolidation of executive power under the AKP; however, the text data for public 
communication over the issue of consolidation of executive power were removed from the 
dataset analyzed in this chapter, removing the possibility for topic modeling of that question. 
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regime to stop mobilization from occurring. A regime can choose either to encourage 
information exchange among citizens, or to control information between citizens and the state. 
These four factors – regime de jure policy position, regime de facto policy position, level 
and composition of citizen conflict, and the chosen tactic of information control or information 
exchange chosen for the public communication process, in combination, create different 
scenarios across and within issue areas for public communication under stealth authoritarianism. 
Table 8 below shows the proposed combinations that could occur according to the regime’s 
policy proposals (sham, weak, stealth policy positions), citizen conflict, and the regime’s 
decision to engage in information exchange or control.  
 
Table 8. Composition of Risk Per Issue Area 
 
 
Regime De Jure/ Regime De Facto 
Policy Position Gap 
Composition and Level of Citizen Conflict Information 
Manipulation 
Incongruent or Sham:  
High level of constitutional 
commitment; low level of observation 
of rights and freedoms 
Divided (High) or Unified (low) Control 
Exchange 
Majority/ Minority (split) Control 
Exchange 
Distorted or Stealth:  
Variance across time and issue area in 
levels of constitutional commitment 
and observation of rights and 
freedoms 
Divided (High) or Unified (low) Exchange 
Control 
Majority/ Minority (split) Control 
Exchange 
Congruent or Weak: 
Level of observation follows level of 
commitment; sometimes “overt 
violation” of rights and freedoms 
Divided (High) or Unified (low) Exchange 
Control 
Majority/ Minority (split) Control 
Exchange 
 
The regime’s degree of control or the level of information exchange regarding citizens’ 
preferences about policies has taken on a new importance in the contemporary digital era of real-
time information and communication technologies like social media.  In the public 
communication of constitutional reform under authoritarianism, the regime uses the deliberative 
process to gauge the level of conflict between citizens on all issues pertaining to the reform, 
  160 
encouraging language acts that are self-censored, euphemistic, or misrecognized. As Hanks 
writes: “The speaker censored or obliged to euphemize in order to earn credit, show loyalty, or 
maintain confidence is the object of symbolic violence because his or her speech is curtailed, 
whether by self or other. Obviously, to be classified, evaluated, stereotyped, or portrayed as such 
and such is to be the object of symbolic violence. Misrecognition is the social effect whereby 
practice underwrites power divisions and the imposed rules of the game,” (Hanks 2005). 
Language acts become symbolically violent, in which the standard “dominates by defining as 
legitimate limitations that derive from and reinforce differences of power [emphasis added]”. In 
addition, the regime can also use other tools of repression, including harassment, intimidation, 
and physical violence – but the tactic of public communication does not violate international 
standards of rule-of-law or democracy promotion – and can still have a de-mobilizing effect on 
collective action. 
As a consequence, attempts to act collectively, or actual acts of collective action, work to 
reinforce the standard in the field as defined and manipulated by the stealth authoritarian 
constitutional regime. This theory of information exchange via controlled public communication 
is scalable because it can occur wherever groups may have the potential for conflict within or 
between them and also the potential to be contributors to collection action. Therefore the theory 
holds for conflict within an issue area, sub-nationally, or across issue areas at the national level. 
This chapter shows how conflict over an issue area can also be localized geographically to 
understand how different group preferences work for the regime within a single-issue area. The 
next section of this paper explains the methodology, using topic modeling for large survey data, 
and the dataset itself. 
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7.4 TOPIC MODELING AND THE STM 
Probabilistic topic models, such as the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), are increasingly being 
seen as a valuable tool by social scientists to measure “latent linguistic, political, and 
psychological variables” (M. E. Roberts et al. 2013). Topic modeling, a statistical methodology 
developed to analyze textual corpora, is based on several assumptions; first, that documents have 
latent semantic structures, or topics; second, that it is possible to infer topics from word-
document co-occurrences; and third, that words are related to topics and topics to documents. As 
Blei, writes: “the goal of topic modeling is to automatically discover the topics from a collection 
of documents. The documents themselves are observed, while the topic structure—the topics, 
per-document topic distributions, and the per-document per-word topic assignments—is hidden 
structure. The central computational problem for topic modeling is to use the observed 
documents to infer the hidden topic structure. This can be thought of as “reversing” the 
generative process— what is the hidden structure that likely generated the observed collection?” 
(Blei 2012). In answering this question about hidden structures within texts, and in order to draw 
knowledge from the large amounts of texts now generated through the use of information and 
communication technology, machine learning researchers developed probabilistic topic 
modeling, a “suite of algorithms that aim to discover and annotate large archives of documents 
with thematic information” (Blei 2012). 
Within the general framework within the larger field of probabilistic topic models, with 
document-level covariate information, probabilistic topic models have been improved for social 
scientists dealing with survey or social media data.. Probabilistic topic modeling algorithms are 
statistical methods that analyze the words of the original texts to discover the themes that run 
through them, how those themes are connected to each other, and how they change over time 
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(Blei 2012). In mathematical terms, a generated discovery of the hidden structure of topics 
occurs by treating the data differently, as: “… arising from a generative process that includes 
hidden variables [and] defines a joint probability distribution over both the observed and hidden 
random variables … data analysis [is performed] by using that joint distribution to compute the 
conditional distribution of the hidden variables given the observed variables … ” (M. E. Roberts, 
Stewart, and Tingley 2015). Document-level covariates alter the structure of a text corpus and 
therefore require different algorithms to model the topics in order to most reliably draw 
inferences from the data. 
The Structural Topic Model (STM), and other frameworks like it, input document-level 
information, such as geography, author, ideology, or time, as the model is run, and allow them to 
predict different measures of topical prevalence or topical content as specified to answer research 
questions of theoretical interest to the social scientist, to “directly estimate the quantities of 
interest in applied problems” (M. E. Roberts et al. 2013). The idea behind the STM is to provide 
a “better alternative to post-hoc comparisons” by building the “additional information about the 
structure of the corpus into the model itself by altering the prior distributions to partially pool 
information amongst similar documents” (M. E. Roberts et al. 2013). The STM achieves this by 
“specify[ing] the priors as generalized linear models through which we can condition on 
arbitrary observed data,” thereby “making inference about observed covariates rather than 
predicting covariate values in unseen text” (M. E. Roberts et al. 2013). The covariates derived 
from the documents’ attributes can “improve inference and qualitative interpretability and are 
allowed to affect topical prevalence, topical content or both” (M. E. Roberts et al. 2014; M. 
Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2014). These new frameworks build document-level covariates 
into the generative process itself, focusing on observed covariates rather than latent ones.  
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This method allows the model to use survey data collected on citizens’ constitutional 
preferences to be used within the topic model as predictors of the topics modeled from the open-
ended focus group answers. The model can show, depending on the level of conflict or regime 
policy position and congruence, how citizens’ public communication about a particular issue 
area by generating a model of topics within the content of the record of that public 
communication. This analysis uses the degree of conflict among citizens over a particular issue 
area or policy change to model deliberative content about that issue area.  
7.5 PUBLIC COMMUNICATION PROCESS DATA 
The original dataset analyzed in this paper was collected from Turkish citizens regarding their 
preferences on constitutional reform, through a large sample of survey data of both closed and 
open responses ranging geographically across Turkey. From January 2012 to April 2012, a 
prominent thinktank did a large opinion-gathering project in Ankara, Konya, Edirne, Diyarbakir, 
Izmir, Antalya, Bursa, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Erzurum, and Istanbul. In Samsun and in Ankara, the 
survey focused on questions for Turkey’s youth and for women, respectively. The organization 
held large summits where participants answered survey questions and participated in focus 
groups sessions lasting up to eight hours (Baburoglu and Göker 2014). Respondents self-reported 
to sites based on text messages sent at random through cellphones to citizens in each city 
(Baburoglu and Göker 2014). 
In the next section, using this dataset, the closed-ended question survey data is first 
statistically analyzed to identify the degree of conflict among citizens pertaining to each issue of 
constitutional reform. First, frequencies are used to obtain a variable of citizen conflict that 
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identifies the level of conflict among the population for each issue. The conflict variable, created 
to be a covariate in the topic model, is categorized into low (near unification), moderate 
(majority/minority split) and high (polarization) levels of conflict for each issue area and within 
the issue area, local group preferences. 
The regime position on a policy area, both de facto and de jure, was collected from 
qualitative sources including the party’s publications, state-run, opposition-oriented, and 
independent media, and legislative changes made under the regime’s tenure. The issue areas 
were also categorized into “sham,” “weak,” and “stealth” issue areas for collective action for the 
regime for being held accountable for a policy it has supported on paper but not in practice (Law 
and Versteeg 2013). When the regime engages in “cheap talk,” the issue area is a “sham” policy 
position; on the other hand, when the regime’s de facto and de jure records match on an issue 
area, it is a “weak” policy position, unless it is trending toward more democratization. However, 
some issue areas fall into both categories – or are incongruent – and reflect changing or 
competing meanings in the standard language in the field. These are stealth policy position. 
After choosing an issue area where information control and exchange is clearly taking 
place, and that has a range of levels of citizen conflict both nationally and sub-nationally, citizen 
conflict is utilized as a covariate to predict topical prevalence and topical content. These 
measurements quantify which words are used, and how prevalently they are used within the 
topics generated by the STM. Second, I also perform a structural topic model on organizational 
proposals to using official, civil society, and committee-meeting minutes as document covariates. 
Utilizing elements of strategic action combined with elements of language practice (Hanks 
2005), the results of both analyses are interpreted to identify combinations of words providing 
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insight into the “things that were done with words” (Austin 1975) and what those performative 
actions mean for democracy and authoritarianism in present day Turkey. 
7.5.1 Level and Composition of Citizen Conflict 
The dataset was cleaned and assessed for systematically missing data and outliers. The conflict 
variable was created based on both dichotomous and categorical closed-ended answer survey 
questions, and highlighted those where two criteria of data sufficiency were met. The first 
criterion was a sufficient percentage of answers to the closed-answer survey questions despite 
information being missing due to respondents not answering, a question being skipped in a 
particular city, or the information being systematically removed. As the data given to me was the 
data also presented to the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, or CRC, by a think-tank 
that is partially beholden to state funds, it was likely manipulated to fit the regime’s preferences; 
however, a close look at the data reveals where manipulation likely occurred. The second 
criterion was an adequate percentage of answers to the open-answer survey questions, or minutes 
from the focus group discussions. Again, information was missing due to respondents not 
answering, a question being skipped in a particular city, but in general, in the text documents, 
information seemed not to be systematically removed. However, given the thousands of pages of 
text documents from the open-answer survey question and focus group minutes, most 
systematically removed data could be reconstructed through a very close look at the data. 
Each issue area with sufficient data was rated according to frequency distributions for a 
measure of low, medium (majority/minority split), or high level of citizen conflict. The results 
are summarized in Table 9 below. The thresholds were below an 80/20 split or disagreement for 
a low level of conflict, between an 80/20 and 60/40 split for a medium or majority/minority level 
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of conflict, and above a 60/40 split for a high level of conflict. Citizen conflict was analyzed for 
patterns on the issues regarding constitutional change. Issues with low conflict, where the 
population was 80 percent or more in agreement about a certain issue, reflect a consensus.  
 
Table 9. Citizen Conflict Across Issue Area 
 
 
Variable Level of Conflict %Missing %No %Yes 
V34 (Impartiality1-publicattire) High 25.7 46.1 53.9 
V37 (SocialState) High 26.7 59.3 40.7 
V42 (LivingTogether) High 28.9 38.1 61.9 
V65 (ReligiousServices1) High 33.1 38.8 61.2 
V73 (ConstlText) High 35.5 57.3 (short) 42.7 (long) 
V27 (Referendum) Majority/ Minority 27.6 31.7 68.3 
V28 (Recall) Majority/ Minority 29.0 28.7 71.3 
V29 (Public Entrepreneurship) Majority/ Minority 28.1 21.2 78.8 
V30 (PublicVeto) Majority/ Minority 29.1 22.3 77.7 
V33 (EqualPay) Majority/ Minority 24.4 28.9 71.1 
V38 (PositiveDiscrimination) Majority/ Minority 25.9 21.6 78.4 
V41 (BanDiscrimination) Majority/ Minority 24.2 34.0 66.0 
V48 (Decentralization1) Majority/ Minority 32.0 26.5 73.5 
V49 (Decentralization2) Majority/ Minority 33.5 27.3 72.7 
V13 (Individual Expression) Low 16.4 10.8 89.2 
V17 (JudicialIndependence) Low 22.8 9.9 90.1 
V21 (Accountability2) Low 27.9 2.5 97.5 
V22 (RuleofLaw1) Low 20.1 5.6 94.4 
V23 (RuleofLaw2) Low 22.7 5.9 94.1 
V24 (CivilSociety1) Low 24.5 7.0 93.0 
V25 (Media) Low 25.9 6.9 93.1 
V26 (Sensitivity) Low 27.9 88.4 11.5 
V55 (PartyDemocracy) Low 32.8 4.5 95.5 
 
 
Enhancing rule of law, changing the structure of the political system, and concern over 
representation, freedom of expression, civil society, and the media were the issues with the least 
conflict among the Turkish citizenry in 2012. Citizens showed an overall concern about the 
neutrality and impartiality of the judiciary and the ability of judges and prosecutors to remain 
politically neutral and impartial. Citizens also agreed that rule of law and accountability 
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mechanisms should be enhanced for those in government positions. Citizens widely agreed on 
the question of increase of executive power. Citizens were in agreement that the powers of the 
Presidential office should not be concentrated any further than they already are. Most agreed that 
the status quo should remain, with division between a Prime Minister and a President, but many 
also thought that the Prime Minister’s office should have reduced powers, or that the President 
should be the only executive. Citizens expressed an almost uniform interest in creating a channel 
for communication between themselves and those they elect to represent them, and also for more 
representation between party members and Parliamentary representatives, rather than party 
management. Citizens agreed that constitutional arrangements should be made to enhance civil 
society and maintain or enhance the independence of media and prevent it from being 
monopolized. Citizens also agreed that both individuals and political parties should have 
protection of freedom of expression with the exception of hate speech. 
Issues with a majority/minority split of conflict included the adoption of new mechanisms 
for legislative, political, or policy change. These issues included support for reforms to or 
creation of new public referenda, a “recall” mechanism for members of Parliament, a “public 
veto,” and petitions from citizens and civil society to create new legislation.  
Minority rights and representation issues also reflected a majority/ minority divide among 
the population. A new constitutional provision to more effectively apply the policy of positive 
discrimination was also contentious, as were any reforms related to the principle of 
decentralization or enhancing local or regional government, in other words, for minority rights or 
representation. Issues where the population was split between 60/40 or nearly in half were often 
related to issues of conflicting identities in religion, ethnicity, or nationality. The public was also 
split about the principle of neutrality and how the appearance of those who wished to wear attire 
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that reflected their religious preferences in public institutions should be provided for 
constitutionally. These nationalism issues included a constitutional assurance that those of 
different orientations, ethnicities, or preferences be facilitated in the process of “living together” 
(birlikte yaşama) in harmony. Another highly divisive issue was the state provision of religious 
services and religious education, and whether the state should promote or support one religion. 
The constitutional arrangement of religion split the population nearly in half. The regulation of 
the state’s finances to provide for state and societal “economic duties” was also highly divisive, 
with the majority opting for no state role in the constitution to designate religious services, 
religious education, or to regulate the economy. A high level of conflict was also found over 
some policy changes in the issue areas of representation, minority rights, and changing the 
political system, specifically regarding what changes should take place to the current standing 10 
percent electoral threshold for parties to enter Parliament. Most said the threshold should be 
abolished or lowered, but many said it should remain as is. Finally, citizens’ preferences were 
also nearly split in half about a bicameral option for the legislature that would make one body 
responsible to the entire country, and the other responsible to local districts. 
7.5.2 Regime Policy Positions 
The regime’s legislative actions and media coverage of these issues in state-run and in 
independent media were analyzed to operationalize regime policy position and congruence.  
Regime policy preference is measured by both regime de jure positions as well as regime de 
facto support for an issue area or policy change as manifested in practice. Using the TBMM’s 
legislative databases (TBMM 2015), the AKP’s party manifestos (Volkens et al. 2012), and 
state-run media sources, I summarized regime de jure positions. Using the aforementioned 
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sources, and opposition-oriented or independent media sources about current events in Turkey, I 
also measured the AKP’s de facto positions.16 This designation is important because I 
hypothesize that when there is distortion, agenda manipulation or information control and 
exchange strategies are likely taking place. In a stealth authoritarian constitutional environment, 
we observe first, “sham” constitutional commitments, in which a regime’s observation falls far 
below those commitments, and the grievance is for observation of an already existing legal right. 
Second, we observe “weak” constitutional commitments in which the grievance is both for legal 
commitments to and observations of rights and freedoms. Third, we observe “weak” and “sham” 
policy positions simultaneously in the “stealth” dynamic, manifesting variance across time and 
issue area. As a result, the regime’s policy record appears ambiguous, manipulated, distorted, or 
contradictory. 
Based on the descriptive statistics of the survey data, I aggregated the issue areas into the 
broader groups of I) political system structure, II) minority rights and representation, III) 
freedom of expression, IV) religious expression, and V) the role of the state.17 Table 10 below 
shows the issue areas with regime policy positions and citizen conflict, for categorization as 
                                                 
16 Data on de facto policy positions came from both regime-aligned media sources: Star, Bugün, 
Yeni Şafak, Vakit, Kanal 24, Kral TV, Kanal 7, STV, Sabah, Takvim, Günaydın, inter alia; as 
well as regime-opposed media sources: Sozcü, Cumhuriyet, Bianet, Radikal, Hürriyet Daily 
News, Today’s Zaman, Birgün, Sözcü, Aydınlık, Ortadoğu, Zaman, Bugün, Aktif Haber, 
Evrensel, Özgür Gündem, Sol, Taraf, and international sources, inter alia. 
17 Political system structure includes “Changing structure of political system,” “Increase of 
executive power,” “New mechanisms for legislative/ political/ policy change,” and “Rule of law/ 
Accountability mechanisms.” Minority rights and representation includes “Electoral threshold,” 
“Citizen uptake channels,” “Positive discrimination,” “Decentralization,” and “Living Together.” 
Freedom of expression includes: “Freedom of expression,” “Civil society,” and “Media.” 
Religious expression includes “Religious attire,” “Religious services/ religious education.” Role 
of the state in religion and in the economy includes “State religion,” and “State-run economy.” 
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sham, weak, or stealth, policy changes due to the level of grievance, and level and composition 
of citizen conflict about policy change in the issue area (Law and Versteeg 2013).  
The only policies that solely fall into the “sham” category for the regime for collective 
action are grouped into freedom of expression. Those issues in the high risk category include the 
following issue areas: freedom of expression, civil society, media.  
 





Policy Position Regime de facto/ de jure 
position 
Citizen Conflict Risk Level 
I: Political system 
structure (“weak”) 
Changing structure of 
political system 
Support/ Support Low conflict –  
status quo 
Low 
Increase of executive 
power 
Support/ Support Low conflict –  
status quo 
Low 
New mechanisms for 
legislative/ political/ 
policy change 
Support/ Support Medium – 
majority support 
Moderate 
II: Minority rights 
and representation 
(“stealth”) 
Electoral threshold Oppose/ Oppose High – majority 
split 
Moderate 
Citizen uptake channels/ 
Rule of law/ 
Accountability 
mechanisms 
Oppose/ Support Low – enhance High 
Positive discrimination Support/ Oppose Medium – 
majority support 
High 
Decentralization Support/ Oppose Medium – 
majority support 
High 
“Living together” Support/ Oppose Medium – 
majority support 
High 
III: Freedom of 
expression 
(“sham”) 
Freedom of expression Oppose/ Support Low – enhance High 
Civil society Oppose/ Support Low – enhance High 
Media Oppose/ Support Low – enhance High 
IV: Religious 
expression 





Support/ Support High – majority 
split 
Low 
V: Role of state in 
religion and 
economy 
State religion Support/ Support High – majority 
split 
Low 
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The policies that fall into the low-risk for collective action category, due to regime consistency 
on paper and in practice are political system structure, and the role of the state in religion and the 
economy. Those issues in the low risk category include the following issue areas: changing 
structure of political system, increase of executive power, and the state-run economy. Table 10 
summarizes. 
The issue areas of minority rights, representation, and the role of the state in religion/ 
religious expression exists in both the high-risk and low-risk categories, reflecting ambiguity in 
the regime record and signaling that information exchange is being promoted in some places 
while information is being controlled in others. The issues that fall into both the high and low 
risk categories include the following issue areas: Decentralization, Citizen uptake channels, 
Positive discrimination, “Living together,” Rule of law/ accountability mechanisms, New 
mechanisms for legislative/ political/ policy change, and the Electoral threshold, Religious attire, 
Religious services/ religious education. Minority rights and representation was chosen as the 
issue areas for analysis of information exchange and control mechanisms. 
Assuming that the theory holds locally as well as in aggregate at the national level also 
will provide opportunities for further research to model both multi-modal local optimization 
topic models as well as multi-level models of within issue-area sub-national dynamics and across 
issue-areas national dynamics. In this chapter, the issue of minority rights and representation, 
which is an issue of nationalism, is analyzed at a local level, based on the theory that the same 
scalable dynamic is at play within an issue area, sub-nationally. King, et al. define issues that 
relate to nationalism as having high potential for collective action: “nationalism is treated 
separately because of its frequently demonstrated high potential to generate collective action” 
(Reilly 2013; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Furthermore, textual analysis can help us analyze 
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how ideas of nationalism are deliberated over and contested by citizens, or are idealized in 
official sources, while also enabling us to think about what work these discourses actually do for 
the regime and for those who oppose it. In the next section, the results of the Structural Topic 
Model using the degree of conflict variable to model topics of words over policy changes in an 
issue area with various levels of citizen conflict distributed geographically across the population. 
All analyses were run using the STM R Package (M. Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2014). 
7.6  ANALYSIS: THE STRUCTURAL TOPIC MODEL 
Structural topic modeling was performed on open-ended focus group answers to the question of 
whether the constitution should guarantee living together in harmony despite ethnic, ideological, 
or religious or other differences. The structural topic model of three or four topics uses the 
covariate of degree of conflict, and then organizational type, to predict the topics and their 
content, or whether or not certain words exist within the topic. The STM was run to identify 
topics and to see how the degree of citizen conflict altered the topic words, the covariate words, 
and the topic-covariate interaction words. The words were then interpreted for their performative 
acts according to language practice theory. 
7.6.1 Modeling Citizen Focus Group Answers 
I plotted citizen conflict sub-nationally over the issue of “constitutionally-guaranteed national 
harmony” across Turkey in 2012 to operationalize the micro-level dynamics of conflict over 
minority rights and nationalism; Table 11 below shows the quantitative measurements. Within 
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the greater data collection endeavor, five of thirteen conventions were polarized about the issue, 




Table 11. Local Citizen Conflict Over Minority Rights 
 
 
 Degree of Conflict (No/Yes) 
Antalya High (46/54) 
Erzurum High (48/52) 
Trabzon High  (42/58) 
Konya High (52/48) 
Youth-Samsun High  (54/46) 
Diyarbakir Low (6/94) 
Women-Ankara Majority/ minority (61/39) 
Ankara Majority/ minority (60/40) 
Istanbul Majority/ minority (30/70) 
Gaziantep Majority/ minority (31/69) 
Izmir Majority/ minority (33/67) 
Edirne Majority/ minority (34/66) 
Bursa Majority/ minority (39/61) 
 
The first leg of STMs were run with four topics without covariates to determine whether 
and how the conflict covariate would change the deliberation over nationalism and minority 
rights, and the results are translated below in Table 12 (the original Turkish is shown in 
Appendix B). The results show no indication of censorship, euphemism, misrecognition, or other 
tactical language acts to oppose the existing standard, but rather includes what we would call the 
Kemalist standard of the field in topic 4, which uses the words “society/ community, happy, 
Turkishness, Turkish language, conception, to want, past/ history, geography.” This topic is also 
captured in the utterance of the commonly-known phrase propagandized by Atatürk during his 
major reforms during the foundation of the Turkish Republic: “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene,” or 
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“How happy is the one who says he is a Turk,” which is still popularly shared by citizens on 
bayramlar, or Turkish national holidays, and written on walls and buildings across Turkey, as a 
singularizing euphemism for national identity in Turkey. 
 
Table 12. Topic Model of Focus Groups’ Deliberation (STM 1.1) 
 
 
Topic Model 1: No Covariates 
Words (Top Words and FREX) 
1 union, necessary, ‘should be given’, certainty, harm, argument/war, why/question, 
popularity, support, head 
2 age, association/organization, school, free/without constraints, student, university, 
retired 
3 elderly, statement, absence, application/ administration, perspective, financial, taken, 
positive 




This consensus in the dominant standard of the field is also represented by a quote written by 
those who helped design the process in the Constitution Platform and their perception of their 
relationship with the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, the official group to which the 
data gathered were to be presented to, showing a euphemistic account of the communication 
channels between the bodies. The organizers here recount the feeling of legitimacy created 
between the CRC and the CP through the large-scale “deliberation” project.  
The Constitutional Reconciliation Committee enthusiastically accepted CP’s large-scale conferencing 
project. Committee members endorsed the project, agreed to show up to the meetings, and take their results 
seriously. They regarded the CP as a credible ally because of its nation-wide representation of civil society 
groups. Citizens also perceived the CP as a legitimate and neutral platform and agreed to utilize the 
conferences as a vehicle for providing input to constitution making. The establishment of such two-way 
legitimacy was absent in the ecology of other organizations and platforms involved in constitutional 
debates. The organizational capacity at different levels enabled a setting where citizens could come 
together with public institutions and elected lawmakers. The conferences acted as channels between 
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Indeed, the definition of political legitimacy from a social constructivist point of view is 
subjective to the participants in the large-scale survey project. The utilization of “deliberation” 
processes to produce such legitimacy by the regime to claim democratic production of a civilian 
constitution is not subjective to the participants. While participants deliberated to an extent, the 
existing field of power relations within which that public communication took place, cannot be 
ignored in the analysis of its contribution to democratization. Instead, the public communication 
process shielded the regime to criticism regarding the consolidation of power over institutions in 
separate branches of government – the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the military – 
through institutional self-dealing in the constitutional reform process.  
The second STM was run with four topics with a citizen conflict covariate to determine 
the topical content (which words are present or not) in the focus group answers, shown in Table 
13. Comparing this model to the baseline STM without covariates and examining the interactions 
between topics and covariates enables us to interpret how deliberation over nationalism and 
minority rights changes among groups, and how, where conflict among citizens is low, medium, 
or high.  
In this set of STMs, the topics and the covariates clearly start to indicate the opposition or 
struggle to the standard of the field: Diyarbakır (the Kurdish capital), “we are Kurds,” Zaza, 
Black Sea region, “to be veiled/covered,” Roma, marginalized, exotic, and border are some of 
the words that indicate minorities not present in the topic model without covariates. Second, 
words that indicate misrecognition and symbolic violence on the parts of minority groups in 
Turkey are also present: slave, marginalized, cannot be, retained, held/ corrected, should not 
speak, forced, unseen, oppression, and prohibited. Finally, words that indicate a potential for 
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collective action are also present, such as act/behave, necessity, the public or the people, can do, 
hope, motive/ reason, recognition, accommodation, and changing and amending.  
 
Table 13. Deliberation With Conflict Predicting Content (STM 1.2) 
 
 







should not throw, 
unseen 
Should not speak, 
forced, assist, not 
made easier, issue 
Retained, held/ 











amending, the law, 




















Roma, look, think 
Fifth, elderly, birth 
































Black Sea region, 




Figure 14 plots those words by size/ distance according to their importance to a topic, and the 
phrases “We are Kurds” and “to emphasize” are the outlying terms. 





Figure 14. Plot of Topic-Covariate Words for STM1.2 
 
 
Next, I ran a set of STMs on a dataset created from the texts that were submitted to the 
Constitutional Reconciliation Commission during its opinion-gathering and negotiations phases, 
by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) by official bodies affiliated with the government, such as 
political parties in Parliament, and by the CRC itself. The models for this were first run on the 
texts to generate topics without covariates, and second, to generate topics using “official” versus 
civil society attributes to predict topical content. The results are in Table 14. 
 




1 child, profession, soldier, discrimination, province 
2 crime, clause, reason, politics, contrary 
3 society, report, professor, university, local 
4 question, national, preamble, citizenship, sovereignty 
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The topics in the first STM with no covariates for organizational proposals are more diverse than 
the individual focus group answers, but similarly, still include a topic (2) for law, crime, and 
politics, and a topic (4) for the question of minority rights and nationalism. A third topic (3) 
indicates that universities may be the locale where changes are proposed about nationalism and 
minority rights, while the first topic (1) brings together minority rights issues (discrimination, 
province) with majority problems (child, career, soldier). In the follow-up model of this second 
set of STMs, covariates of document types – minutes of constitutional reconciliation meetings, 
civil society organization proposals, and official proposals – were used to predict the topical 
content within the topics generated from those documents.  
 
Table 15. Organizational Proposals with Group Predicting Content (STM 2.2) 
 
 
 Committee Minutes: 








arrested for, to 
exploit 






unless, all the while we 
fall, humiliating 
to be able to open/ 
make public, to be able 
to fill, as long as it was 
unexplained 
to be changed, legal 
decision, Court of 
Cassation) 
Idea, to relax, 
generally able to 
open 
Topic 3: 
adult, suspect, to arrest 
Completion, to be able 
to say 
Court of Accounts, 
constitution, change/ 
amend 
To be delayed, 
property, moral laws 
 
 
This model, in Table 15, should bring insight into how different groups in struggle against the 
dominant standard of language deliberate in comparison to those who are aligned with, or being 
forced to align with, the dominant standard of language use in the field. 
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The first topic focuses on things that are certain and/ or desirable across groups (wealth, 
star, government, desire, referendum, abolition). The second topic summarizes political system 
change and the ability or fashion in which things get done or how things have been changing, 
with official proposals being positive about the idea using words (idea, to relax/ good life), 
committee minutes having a sense of ambiguity (to be able to open/ make public, generally be 
able to open, to be able to fill, unless, all the while we fall), and the civil society organizations 
focusing on institutions and change (legal decision, Court of Cassation, to be changed). The third 
topic focuses on things of a criminal nature (adult, suspect, to arrest); the official proposals relate 
this to morality and property and delay (property, moral laws, to be delayed), the civil society 
organizations relate this to constitutional and judicial change (Court of Accounts, constitutional, 
to change/amend), and the committee minutes focus on the ability to speak and completion 
(completion, to be able to say, to change/ amend, to be delayed). 
In summary, committee minutes focus on time (truth, time, completion), discussion, the 
ability and fashion in which things are done (to be able to fill, to be able to open/ make public, as 
long as it was unexplained). Civil society organization proposals focus on specific institutions 
and actions to take, generally in a legal or political nature (defense, negligence, Court of 
Accounts, constitutional, Court of Cassation, legal decision, government, referendum, abolition). 
Official proposals use popular positive words (fortunate, idea, relax/ good life, star, desire, 
property, moral laws), and past tense of negativity (convicted/ was arrested for, to exploit, to be 
delayed), and future sense of change (generally able to open). 
According to Bourdieu’s theory of language practice, it is opposing members of political 
parties in deliberation with each other that are subject to the most symbolic violence as they 
absorb the need to operate within the authorized standard of language to be legitimate, 
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reinforcing the dominant language system. Civil society organizations direct their speech more 
toward specific changes, still within the standard. Official proposals positively uphold the 
dominant standard and reflect a pressure to complete the process. Official CRC committee 
minutes focus on time (truth, time, completion), discussion, the ability to do and the fashion in 
which things are done (-dikçe tense). Officially represented political parties’ official proposals to 
the CRC are euphemistic and use popular positive words (keyfi, moral laws, desire), and past 
tense of negativity (tutanlandık), and future sense of change (-abil tense). Finally, CSOs 
submissions to the CRC convey a false sense of action by focusing on specific institutions and 
actions to take, generally in a legal or political nature  (hükümet, değiş-). 
These preliminary analyses still have limitations that will be addressed in further research 
in assessing the optimality of the model and its fit using semantic coherence measures and 
exclusivity parameters (M. E. Roberts et al. 2014). However, by laying the groundwork and 
presenting preliminary empirical evidence in support of a theory of public communication 
processes under stealth authoritarianism, this paper proposes that regimes use public 
communication of participatory processes and authoritarian policymaking at the constitutional 
level to reinforce their positions of power through self-dealing institutional reforms but also 
through the practice of language. This analysis was performed by theorizing and operationalizing 
the “standard” of the language field through regime policy position and congruence, the 
opposition in the language field through the degree of citizen conflict, and acts of symbolic 
violence through information control or exchange.  
The AKP government used the 2010 referendum package to set the stage for reform as a 
public mandate for the party itself, rather than for individual policy changes at the constitutional 
level. This, and other, constitutionally dubious moves brought constitutional reform from the 
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realm of “higher politics” through “ordinary politics,” or Parliamentary negotiations, into a 
singular course of action, or policymaking. The AKP then popularized the deliberative 
participatory process about constitutional reform through media and through various CSOs, both 
those aligned with the party and those aligned with the opposition, to increase the legitimacy of 
the process. Numerous opportunities were presented for public communication and the gathering 
of citizen preferences, but results of these processes were presented either in opposition or 
independent news media, or only partially presented in state-run media. Results presented to 
Parliament were both tailored to the type of findings the government wanted to hear and kept 
from the public except in the most general of media reports. This is shown through the 
information that was systematically removed from the dataset. 
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8.0  AGAINST ALL ODDS: KURDS’ SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS 
Kurds are a puzzling island of desire for democracy in a sea of conflict, grievance, repression, 
inequality, and discrimination. This chapter assesses Kurdish self-determination movement 
groups’ evolution under the aforementioned complex dynamics of constitutionalism between 
democracy and authoritarianism from 1982 to 2012. The model developed theorizes that states’ 
semi-authoritarian constitutional dynamics both impact, and are impacted by, the influence of 
external actors promoting democracy as well as local self-determination movements that interact 
across states and on multiple levels: local, national, and international. Each of these states – 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq – is in a different phase transition between dynamics of constitutional 
semi-authoritarianism. In each state, Kurds are developing systems of self-governance with 
different constitutional strategies, guided by distinctive commitments to democratic 
constitutional norms. This chapter explores the effect systemic international democratization 
influence has in complex systems like Kurdistan. Specifically, how do the dynamics of the semi-
authoritarian constitutional system, measured as regimes’ de jure and de facto constitutional 
change across issue areas, affect groups making constitutional claims for self-determination? 
The Kurds are well known as the largest stateless ethnic group in the world (Romano and 
Gurses 2014). Geographically, Kurds are located in the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. 
Kurds also exist in some parts of the former Soviet Union, but their major geographic 
concentration is in the four aforementioned states. A less well-known characteristic of the Kurds 
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is that some groups seeking self-determination do not advocate for autonomous Kurdish 
statehood. Rather, they struggle for Kurdish local governance within existing state structures. 
Democratic autonomy is self-organized governance that can exist alongside the structures of the 
nation-state system. Much inspiration for the Kurds’ self-determination movements’ goals comes 
from imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, whose writings on democratic confederalism state the 
ideological aims underlying much of the Kurdish movement in Syria and Iraq (Öcalan 2011). 
The Kurdish group the PKK, formed in Turkey, was exiled to Iraq after Öcalan was imprisoned 
in 1999. In contradiction, after Öcalan’s imprisonment, the political ideology of the movement 
reformed to democratic autonomy rather than the development of a separate Kurdish state as the 
Kurds in Iraq were internationally-recognized as an independent political entity.  
Self-governance within and across existing nation-states, or in the case of Syria, 
collapsed states, is a potential solution to the problem of protracted civil or inter-state conflict, 
should host states allow self-governance to exist. However, some groups of Kurds subscribe 
more radically to the philosophy than others; democratic confederalism is a goal for Kurds’ 
struggles for self-determination in Turkey and in Syria, but not in Iraq, where political autonomy 
was established for Iraqi Kurds after two major international interventions. These interventions 
were Operation Desert Shield in 1990-1 and the Iraq War, part of the US and UK-led invasion of 
Iraq, lasting from 2003 to 2011. Groups with a political ideology advocating for Kurdish self-
governance without statehood include the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane or Kurdistan 
Workers Party of Turkey), the PUK (Yeketiy Niştimaniy Kurdistan or Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan of Iraq), and the Kurdish movement in Rojava, or northern Syria, the PYD (Partiya 
Yekitiya Demokrat, or Democratic Union Party of Syria) (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012). The 
political program of stateless democratic autonomy contrasts with most observers’ perceptions of 
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the aims of the Kurdish self-determination movement, as well as with the constitutional 
strategies of many other self-determination movements (Cunningham 2014). Nearly every media 
article in major news sources, as of July 2015, still identifies the Kurds as a movement seeking a 
separate state. 
Historical influences such as the degree of decentralization of the state, which can be 
affected by complex influences like colonization, and states’ policies toward ethnic groups 
within their border have been shown to have important effects on the actions of groups seeking 
autonomy. For example, French colonialism had highly centralizing tendencies, while British 
colonialism was more decentralized, creating more power-sharing or exclusion among groups . 
This chapter adds to this literature by addressing the interactions between levels with the 
international system and between the groups across states.  Historically, in each of the four major 
states geographically dividing the Kurdish population, the governments pursued mono-
nationalist ideologies or “official, constructed national identities … based on Turkish, Persian, or 
Arab national ethnicity” (Romano and Gurses 2014, 3). Nation-states sought unified ethnic 
nationalities despite the existence of large Kurdish minorities, giving rise to state policies of 
repressing Kurdish identity. Emerging from the dissolved Ottoman Empire, three states, the 
Republic of Turkey, and the French and British colonies of Syria and Iraq, each pursued 
assimilationist policies toward minority ethnic groups after World War I, following the model of 
French civic nationalism while Iraq had an administrative structure decentralized per the British 
model (2014, 4).  
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Figure 15. Kurdish Region. Source: (Werz and Hoffman 2015) 
 
In Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, Kurds were the only “significant ethnic minority to be assimilated” 
(2014, 4). The geographic area, centering on the border regions of these four countries, is shown 
in Figure 15 above. 
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Figure 16. ISIL-Controlled Areas. Source: Institute for the Study of War 
 
 
Figure 16 shows the area in 2014-5. Most of it is mired in conflict between international forces, 
the government forces of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, opposition forces, the armed group seeking to 
re-establish the Caliphate, known as the Islamic State (IS), and Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian 
organizations of Kurds. IS is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or as Daesh in Turkish. 
As of 2015, Kurds’ official level of autonomy is the highest in Iraq, where the Kurdish 
Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) has internationally recognized regional autonomy from the 
federal republic of Iraq. In the vacuum of a functioning Syrian government, Kurds in Syria have 
established a de facto autonomous state, not internationally recognized or internationally 
supported, in a self-organized governance system called the Autonomous Cantons of Rojava; 
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Rojava means “west” in Kurdish. (Xulam 2015).18 In Turkey, Kurds have no autonomy, having 
fought Turkish military forces in a civil war that has ebbed and flowed for decades. At the time 
of writing, the conflict between the government of Turkey and the PKK in Turkey and in Iraq 
has renewed, clashes with the YPG in Syria have began, and the ceasefire has ended. 
In Turkey, the powerful Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had majority rule 
from 2002-2014, began a program for a Kurdish “opening” (Kürt açılımı) in 2009. Despite 
intermittent violent outbreaks, Kurds in Turkey worked intensively within the existing 
parliamentary system.viii After an escalation in conflict in 2012, the PKK and Turkey agreed to a 
ceasefire with the Turkish state in 2013 (Tezcür 2014). On June 9th, 2015, for the first time in 
history, the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, or Halk Demokratik Partisi (HDP) crossed the 
exceptionally high electoral barriers set in the Turkish constitution to openly gain party 
representation in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, or Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
(Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2015).  
Yet Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syrian Kurds, who are fighting Bashar al-Assad’s 
government forces and ISIS in Syria, has complicated Turkish Kurds’ political advances within 
the Turkish state. Recently, there is a growing perception that the Turkish government is 
supporting IS, along with other Syrian opposition groups, in its endeavor to bring down not only 
al-Assad’s regime but also the Democratic Union Party, or Partiya Yektiya Demokrat (PYD), the 
organization of Syrian Kurds as well. Media articles have alleged that weapons have been 
smuggled to ISIL forces to fight not just al-Assad’s regime but also the Syrian Kurds from the 
Turkish government (Arango and Schmitt 2015; Masi 2015). However, the perception is growing 
                                                 
18 Kani Xulam (Founder, American Kurdish Information Network) Personal communication with 
author by telephone, on June 10, 2015. 
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while evidence is still lacking (Stein 2015). Turkey’s policy toward Syrian Kurds under the AKP 
from 2011 onward greatly contrasts with its policies toward Iraqi Kurds during the late 1980s 
and 1990s, under the governments of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, when Turkey began 
cross-border trade with Iraqi Kurds and allowed international forces to form within its territory to 
protect Iraqi Kurds against violence from Saddam Hussein’s regime after the Persian Gulf War 
(Gunter 1993).19 Turkey’s ceasefire ended in July 2015 with Turkey’s entry into the conflict in 
Iraq, Syria, and southeastern Turkey. The section 7.1 provides an overview of the historical 
antecedents in each of these three countries, briefly summarizing state structure and relations 
with external actors in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. 
8.1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: TURKEY, IRAQ, AND SYRIA 
The historical antecedents in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are reviewed in brief as the initial 
conditions of the complex adaptive system of systems model of the struggle for self-
determination movements under constitutional authoritarianism. With origins in the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have both similarities and differences. The 
Republic of Turkey was born was out of a successful struggle against imperial powers, those that 
for decades colonized Syria and Iraq. However, at its foundation, each country pursued an 
assimilationist policy toward minority populations. Within each country, Kurds seeking self-
determination perceive each nation-state structure as the facilitator of oppression, despite its 
                                                 
19 Michael Gunter (Professor, Tennessee Technological University) Personal communication 
with author by telephone, June 11 2015. 
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origins. These conditions have created different dynamics within and across the countries Kurds 
are struggling for self-determination within in the 21st century.  
As the seat of the former Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey built a robust façade 
of nominally democratic institutions after the Empire dissolved. Turkey’s administrative 
structure has always been highly centralized, following the French administrative model, but 
while not being directly beholden to the French. No power has ever been devolved to the 
Kurdish population. Simultaneous to its Republican foundation, Turkey has maintained some 
authoritarian traditions. Throughout the last century, Turkish governments have vacillated 
between non-consolidated democracy and semi-authoritarianism, depending on whether the 
current trend is toward or away from liberal constitutional democracy. The government and 
public in Turkey has maintained a strong, anti-imperialist sentiment, weary of foreign 
involvement, due to its revolutionary beginnings against Western imperial powers (Danforth 
2015). Despite frequent interactions with North American and European powers in the 
international arena, Turkey sustains some of the highest levels of anti-American sentiment of any 
country in the world (Taspinar 2014). 
Though modern Turkey remains averse to foreign involvement in domestic affairs, 
paradoxically, it maintains frequent interactions with the West. Turkey became a member of the 
United Nations in 1945, and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1952. In 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community, and officially 
began accession talks with the European Union (EU) in 2005, resulting in much political reform 
(Usul 2010). These actors have influenced the evolution of democracy in Turkey since the 
Ottoman era, when Western nation-states exerted influence on the Turkish government to adopt 
norms of constitutional democracy (Zürcher 2004). Through World War I, World War II, and the 
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Cold War, countries have demanded Turkey comply with democratization conditions to 
participate in programs of the international system (2004). For example, to qualify for 
participation in Western clubs or international economic institutions, external actors demanded 
the Sultan uphold standards of minority rights, particularly for Christians, within the Empire 
(Yıldız 2007). After World War I, the need for recognition of Turkey’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity coincided with the establishment of a parliamentary Republic (Ward and 
Rustow 1964). Turkey’s establishment of multiparty politics came at a time when the country 
needed to qualify for funds from the Marshall Plan and reconstruction in the aftermath of World 
War II (Mutlu 2001). Turkey also needed to adhere to democratic standards for admission to 
NATO during the onset of the Cold War given its proximity to Russian nuclear arsenals (Zürcher 
2004). The Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union have driven many 
democratic reforms as Turkey has dealt with opening trade on its Western borders and the 
European single market (Börzel 2011). 
In contrast to Turkey’s victorious struggle against colonial powers, the British highly 
impacted the state structure of colonial Iraq and its relationship with external powers. The British 
occupied Iraq during the course of World War I; in 1920, Iraq was declared a League of Nations 
mandate. Unlike the French, the British colonial model was more decentralized, and from 1959 
to 1980 Kurds had an autonomous territory they governed in self-exclusion from the Iraqi state. 
Iraq was created from the combination of three outlying provinces of the former Ottoman 
Empire: Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, until the country obtained its independence as a kingdom in 
1932. From 1925 to 1958, Iraq was a constitutional monarchy. Although Iraq was declared a 
republic in 1958, from 1958 to 2003, de facto military governments dominated by the Baathist 
Party ruled Iraq, the last, Saddam Hussein. Hussein led a brutal dictatorship during which: 
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“… dissent was banned on pain of death. Tens of thousands of Iraqis perished at the hands of a regime 
whose readiness to kill was matched only by its resort to extreme cruelty as a method of intimidation, 
deterrence and control. The sole organized opposition that could exist arose, by necessity, in exile, and only 
after the defeat in the 1991 Gulf War gave Iraqis a sense that the regime, after all, was vulnerable…” 
(International Crisis Group 2003; Sassoon 2011; Human Rights Watch 1994). 
 
In 1990, Iraq’s attempted annexation of neighboring Kuwait and a dispute over oil reserves 
sparked the Gulf War of 1990-1, or Operation Desert Shield, led by the US in a United Nations 
coalition. Following, the UN Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to destroy its weapons of 
mass destruction and allow weapons inspections. Continued, perceived, noncompliance led to the 
2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which remained in Iraq under a UNSC mandate through 2009 and 
under a bilateral security agreement thereafter, to provide and strengthen Iraqi security forces. 
Nearly nine years after the start of the Second Gulf War in Iraq, US military operations there 
ended in mid-December 2011. An international coalition led by the US and the UK still occupied 
Iraq during its recreation as a decentralized, federal, constitutional republic beginning in 2004. In 
October 2005, Iraqis approved a new constitution in a national referendum, then elected a 275 
member Council of Representatives (Arato 2009). 
Finally, following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the 
former Ottoman Empire province of Syria, enacting a highly centralized administrative structure. 
Syria gained independence from France in 1946. From 1946 to 1961, Syria’s government was 
taken over in a series of military coups. During this time, the Kurds had a power-sharing 
agreement with the regime for a brief period, but they did not control autonomous territory. Syria 
briefly united with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In 1961, the Syrian Arab 
Republic was reestablished. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, a member of the socialist Baath Party and 
the minority Alawite Islamic sect, seized power in a non-violent coup and brought political 
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stability to the country (Hinnebusch 2002). Anti-government protests against Hafez’s son Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime began in 2011 and have since evolved into a civil war. To the present day, this 
civil war has created the largest humanitarian crisis in human history (Peralta 2014). As of 2015, 
the conflict has created 12.2 million people in need of humanitarian crisis, internally displacing 
7.6 million, creating 3.9 million refugees, and affecting 5.5 million children (USAID 2015). 
International pressure on Bashar al-Assad’s regime increased in 2011, with economic sanctions 
imposed by the Arab League, European Union, Turkey, and the United States. In 2012, most of 
the international community recognized the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces, commonly referred to as the Syrian National Coalition, as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people. Currently, international and regional organizations are 
involved in Syria providing humanitarian aid. As of July 2015, the United States and Turkey 
have agreed to escalate military intervention in Syria (Barnard and Gordon 2015). 
8.2 CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: TURKEY, IRAQ, AND SYRIA 
This section of the chapter assesses and compares the official constitutional environments in 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria from 1982 – 2012. First, I review historical constitutional developments 
in each of the countries. Second, I use data from the Comparative Constitutions Project on 
constitutional commitments, and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset on observations 
of some of those commitments, to operationalize and measure the semi-authoritarian 
constitutional dynamic of each state throughout the period. 
From 1876 until 1923, the Ottoman Empire was a constitutional monarchy (M. Sukru 
Hanioglu 1995; M. Sukru Hanioglu 2001). The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 as a 
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constitutional republic (Rustow 1968). For its first three decades, the Republic was a one-party 
system under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Cümhuriyet Halk Partisi, or the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP). Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country underwent wide-
ranging reforms in nearly every aspect, including social, political, legal, and cultural 
transformations of Turkish life (Atabaki and Zurcher 2004; M. Sükrü Hanioglu 2011). The 
overarching national ideology driving these reforms was the merging of multiple imperial 
Ottoman identities into a single Turkish national identity defined by secularism and Turkish 
ethnicity (Bayir 2013). CHP leadership enacted constitutional reform to open the system to 
multiple political parties in 1945 (Zürcher 2004). In 1950, the first opposition party in Turkey, 
the Demokrat Partisi (DP), was elected in a peaceful transfer of power but was overthrown in a 
military coup d’etat ten years later (Karpat 1959).  
From 1950 until 1980, several military coups interrupted multi-party electoral political 
competition, the building of democratic institutions, and the development of democratic political 
culture in Turkey (W. M. Hale 1994). The last informal military intervention in politics resulted 
in the ouster of the Islamic-oriented Refah Partisi or Welfare Party (RP or WP) in 1997 (Yavuz 
1997). From 2002 to 2014, the conservative Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) ruled Turkish politics, removing the informal influence the military 
held over the executive and judicial branches (Michaud‐Emin 2007). After 2007, under the 
leadership of then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP began consolidating its rule 
and using repression in an increasingly authoritarian-style government. Erdoğan desires a 
stronger presidency in Turkey, and became Turkey’s first popularly elected President in 2014. 
Constitutional reform process has been ongoing under the AKP since its first election into the 
  194 
TBMM, but is stalled at opposition to Erdoğan’s preference for a stronger executive (Varol 
2015). 
Second, the current Iraqi Constitution, promulgated in 2005, is an interim-turned-
permanent constitution written while Iraq was still occupied (Arato 2009). The 2005 
constitutional drafting and approval process is widely criticized because the majority of Sunni 
support came only due to “last-minute concessions to create a panel in Iraq’s next parliament 
with powers to revise the constitution at a later date,” which never fully materialized (Beehner 
2005). Some scholars have argued the deferral of some constitutional matters proved successful 
in the short-term for creating the democratic Iraqi federation (Hamoudi 2013). Others claim the 
constitution is now a “source of fundamental and nearly irreconcilable division across Iraq’s 
large ethno-religious political groupings” (Arato 2009). The Constitution created a semi-
presidential federalist system, using Islamic law a basic foundation that no other law can 
contradict. Ambiguously, the Iraqi Constitution has both a “supremacy” clause, saying that a 
regional constitution cannot contradict it, and also a “savings” clause that leaves anything not 
formally specified in it to the power of the regional governments (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 
2011). In 2009 and 2013, Iraq held elections for provincial councils in all governorates except 
for those in the Kurdistan Regional Government and in Kirkuk. Successive national legislative 
elections were held in 2010 and 2014, expanding the legislature to over 325 members. In 2014, 
after Prime Minister al-Maliki dropped his bid for a third term, and Haydar al-Abadi, a Shi’a 
from Baghdad, won approval from the legislature for his new cabinet in September 2014. Since 
early 2014, Iraqi state forces, and the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq, have been engaged 
with aid from some international actors in armed conflict against ISIS to recapture territory lost 
in the western and northern portion of Iraq to ISIS and other Islamist militant groups. 
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Finally, the Syrian Constitution was created when Hafez al-Assad seized power. The 
Constitution was first amended in 1973 to give the Syrian Ba’athist Party a leadership role over 
state and society, in Article 8 of the Syrian Constitution. Following Hafez al-Assad’s death, his 
son Bashar replaced him in his first and second terms as president, ostensibly approved by 
popular referendum, in 2000 and 2007. When Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, the 
constitution was first amended to lower the required age for President from 40 to 34 so he could 
take power (Hinnebusch 2002). Anti-government protests began in 2011 with demands for the 
“repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of 
political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials” (CIA World Factbook 2015).  
Bashar al-Assad’s government responded with a mixture of political concessions and 
violent repression. Once the Syrian uprising began against the Assad government, the Syrian 
Constitution was amended by a commission appointed by the President, then approved by a 
public referendum in 2012 (Fares 2014). Article 8, privileging the Baathist Party in politics and 
society, was removed in the concessions made to political opposition in 2012, along with other 
superficial changes. These changes effectively replaced the socialist Baathist Arab character of 
the previous constitution with an emphasis on sovereignty and democratic pluralism (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2011). The latest amended Syrian Constitution provides for a multi-party 
parliamentary system with direct election of the President in a race with multiple candidates 
(Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2011). Yet where the Syrian state is in control, the Ba’ath party 
remains in control of every aspect of political and public life, including the military. Organized 
political opposition is non-existent in those areas, with those who tried to engage in politics 
against the regime previously risking imprisonment and exile from politics for offenses such as 
“weakening national sentiment” (Whitson 2015). Political opposition in Syria now has formed its 
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own governing coalition, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 
commonly referred to as the Syrian National Coalition, and has control of portions of the Syrian 
state territory. 
Figures 17 and 18 below show the de jure constitutional commitments of Turkey, Iraq, 
and Syria in 1982 and in 2012 and show the level of change undertaken by regimes in their 
constitutions throughout the period. Eleven indices were created based on a coding scheme 
developed by comparative constitutionalists of clauses of constitutional commitments: equality 
rights, gender rights, personal integrity rights, civil and political rights, minority rights, socio-
economic rights, environmental rights, property rights, good governance, government structure, 
judicial integrity, and human rights institutions (Chilton and Versteeg 2014). The indices are 










































Figure 18. Change in De Jure Constitution Commitments, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
 
 
In 1982, Turkey’s 1982 constitution was in effect, amended many times between 1982 
and 2012. In 2007, the AKP started an intensive process to replace the constitution in its entirety. 
Iraq’s constitution in 1982 was in effect its 1970 Constitution, which was prepared as a draft 
interim constitution and never promulgated due to the onset of the first Gulf War. Nevertheless, 
it functioned as the law. Iraq rewrote its constitution in entirety in 2004 and 2005 under the 
influence of US-led occupying forces (Arato 2009). Syria’s 1973 constitution was in effect in 
1982, with a few, technical amendments, including lowering the presidential candidate’s age of 
eligibility allowing Bashar al-Assad to contend for the position (Hinnebusch 2002). Syria had a 
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The countries show different patterns in different issue areas. 20 Syria showed a slight 
increase in all de jure constitutional commitments except for human rights, minority rights and 
good governance. In Iraq, there was a universal increase across all indices, indicating higher 
constitutional commitments in every issue area. In stark contrast, de jure constitutional 
commitments did not increase in Turkey, except for slight increases in personal integrity rights, 
civil and political rights, socio-economic rights, and judicial independence, and a large increase 
in commitments to human rights institutions. 
Data on governments’ observations of freedoms and rights allow for a comparison of de 
jure constitutional commitments to de facto constitutional rights and freedoms.21 Observations of 
de facto constitutional commitments show different trends in different areas in the three 
countries. When compared to change in de jure constitutional commitments, Turkey,ix Syria,x 
and Iraqxi phase transitions can be measured. Turkey shifted from an overt-sham environment to 
a stealth environment. Iraq shifts from an overt-weak to an overt-sham to a stealth/ fragile 
democracy dynamic, but overall maintains the overt-weak to overt-sham transition dynamic 
                                                 
20 In Syria, increases of between 5 and 10% occurred in equality/ gender and judicial 
independence. Increases of between 10 and 20% took place in personal integrity rights, civil and 
political rights, property rights, and government structure. Increases in socioeconomic rights and 
environmental rights were over 20%. In Iraq, judicial independence and government structure 
had an increase of 10-20%. Socioeconomic rights, property rights, civil and political rights, 
equality/gender rights, and judicial independence were between 20-40%. Human rights 
institutions, personal integrity rights, and environmental rights increased from between 40-60%. 
Minority rights had the highest increase of all at about 70%. In Turkey, there were no increases 
except for personal integrity rights and civil and political rights which increased slightly, from 2-
7%. However, commitments to human rights institutions, including a Human Rights Commission 
and an ombudsman, increased over 80%.20 the rest of the indices of equality/ gender rights, 
minority rights, socioeconomic rights, environmental rights, property rights, good governance, 
government structure, and judicial independence did not increase at all. 
21 The Figures and Tables in the Appendix C visualize the contrast the de jure change with 
changes in observed rights and freedoms from 1981 to 2011 with the corresponding model 
dynamics. 
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environment. Syria shifted from overt-weak to overt-sham back to an overt-weak environment, 
but maintained an overt-weak dynamic overall. The summary of the comparisons yields the 
following results, summarized below in Table 16, for Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. 
 










IDP Moderate – regime 
benefits 
Low – no benefit High – opposition 
benefits 
Dynamic OCA-Sham to Stealth OCA-Weak to OCA-Sham 
to OCA-Weak 
 






High to fight Kurds None High to fight groups 
other than Kurds 
SDM Must cooperate with 
SDM across borders 
No aid, no benefit, no SDM 
without cooperation 
External actor imposes 
reform of state structure 
 
Under these dynamics, the influence of international democracy promotion has different effects 
on political opposition and self-determination movements. Figure 19 below shows the reported 
level of aid given to each country from all reporting donors for targeted democratic governance 
reform since 1980. Iraq has the highest level of aid, Turkey the second highest level of aid, while 
Syria has little aid up until 2012. These figures do not include humanitarian, military, or 
economic restructuring aid. 
In Turkey, international democracy promoters have taken little to no action in support of 
the Kurds’ self-determination struggle, but rather have given moderate amounts of aid to the 
Turkish government to promote democratic governance and reform and a high level of military 
aid to Turkey to fight the PKK. No “sticks” such as sanctions have been used against the Turkish 
state. In Iraq, the first military intervention occurred in 1990-1, and was followed by economic 
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sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1990s.  These military interventions 
specifically designated Iraqi Kurds as allies rather than targets; no military aid given to Iraq has 
been intentionally given with the goal of fighting Kurds, but rather has been designated to 
support them. The datasets reviewed below show no evidence that no external support was given 
to Iraq in order to fights these Kurdish groups in Iraq from 1984 onwards. International 
democracy promoters performed a second extensive intervention from 2003 to 2011, and had a 
highly influential role in the promulgation of Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which reaffirmed the 
KRG’s autonomy. In Syria, international democracy promotion is becoming heavier in the 
humanitarian intervention in the Northern Region of Rojava, which includes not just Kurds, but 
other minority groups as well. However, international actors are not involved in the negotiations 





Figure 19. Levels of Democracy Promotion Since 1980: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
 
The independence struggles of Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey provide an opportunity to assess 
the evolution of political opposition, self-determination movements, and the commitment to 
constitutional democracy under different conditions. Their evolution is assessed in evidence for 
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the model as a complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS).  Under these phase transitions and 
the influence of international democracy promotion in each of these regimes, the analysis shows 
how the Kurdish self-determination movement cooperated across borders and evolved. The 
Kurds’ constitutional movements combine elements of popular and post-sovereign models within 
the different semi-authoritarian constitutional environments of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq from 1982 
to 2012. The Kurdish movement, like other movements for self-determination, is a constitutional 
movement that is both revolutionary, but also struggles within already existing dynamic 
constitutional environments. These constitutional environments are states that Kurds do not 
necessarily seek to displace. Therefore, constitutional movements for self-determination, like 
those of the Kurds, combine elements of the two traditional modes of constitution-making 
(Kalyvas 2005). The first mode is the original American or French popular sovereign model, in 
which constituent power and legitimacy are embodied in one revolutionary group that displaces 
the existing order (Arato and Tombuș 2013). The second mode is the post-sovereign model, in 
which constitutions are made with “plurality, inclusion, compromise, publicity, free elections, 
self-limitation, and enforceable legality” within an existing constitutional order (2013). Their 
histories are briefly reviewed here before the presentation of original data on their cooperation 
and evolution for assessment under different constitutional semi-authoritarian dynamics. 
8.3 KURDISH GROUPS IN TURKEY, IRAQ, AND SYRIA 
The Kurds are a group with similar historical antecedents that were divided into states with 
different dynamics, summarized in Table 17. These dynamics range from Turkey’s secular 
republican semi-authoritarianism, to Syria’s brutal dictatorship and civil war, to Iraq’s ruthless 
  202 
autocracy turned democratic federal republic created as a result of international intervention. 
Since the end of World War I and a promise for an independent Kurdish region in the Treaty of 
Sevres, to its revocation in the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurds have been seeking self-determination, 
and their struggle has been intermittently, and necessarily, violent (Sharifi 2013). Over a century 
later, Kurds’ political organization may present a potential foundation for democracy in the 
Middle East. Some Kurdish groups vocally embrace the tenets of democratic constitutionalism, 
or, in their terms, democratic autonomy (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012; Casier, Jongerden, and 
Walker 2013). Within the states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, the Kurdish self-determination 
movements has declared constitutional preferences regarding their national identity, governing 
principles, and governance structure. 
 
 




State Official Dynamic Democracy Promotion and Self-Determination 
Turkey: OCA-Sham to Stealth 
Moderate level of international aid for democratic 
governance and ROL reform 
Must cooperate with SDM across borders 
Iraq: OCA-Weak to  
OCA-Sham to Stealth/DEM 
High level of international aid for democratic governance 
and ROL reform; extensive military intervention in 1990-1 
and from 2003 to 2011; External actor imposes reform of 
state structure 
 
Syria: OCA-Weak to OCA-Sham 
to OCA-Weak 
Low aid for democratic governance and ROL reform; 
Economic sanctions, political opposition funded and 
armed 
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8.3.1 Kurdish Groups in Turkey 
Turkey, with an assimilationist Sunni Muslim Turk nationalist ideology, maintains an anti-
imperialist, parliamentary republic with strong nominally-democratic institutions. From 1982 to 
2012 it has functioned under the dynamic of movement from an overt autocracy with a sham 
constitution, which sometimes increases observations of those rights in different issue areas at 
different times, creating a stealth authoritarian regime. Turkey received a moderate amount of 
aid from international democracy promoters that was targeted to the regime for democratic 
governance reform, fueling de jure changes in constitutional commitments. Because Turkey kept 
its level of repression low, except for personal integrity rights in the 1990s, all parties preferred 
moderate democratic reform to regime change, including the Kurds. Kurds constitute one-fifth of 
Turkey’s population, making them the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. Kurds differ from the 
Turkish majority in language, religion (following the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam rather than 
the Shafi school), social customs, and geographic location (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).  
The majority of Kurds in Turkey reside in the Southeast, though there has been 
significant urban migration. Beyond serious economic and political discrimination, Turkey’s 
policy toward the Kurds has included restrictions on linguistic and cultural expression, and on 
non-violent political organizing as well (2009 Turkey). Yet Kurds in Turkey, as opposed to those 
in Syria, can avoid discrimination almost entirely by assimilating into Turkish culture, leaving 
“all forms of social progress … open” (2009 Turkey). Kurds have been suppressed in the name 
of constructing a robust Turkish national identity through the ideology of Kemalism since the 
foundation of the Republic, throughout which their very existence was denied until recently by 
referring to them as “Mountain Turks.” The armed struggle for autonomy in Turkey has ebbed 
and flowed since the early 1900s, from brutal response by the Turkish government to the 
  204 
Rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925, to the rise of the PKK in the 1970s, and the growth of political 
organization by the Kurds throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Turkish Kurds, according to one 
scholar, rebelled 28 times and were suppressed violently by the Turkish state 28 times.xii 
Until recently, Turkey maintained an assimilationist policy toward Kurds. Under the 
AKP, a policy for Kürt açılımı or Kurdish “opening,” was instituted but came to a halt when 
Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq were strengthened due to ISIS’ assault on those states’ official 
structures. Kurdish groups in Turkey face a legacy of being collectively identified as terrorists 
seeking an autonomous state, as well as being internationally designated as a terrorist 
organization by the US and the EU (Gunter 2015).22 In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or 
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK) and the Turkish government fought in a civil conflict that 
has claimed between 10,000 and 45,000 lives (Xulam 2015).23 After the PKK’s leader Abdullah 
Öcalan, was captured in 1999, the PKK moved its base of operations to Northern Iraq. Öcalan’s 
philosophy changed from a position of armed struggle for a separate state to peaceful, if possible, 
transition to democratic confederalism within existing state structures, during his incarceration at 
Imrali. Öcalan’s doctrine for democratic autonomy has three distinguishing components: gender 
equality, environmentalism or ecological awareness, and local, decentralized, bottom-up rule by 
elected councils (Gunter 2015).xiii Turkish governments’ approach to the Kurdish issue over the 
last two decades has been inconsistent, resulting in a policy dynamic of variation in time and 
across issue area, a stealth dynamic. In 1991, the TBMM eased restrictions on the ban on using 
the Kurdish language, and in 2001 the TBMM repealed the constitutional ban on broadcasting 
                                                 
22 Michael Gunter (Professor, Tennessee Technological University) Personal communication 
with author by telephone, June 11, 2015. 
23 Kani Xulam (Founder, American Kurdish Information Network) Personal communication with 
author by telephone, on June 10, 2015. 
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and education in Kurdish. However, both were later rescinded and then reinstated (Cunningham 
2014). Turkey currently has one television channel broadcast in Turkish (Xulam 2015). The 
stealth dynamic strengthened under the AKP, whose policy toward the Kurds has drastically 
varied across time. For example, while the AKP did move public investments in Kurdish region 
into education, health, and infrastructure, establishing universities in Batman, Siirt, Tunceli, 
Hakkari and Mardin, and implementing projects such as road-building, the AKP has 
simultaneously “given full support to cross-border military attacks on PKK bases after the 2007 
election, even while state agents were secretly engaged in talks” with PKK representatives in 
Oslo and with Öcalan in his prison on the island of Imrali (Casier, Jongerden, and Walker 2013). 
After Öcalan’s capture and reform of the goals of the movement toward radical 
democracy that does not seek its own nation-state, or the overthrow of the existing state, Kurds 
in Turkey have broadened their political agenda to one that has encompassed more dissatisfied 
Turkish citizens, mobilizing broader support for their program dedicated to constitutional 
democracy (Sardağ 2015). Kurdish political organizations in Turkey were able to use heightened 
dissatisfaction with the AKP government to gain broadened electoral support, becoming a highly 
organized political force inside the existing system that is now being challenged by the AKP 
government. One expert compares the Kurds’ moment in Turkey under the HDP in 2015 as 
similar to the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the United States, as the beginning of a battle for rights 
now legally recognized to also be observed by Turkish state and society in practice (Xulam 
2015).  
In 2013, the AKP government and the PKK agreed to a ceasefire and disarmament that 
continues but has become more complicated by the Kurds’ armed struggle in Syria over Turkey’s 
northern border, against ISIS. The Turkish government’s inaction in that conflict first caused 
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protests that were violently suppressed in Turkey, for which the leadership of the HDP is now 
under criminal investigation (BBC News 2014). Allegations that the Turkish government 
supports opposing forces of the Kurds in Iraq and in Syria are surfacing (Arango and Schmitt 
2015; Masi 2015). Currently, the political organization of the Kurds in Turkey does not seek 
statehood or autonomy but recognition of their minority rights and adequate political 
representation (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2015). Under the recent campaign of the HDP, led 
by Selahattin Demirtaş, the Kurds’ political campaign has broadened from recognition of 
minority rights to recognition of the constitutional rights for all Turkish citizens in Demirtaş’ 
presidential and the HDP’s legislative campaign “Call to a New Life” (Demirtaş 2014). Since 
they became a notable electoral threat, the AKP’s stealth authoritarian tactics challenges the 
HDP and its leadership. 
8.3.2 Kurdish Groups in Iraq 
Iraq is now a federal republic due to sustained international interventions, led first by the UN and 
then by the US. In Iraq, frequent, sustained interactions with external actors due to these 
interventions allowed Kurds to separate from the official state with a politically autonomous 
region starting in 1992. This political autonomy was codified in the 2005 constitution and 
continues today. Kurds in Iraq have the lowest barriers to collective action of all the three 
countries, yet their challenge has been intra-group conflict (Cunningham 2014; Gunter 1993; 
Gunter 2015). Conditions that have worked in favor of mobilization for Iraq Kurds are a high 
level of organization and resources by the PKK, Peshmerga, PUK, the PYD, and Kurdistan 
Regional Government, given the high value of natural oil resources in the region. Kurds in Iraq 
sustained very high levels of repression throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mobilizing their action 
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against the regime. However, in contrast to Turkey and Syria, the Iraqi regime was subject to the 
“sticks” of international democracy promotion, making the Iraqi Kurds the recipients of de facto 
IDP support. 
The majority of Iraq’s population is composed of Shi’a Muslim Arabs. Kurds in Iraq 
differ in language, religion (Kurds are generally Sunni Muslim), ethnicity, culture, and 
geography. Kurds were subjected to brutal repression by Saddam Hussein’s regime, including 
chemical and biological weapons in a “series of attacks on Kurdish villages, killing thousands 
and displacing tens of thousands more,” in the late 1980s in the Anfal campaign (Human Rights 
Watch 1994; Sassoon 2011; International Crisis Group 2003).xiv Kurds in Iraq obtained relative 
cultural and political autonomy in 1992, in conjunction with the Persian Gulf War, and they held 
their first elections in 1992 (Cunningham 2014). During the 1990s there was also a major civil 
conflict between the two major Iraqi Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Natali 2005). There were also lower level conflicts between these 
Iraqi Kurdish organizations and the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish militant group. 
After Iraq became a federation in 2005, the Kurds retained international recognition of 
their autonomy and increased their demands for self-determination. They established a unity 
government of Kurdish groups within the KRG under one umbrella, held elections, and 
transitioned between elected executives, or ministers (Süleyman 2015).24 Since the adoption of 
the Iraqi Constitution in 2005, the Kurdistan Regional Government has been drafting and 
promulgating its own constitution with its recognition as an autonomous region under a federal 
structure (Kelly 2009). Unlike Kurds in Syria and in Turkey, the KRG seeks more official 
                                                 
24 Remziya Süleyman (Kurdistan Regional Government’s Representation in the United States, 
Director of Congressional Affairs) Personal communication with author by telephone, June 9, 
2015. 
  208 
statehood or autonomy in their constitution than is granted to them by the current constitution of 
the Iraqi state (Kelly 2009). Most recently, they are seeking a constitutional provision that will 
allow the KRG to seek international aid and loans as a separate entity from Iraq (Süleyman 
2015). 25 
Within the autonomy conceded to it by the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdish Regional 
Government of Iraqi Kurdistan held a commission and participatory process (Kurdistan Tribune 
Editors 2012) to draft their own regional constitution in 2009 (Kelly 2009). The KRG Parliament 
approved the draft but it has yet to be put to a referendum because it contradicts with the Iraqi 
constitution by laying claim to the region's territory, and oil and gas reserves. Unlike the 
proposals of Kurdish political parties in Turkey, or Syrian Kurds in Rojava, the KRG's 
constitution directly appeals to the Wilsonian ideal of sovereignty (Kelly 2009, 735).  
The KRG constitutions states that its constitution and laws of the Kurdistan Region are 
more sovereign and supreme than those passed by the Iraqi government, and includes a choice of 
law provision that requires Kurdish courts to follow Kurdish law in the event of a conflict with 
other laws (Kelly 2009). The approved draft also allows an opt-out of the Iraqi federation if the 
Iraqi government abandons the federal model or the constitutional principles of democracy and 
human rights, or if the central government fails to effectuate Article 140, which would determine 
whether the regions in surrounding Kirkuk would become part of Iraqi Kurdistan, which has so 
far not taken place. The KRG Constitution also places much less emphasis on Islamic identity 
than its federal counterpart, and more emphasis on pluralism (2009). 
                                                 
25 Remziya Süleyman (Kurdistan Regional Government’s Representation in the United States, 
Director of Congressional Affairs) Personal communication with author by telephone, June 9, 
2015. 
  209 
8.3.3 Kurdish Groups in Syria 
Syria, as a formerly Socialist Arab Baathist single-party Republic with very high levels of 
repression for all political opposition, including the Kurds, enforced a policy of Arabization 
throughout the presidential tenures of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad from 1970 onwards. Kurds in 
Syria differ in language and culture from the rest of the Syrian population, but generally practice 
the same religion, Sunni Islam. Syrian Kurds make up about 10 percent of the population and are 
somewhat geographically concentrated (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). During the 1980s and 
1990s, the Assad regime instituted a system of forced resettlement in competition for land. Kurds 
faced severe discrimination, including a lower form of citizenship or no citizenship at all, though 
some were granted citizenship as a concession in 2011 (CNN Wire Staff 2011). Kurds have not 
received equal access to education, healthcare, or employment, and have no legal protection or 
right to organize (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Kurds in Syria have been subject to highly 
effective repression and forced Arabization (D. L. Phillips and Kouchner 2015). Historically, the 
Kurds in Syria have not been highly organized because political parties were banned, although 
Kurdish groups existed covertly (Minorities at Risk Project 2009 Syria). Before the onset of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011, violent repression of Kurdish protests occurred in 2004, 2005, and 2006 
(2009 Syria). 
As the international democracy promotion program enacted its “sticks” and targeted the 
al-Assad regime with economic sanctions, it has shifted its recognition from that regime to the 
opposition Syrian armed groups. These groups are being funded, trained, and armed, and 
alongside them, Syrian Kurdish groups have been able to overcome barriers to collective action 
in their self-determination movement within the vacuum of a functioning government. However, 
they do not seek independent statehood. Against all odds, every possible barrier to mobilization – 
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lack of organization, lack of resources, lack of legitimacy and recognition within the state – has 
been overcome by Kurds in Rojava for Kurds to establish the Social Contract of the Autonomous 
Cantons of Rojava. Despite being at high risk for rebellion, Kurds in Syria maintain a 
commitment to democratic autonomy. Relative to Turkey and Iraq, actors in Syria – whether the 
regime or the opposition – have consistently received little targeted democracy aid except for 
recent spikes in aid to lessen the impact of the humanitarian crisis, ongoing from 2011. 
The Kurds in Syria, according to the Social Contract of the Cantons of Rojava, the 
constitution, “form an integral part of Syria … a model for a future decentralized system of 
federal governance in Syria” (Civiroglu 2015).  The Constitution was promulgated in November 
2013, creating an elected Legislative Assembly that represents the entire northwestern region of 
Syria. The constitution states that the Autonomous Region of Rojava is composed of the three 
cantons of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane; Jazira is ethnically and religiously diverse, with co-existing 
Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, Chechen, Armenian, Muslim, Christian and Yazidi communities. The 
Social Contract of Rojava draws on the de jure text of the Syrian Constitution to hold it to 
account as a “free, sovereign and democratic state, governed by a parliamentary system based on 
principles of decentralization and pluralism” (Ginsburg and Simpser 2013). However, the Social 
Contract has not been recognized by any external states (Xulam 2015). 26 
The rhetoric surrounding Rojava’s creation is democratic, based on Öcalan’s program of 
democratic confederalism. One author writes that the “autonomous region of Rojava, as it exists 
today, is one of few bright spots … to emerge from the tragedy of the Syrian revolution … 
despite the hostility of almost all of its neighbors, Rojava has not only maintained its 
                                                 
26 Kani Xulam (Founder, American Kurdish Information Network) Personal communication with 
author by telephone, on June 10, 2015. 
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independence, but is a remarkable democratic experiment” (Graeber 2014). Rojava’s 
participatory processes take place through popular assemblies and “councils selected with careful 
ethnic balance (in each municipality, for instance, the top three officers have to include one 
Kurd, one Arab and one Assyrian or Armenian Christian, and at least one of the three has to be a 
woman)” (Graeber 2014). 
8.4 CASOS MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM 
The research design for this analysis includes a comparison of three dynamics: Turkey and the 
Kurdish political movement; Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq; Syria, and 
the promulgation of the Social Contract of the Cantons of Rojava by Kurds in Syria in 2013. 
Kurds’ democratic constitutionalism has formed despite most factors working against it. The 
cases are unpacked to understand them within the existing dynamic constitutional environments. 
In particular, self-determination movements with varying levels of commitment to constitutional 
democracy, and demands for overthrow or preservation of the authoritarian state as they exist 
within the CASoS are understood as emergent phenomena arising from the frequency and 
intensity of interactions between external actors promoting democracy, the authoritarian regime, 
the political opposition, and the movement for self-determination.  
Turkey’s relative level of constitutional commitments compared to Syria and Iraq was 
moderate from 1982 to 2012, except for the large jump in human rights institutions and small 
increases in personal integrity and civil and political rights, and judicial independence, indicating 
a variance across time and issue area under the SCA dynamic creating a robust stealth 
authoritarian state in Turkey from 1982 onwards. Yet decreases in actual observations of 
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empowerment rights and judicial integrity, combined with the shifting of repression towards the 
Kurds in particular to the political opposition as a whole and back to the Kurds again, under the 
AKP, allowed Kurds to mobilize with a broadened democratic agenda for all Turkish citizens by 
relying on the rhetoric of moderate democracy, rather than appealing solely to Turkish citizens of 
Kurdish ancestry. This is evident in the “Call for A New Life” platform of Demirtaş and the 
HDP. Some see the leadership of the HDP as liberal and activist, having their roots in a 
community and diaspora of Kurds that have faced decades of human rights violations by the 
Turkish state (Xulam 2015). Others see the base of the HDP as socially-conservative Kurds who 
stopped voting for the ruling AKP in Turkey due to their increased authoritarian nature, 
corruption, and/or lack of support for the Kurds fighting ISIL in Syria (Meyersson 2015). This 
electoral success brought the Kurds back to civil war with the Turkish state. In Turkey, a 
democracy program was broadened for electoral appeal by politically-organized Kurds who are 
now being targeted by the regime in Turkey. 
Relative to Syria and Turkey, Iraq has seen the highest degree of change with regard to 
its constitutional commitments. Iraq’s 2005 constitutional commitments increased obligations for 
personal integrity 70%, equality 25%, civil and political rights 40%, and minority rights 70%. 
Judicial independence also increased 40%. Despite having the highest degree of de jure change 
and de facto observation of rights and freedoms in Iraq did not universally follow its 
commitments. After 2005, personal integrity and empowerment rights both increased, but 
judicial integrity approached nearly 0. Of all three states, Iraq has had the highest degree of 
constitutional change, and while the trends from 2005 to 2011 showed increased observations of 
rights and freedoms, the Iraqi state lacks the capacity to institutionally enforce democratic 
practices like judicial independence, particularly with a high level of civil conflict since 2003. 
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Within the CASoS framework, Iraq moved from overt autocracy with a weak constitution to an 
overt autocracy with a sham constitution to a stealth or fragile democracy state with authoritarian 
tactics phase. However, Iraqi Kurds that control the KRG’s demands do not include radical 
democracy or self-governance but rather democratic institutions of the nation-state model. Yet 
because Iraq is a now decentralized federal republic, it lacks the institutional capacity to maintain 
an overt authoritarian regime. In Iraq, independent governance within a fragile democratic 
nation-state and democracy brought much conflict to the Kurds of Iraq, whose factions are 
perpetuated in Syria across state borders. Kurds in Iraq are also targets of Turkey’s entrance into 
the war against ISIS, as it targets PKK installations in southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq, and 
Northern Syria. 
According to the CAS phase transitions, Syria, on the other hand, has moved from an 
overt autocracy with a weak constitution, to an overt autocracy with a sham constitution, 
maintaining an overt authoritarian regime, notably leaving out minority rights, good governance, 
and human rights institutions of its recent constitutional reforms. While Syria increased its 
constitutional commitments to rights and freedoms in nearly every issue area to a moderate 
degree relative to Turkey and Iraq, the Syrian regime’s observation of those rights and freedoms 
has plummeted, from low to lower levels. After 2000, personal integrity rights declined in Syria. 
Empowerment rights also declined, with the lowest point in the early 1990s. Judicial integrity 
peaked in the late 1990s but also reached nearly zero in 2011. Syria has maintained its overt 
autocracy but offered political concessions as the regime tried to engage opposition in a power-
sharing agreement rather than an overthrow of the regime. These concessions failed to meet their 
goal as international democracy promoters first ignored, and then intermittently used “sticks” 
against the dictatorial regime. Infrequent interactions with external actors and a high, sustained 
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level of grievance and repression caused political opposition to develop into groups advocating 
the overthrow of the regime (the National Syrian opposition) and the Kurds, who advocate 
democratic autonomy for all in a future Syria. In Syria, Kurds have created an island of 
democracy against all odds, because of the interactions between neighboring states regimes and 
the Kurdish self-determination movements in those countries, and between the regimes and the 
international actors, yet remain in a state of high uncertainty about who are their allies, and who 
are their adversaries. 
A schematic of the complex adaptive system of systems is shown below in Figure 20. 
The self-determination movement (SDM) system is nested within the nation-state systems of 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. These nation-states contain the government or regime, and the political 
opposition of those three countries, which are subject to the influence of the international 
democracy promotion program’s “carrots” or “sticks.” Below the schematic, an inter-
organizational network analysis of ties of conflict and cooperation between the parties is 
presented, based on an original dataset created from several data sources on conflict, 
cooperation, and claims for self-determination.27  The sub-national groups represented and the 
timeline of events of conflict and cooperation used to create the network visualization, which has 
ties that are weighted and colored according to degree of conflict and cooperation between 
groups, is shown in detail in the Tables in Appendix C.4 and C.5. The network visualization in 
Figure 21 was created using Gephi software. 
                                                 
27 These sources include the UCDP Armed Conflict Dyadic dataset (UCDP 2015); the UCDP 
External Support to Armed Actors dataset (UCDP 2011); the Minorities At Risk Org Behavior 
dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); the Self-Determination Movements Org Behavior 
dataset (Cunningham 2014); and qualitative sources. 
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Figure 22. Color Legend for Ties in Network 
 
In the network visualization, between the international system and states, cooperation occurs 
most heavily between the IDP actors and the Iraqi state post-2003, at a moderate level between 
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the Turkish regime and IDP actors, except for the United States, who it cooperates heavily with 
for military aid, and at the lowest level between IDP actors and Syria. IDP actors are in conflict 
with Iraqi regime pre-2003 and in Syria throughout the period. Between the international system 
and sub-national opposition and self-determination movements, IDP actors are neutral toward 
groups in Turkey, besides providing military aid to fight Kurdish groups in Turkey. In Syria and 
Iraq, IDP actors cooperative with some groups, and conflicting with other groups. Between the 
states and the sub-national groups, the heaviest levels of conflict are between the Turkish 
government and the armed Kurdish group, the PKK, and the Syrian regime and opposition 
groups there.   
 Within the subnational groups, cooperation is high between the PKK and most other 
groups of Kurds in Iraq and in Turkey. However, where conflict does exist, it is generally 
propagated across borders as groups form along faction lines mirroring those SDM groups in 
neighboring states. The political Kurdish group in Turkey maintains a more neutral position 
toward other groups; the PKK provides the main link between Turkish political groups and the 
other Kurdish groups. The organization of the Kurdish problem as a CASoS shows that the 
outcomes of the Kurdish self-determination movements are dependent upon multi-level 
interactions over time within the system of systems. The cooperation between SDM groups 
allows the emergence of Kurdish SDMs in Syria, but also produces prolonged conflict. 
Cooperation has allowed Kurds to mobilize across borders but has also made it possible for the 
Republic of Turkey, backed by US, to use its foreign policy to enter the war against ISIS to play 
domestic politics by shoring up nationalist support before the likely “snap election” that will take 
place as a rerun of the election in which the AKP lost its majority in the Turkish Parliament to 
the Kurdish HDP party. 
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The Kurdish population forms the second largest ethnic group in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Syria.  The politics of their existence in these countries will be an important phenomenon to 
understand well into the future as a security issue, and as an example of leadership for 
democracy around the globe. The Kurdish population’s impact on these countries is complex, yet 
the problem is not one that international democracy promoters can afford to ignore. Future 
research on the Kurds can also inform problems of collective action that are constituted of 
stakeholders with very different perspectives. These stakeholders also share, to an extent, a 
common goal in gaining security, safety, and democratic rights.  Understanding how groups can 
move past an initial, negative joint goal, and move to a universal resolution of the problem is a 
question that has not yet been addressed in literature on collective action.  For example, in the 
perpetuation of intrastate conflict, two joint goals are often examined for explaining the 
collective action of a group: greed for resources that allow a group to prolong its conflict 
activities, or prolonging conflict due to grievance against an oppressor.  Collective action 
involving all sides to the conflict involves overcoming the obstacles to each of these groups by 
focusing on the larger common goal of establishing security and social stability. 
The leaders of the Kurdish party in Turkey, the HDP, in the latest Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections in that country, ran on a campaign of broadened democratic 
constitutionalism that reached beyond recognition for Kurds’ minority rights in a “Call for a New 
Life” for all Turks. In the vacuum of fully functioning government in Syria, Kurds have formed 
semi-autonomous governance that does not call for independent statehood. In Syria, governed by 
the Social Contract of the Autonomous Cantons of Rojava, Kurds proclaimed semi-autonomy in 
2013 (Solomon 2014). In Iraq, the autonomous Kurdish region of Northern Iraq, ia fragile 
democratic entity formed in the wake of international inventions dissolving the brutal 
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dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The ISIS-driven conflict in Iraq and Syria, now spilling over the 
border with Turkey, has overshadowed the importance of the underlying situation in these 
Kurdish regions in general. At the very crux of the conflict, Kurdish groups have vocalized their 
support for democratic constitutionalism, which will have an impact on what democracy will 
continue to mean in the future of the Middle East. The importance of the Kurds’ struggles in 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, today has implications for the idea of international democracy 
promotion itself, and whether and how the program can be successful. The idea of successful 
international democracy promotion poses important questions for the changing international 
order and what it can and will be in the coming era. For international democracy promoters, the 
Kurds’ struggles may be a litmus test for the survival of the international order of normative 
constitutional democracy, as it currently exists. These findings can help to create an 
understanding as to how many stakeholders in a complex conflict overcome initial parochial 
goals and learn to act on behalf of the higher-order joint goal constitutional democracy: of 
resolving conflict, promoting security, and respecting human rights. 
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9.0  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
In order to understand a phenomenon like the resilience of semi-authoritarianism, we must take 
into analytical consideration the complex interactions between the international system and 
domestic politics, both over time, and as a system of systems in its entirety. The cyclic system 
dynamic of constitutional change in polities, conditional on international democracy promotion, 
is one of those outcomes; the emergence of transnational cooperating self-determination groups 
making their own constitutional claims is another. However, scholars also now have the 
computational power to empirically model and analyze such problems. Policy analysis of 
international actors in democracy promotion must observe and understand “democratic behavior” 
in democratizing states with caution. In particular, they must observe the differences between 
constitutional commitments and observations of those commitments over time and across issue 
areas. 
The CASoS model of constitutionalism between democracy and authoritarianism shows 
the system is out-of-equilibrium and shifts between three phases that have varying levels of 
commitment to and observation of the norms associated with constitutional democracy. These 
three phases are Overt authoritarianism with a weak constitution, Overt authoritarianism with 
sham constitution, and Stealth authoritarian constitutionalism. Overt authoritarian regimes with 
weak constitutions make constitutional de jure reforms under demands from external actors, 
shifting to an Overt/sham environment. Under continued pressure from international democracy 
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promoters and strengthened political opposition, the overt authoritarian regime with a sham 
constitution begins observing some of their constitutional commitments, increasing de facto 
constitutional democracy, and shifting to a stealth environment. From a stealth environment, the 
regime can be overtaken by a coup with repression, leading back to an overt/weak environment; 
or the regime can consolidate its power and increase repression, shifting back to an overt/sham 
environment. Finally, the regime can increase political competition, shifting toward a fragile 
democracy. This cycle repeat itself over time in constitutional change in the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkey, from 1876 to the present. 
In the Ottoman Empire, from 1876-1924, there was an Overt/weak regime. The regime 
made nominally-democratic reforms, shifting to an Overt/sham regime in 1924-1945. In the late 
1940s and early 1950s, multi-party politics in Turkey increased competition, causing a shift to a 
democratic/ stealth regime from 1945-1960. After consolidation by a handful of military officers, 
a coup in 1960 in Turkey shifted the environment back to an Overt/weak one. The regime from 
1961-1970 made nominally-democratic reforms, most famously in the 1961 Constitution itself. 
Observations of some rights occurred until 1970, and shifted the environment in Turkey to 
Overt/ sham. However, the military informally hung onto power, shifting to a Stealth regime 
with some observations of rights but increasing civil conflict in the 1970s until the 1980 coup. In 
1982, in Turkey, the new military regime wrote a new constitution that severely limited rights 
and freedoms, shifting back to an Overt/weak environment. Increased observations of some 
rights, but high violations of personal integrity rights from 1987 to 2005 shifted the environment 
to Overt/sham. The AKP regime, elected in 2002, started observing some rights, such as freedom 
of expression in religion and for minority rights, shifting to a Stealth/ Democratic environment 
from 2006 to 2008. In 2009 it shifted back to an Overt/sham environment due to consolidation of 
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power by the ruling party, which then made nominally-democratic reforms in the judiciary in 
2010, shifting again to the Stealth environment. Increased repression since 2011 has shifted it 
back to an Overt/sham and Stealth/democratic cycle from 2011 to the present. In summary, there 
are several patterns. Under overt authoritarianism, weak (1927-37; 1924; 1945) constitutions 
occurring with elite cohesion led to authoritarian stability, while sham and weak constitutions 
occurring with elite factionalism lead to authoritarian instability (1961-71; 1980-1 and 1876-
1921; 1960 respectively). These are the periods of monarchy and its decline, and military coup 
d’etats and the rise of military tutelage. This suggests possible fruitful opportunities for further 
research in political networks. 
9.1 POLITICAL NETWORKS 
Research identifying how hierarchical elite network structures evolve into opinion-leader-like 
network structures – or the use of domination vs. persuasive strategies – could identify a specific 
mechanism by which regimes build the foundations in which they can utilize constitutional 
change, particularly if it benefits them on the international as well, to serve their own ends. This 
dissertation suggests there are network mechanisms through which factionalism within different 
regime structure types work to produce the switch in dynamics between “overt” and “stealth” 
authoritarianism. Through constitutional reform processes, how do the hierarchy’s rigid levels 
with many subordinates evolve into an opinion-leader’s network in which a few leaders drive 
opinion through communication over the skewed distribution of connections, resulting in the 
capacity to unilaterally reform the constitution for extending regime longevity? This question is 
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largely one that would be answered through assessing the changing communication network 
structures on a triadic or group-level with quantitative network data. 
The major difference in the theoretical model is between Hierarchical and Opinion-
Leader organizations, or one of communication and flow of information. These two topological 
structures are two ideal-types of networks. In Opinion Leader networks possess social leaders 
with great influence that drive behavior directly via their numerous connections to followers, 
whereas in Hierarchical networks transmit leaders’ influence downward through deputies to the 
followers at the bottom (Siegel 2011). While Hierarchical networks have more dyads with 
reciprocal ties, Opinion-Leader networks contain dyadic and non-reciprocal ties that make 
participation more unlikely (Siegel 2009). The Hierarchy is measured by the network measure 
known as an “out-tree” (Krackhardt 1994) or an arborescence (M. G. Everett and Krackhardt 
2012) at the micro-level and is characterized by one-way communication and a lack of 
intermediaries. The Opinion-Leader structure is measured by betweenness and centrality for a 
few, central nodes with a high amount of influence. 
9.1.1 Exchange and Reciprocity 
While both network structures are characterized by a skewed distribution of connections, the 
difference between them is what scholars refers to as the degree of positivityxv of the exchange 
network (Bonacich 1987). Exchange in a system characterized by dominance precludes 
reciprocal exchange, while exchange in a system characterized by influence does not (Bonacich 
1987, 1171). In a Hierarchical structure, information flows easily in one direction but not in the 
other, due to the coercive nature of relations. In an Opinion-Leader network, communication 
flows in both directions but is highly impacted by a few central actors. In Opinion-Leader type 
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structures, rather than dominance and force, mechanisms such as persuasion and popularity are 
more important. Intermediaries (Freeman 1977), relayers (Shaw 1964), or weak ties (Granovetter 
1973), in Opinion-Leader structures also have a greater degree of influence because they have a 
greater degree of agency in communication due to the reciprocal nature of ties. 
A network has a Hierarchical structurexvi where organization is characterized by 
dominance relations, or where reciprocal communication is costly to maintain, in “highly 
authoritarian organizations … where there is a large status difference between those 
communicating” (M. G. Everett and Krackhardt 2012, 5). This occurs in formal organizations 
where military superiors give subordinates orders, or dominance-type relations in animal 
societies (Iverson and Sade 1990). This structure is characterized by three network-level 
measures that could be identified in regime network data: reachable connectedness,xvii graph 
hierarchy,xviii and graph efficiencyxix (M. G. Everett and Krackhardt 2012). Ideally, influence in 
the Hierarchy is a one-shot, top-down transfer of information, that moves non-reciprocally from 
superior to subordinates. Communication is transmitted through geodesic or path trajectories in 
serial duplication or transfer, like mitotic reproduction, package delivery, or viral infection 
(Borgatti 2005, 59). 
An Opinion-Leader network is a network with a star or wheel network structure is an 
exchange or communication network with higher levels of centrality and betweenness, though 
many different measures of these phenomena exist that fit different types of relations and flows 
(Freeman 1977; Freeman 1978; Bonacich 1987; Freeman, Borgatti, and White 1991; Borgatti 
2005). xx Put simply, a point in a communication network is central to the extent that it falls on 
the shortest path between pairs of other points (Bavelas 1950; Freeman 1977). Centrality is the 
degree to which an actor falls between other actors on their geodesics, paths, or trails, or 
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walks.xxi The more highly central an actor is, the more essential influence it has in an exchange 
network, as an actor falling between two others can facilitate, block, distort or falsify 
communication between the two, it can more or less completely control their communication. 
However, if it falls on some but not all of the geodesics connecting a pair of points, its potential 
for control is more limited.”  
Network-level measures for Opinion-Leaders include centralization, or the measure of 
how central the network’s most central node is in relation to how central the other nodes are, and 
betweenness centralization, or the tendency of an actor to act as a bridge between many other 
actors (Freeman 1978; Leifeld 2014).xxii Centralization captures the tendency of a network to 
have few very central and many peripheral actors, while betweenness centralization measures the 
tendency of a network to have very few actors that interconnect distinct factions in the network. 
Influence or communication in Opinion-Leader networks is therefore more about replication, 
rather than transfer, and occurs on trails and walks, like gossip or attitude influencing (Borgatti 
2005). 
9.1.2 Domination or Persuasion 
Ideal-type hierarchical structures are communication network structures that utilize their ties for 
domination and control. Control is exercised through efficiently coordinating actors in the 
network to cooperate to act collectively to achieve an outcome. A key factor in coordination is 
whether commitments are credible (North and Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997). Coordination is 
largely a mechanism of directing orders to increase internal efficiency and insulate the regime 
from external threats. Ideal-type opinion-leader communication network structures utilize their 
ties for persuasion and cooptation. Cooptation is a strategy that achieves actors’ aims through the 
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assimilation of smaller, opposing groups, or their views, into the larger group or ideology itself. 
Opposing viewpoints can either be induced to adopt the regimes’ views, or silenced, a more 
coercive form of cooptation. 
This research suggests that in weak constitutional environments, hierarchical networks 
utilize dominance and control, with more consolidation over the institutions of government 
through the executive and the military, utilize repressive tactics against opposition, but have no 
“pull” to say otherwise due to a low amount of international aid for democracy and governance. 
A regime must have political parties and a civilian military to qualify at all as a democracy. 
These regimes maintain their consolidation over the separate branches of government through 
overt repression and therefore cannot last long within an environment that has any level of 
commitment to the norms of constitutional democracy without facing the “sticks” to punish 
transgressions. 
This research also suggests that in the sham environment, opinion-leader networks utilize 
strategies of persuasion and cooptation, with less consolidation over the institutions of 
government through the executive, party, and military. These regimes also utilize a low level of 
repression but also have less “pull” to “walk the walk” due to a low level of international aid for 
democracy promotion, specifically for democracy and governance. “Overt” semi-authoritarian 
regimes, when they have a low level of international aid, disregard the consequences of 
international democracy promotion in their behavior – or their de facto observation of 
constitutional rights – but not in their written reforms of the constitution.  
Political leaders in hierarchical networks are moderately repressive, and have high regime 
consolidation over branches of government. In Turkey, the judiciary, military and the executive 
were consolidated from 1982 up until 2007, when Gül became President of the Republic, and 
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2010, when the judiciary was restructured. The legislature and the executive have now become 
consolidated with popular election of the President and increased appointment powers in the 
executive for the judiciary. These regimes have moderate extrajudicial violations of personal 
integrity rights, and equality rights, and in Turkey, used civil and political rights as policy 
concessions. Leaders in hierarchical networks use strategies of dominance and control in 
communication that result in more exclusive and secretive processes with no façade of 
democratic participation, such as the military regime in Turkey from 1982 to 1986. 
From the period 1982 to 2011, data were analyzed regarding the observation of 
constitutional rights and international democracy promotion. Within Overt Constitutional 
Authoritarianism, different types of communication networks use different strategies that create 
sham or weak constitutional environments. The Stealth scenario is most closely associated with a 
high level of aid from international democracy promoters for democracy and governance reform 
programs in civil society. The following hypotheses were confirmed: low democracy promotion 
with repressive hierarchical regime structures with high consolidation of power yield weak 
constitutional environments. Low democracy promotion with moderate to low repression and 
opinion-leader networks and less consolidation of power yield sham environments. Finally, high 
levels of democracy promotion with opinion-leader regime structures, moderate to high 
repression, and more consolidation of power create stealth authoritarian environments. These 
solutions suggest the following conclusions. 
With a high level of international aid for democracy and governance reforms, the 
hierarchical network, if factionalized, evolves into an opinion-leader network as opposition 
leaders begin to utilize the political opportunity structures made available to them, as occurred in 
Turkey from 1987 to 2005, and in 2009 and 2011. Because the environment has a moderate level 
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of commitment to constitutional democracy, free elections must be held, even if they are not fair, 
and civil liberties must be protected at a moderate level, which can result in unstable coalition 
governments and surprising electoral results. Leaders in opinion-leader networks use strategies 
of persuasion and cooptation and therefore have less violations of equality and civil and political 
rights, but more violations of personal integrity, such as in the repression of the Kurds from 1990 
to 2002. The blatant use of torture and other violations of personal integrity while using rhetoric 
of democratization characterize the shift into the “sham” constitutional environment in which 
leaders’ constitutional commitments far exceed their enactment of those rights. 
9.1.3 Surprising Electoral Outcomes 
This research suggests that Overt-sham constitutional environments in particular can lead to 
surprising electoral victories, like the majority that the AKP won in 2002, which was won amidst 
an already increasingly democratic environment that had, starting in 1997, less violations of 
personal integrity rights, but more violations of empowerment rights. From 2002 to 2005, the 
AKP used strategies of persuasion and cooptation, sometimes increasing and sometimes 
decreasing violations of personal integrity rights, equality rights, and civil and political rights, 
while still decreasing repressive tactics in a regime that was opposing another group to 
consolidate power over the institutions of separate branches of government (the former military 
tutelage or “deep state”). The loss of majority in 2015 was also an electoral surprise. 
While international democracy aid for democratic governance reforms went from nearly 
zero to a high of $2 billion in the year 2010 alone. From 2007 to the present, Turkey has gone 
from being the “model of Muslim democracy” in the Middle East to a country that is 
increasingly viewed by international democracy promoters as violating the norms of 
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constitutional democracy, with no available legal tools or standard protocol in the international 
democracy promotion toolkit to provide remedy or recourse, aside from the unstable coalition 
politics that it is currently entering in 2015. In the stealth constitutional environment, leaders 
within what appear to be opinion-leader networks, utilize all strategies available to them – 
persuasion, cooptation, dominance, and control – to maintain power and marginalize opposition. 
Yet these networks are exclusive and secretive, making the exact structure difficult to ascertain. 
Stealth authoritarian constitutionalism does allow political leaders to legally create more 
consolidation over the institutions of separate branches of government. Leaders then engage in a 
moderate level of repression to ensure their opposition is neutralized. Yet complex adaptive 
systems still yield surprising results. 
Stealth autocrats have more pull to “walk the walk” of their constitutional commitments 
and exercise them in practice, due to a high amount of international aid for democracy and 
governance. However, they cannot completely fulfill their constitutional commitments and still 
maintain the increasing consolidation of institutional power over the separate branches of 
government without engaging in consistent repression of dissent or opposition, but in a legal way 
that displays a moderate commitment to the norms of constitutional democracy through the use 
of democratic rhetoric and seemingly democratic reforms. Of all the emergent outcomes of 
constitutionalism between democracy and authoritarianism, the Stealth phase is the hardest to 
maintain. Recently, the control of information exchange has given regimes a new tactic with 
which to maintain this dynamic. However, because information in public communication 
involves language and legitimacy, the development of this new tactic must be assessed in its 
historical context. 
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9.2 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
The development of new tactics of stealth constitutional authoritarianism, generating a more 
robust type of authoritarian regime, must be understood in part by determining the historical 
conditions of possibility. According to interpretivist theories of social science, talking is action, 
and words are deeds (Wittgenstein 1958). The theory of speech acts states that actors “do things 
with words” (Austin 1975). Actors who understand language are more powerful because they 
become masters of technique. Words can change relationships between actors, particularly 
through words known as performatives (Wedeen 2010). Performatives are words that perform an 
action and change relationships simply by being declared (Austin 1975). In a more general sense, 
all language is performative, simply because speech is an action actors can take with observable 
effects. Actors “promise,” or they “obey.”  In the political sphere, one becomes a citizen through 
“pledging allegiance.” Justice and the rule-of-law come into existence, in the legal sphere, by 
actors legislating, prosecuting, defending, pleading, and judging. In the public sphere, through 
“deliberating,” actors – we assume – participate in some kind of democracy. This is why the 
word “deliberation” was used in this dissertation interchangeably with public communication – 
because the deliberation that is occurring is an exchange of information between citizens, and 
between citizens and the state, but is not deliberation in the sense of deliberative democracy. 
The activity of language makes things like “understanding” observable, identifiable, and 
their assessment replicable (Wedeen 2010). Yet performative language acts are context-
dependent; their meaning depends on the changing social conventions created through dynamic 
relations between actors over time within defined social boundaries. Context is, therefore, 
potentially even causally important. This research suggests that the context matters enough to 
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determine whether deliberation that takes place actually creates participatory democracy through 
public communication, or not.  
“Deliberating” may make an actor a democratic participant, but it may also make an actor 
a participant in the nominally democratic practices of stealth authoritarianism. The difference 
can only be understood through historically grounded examination of the context. The symbolic 
systems of language, society, and law are the arenas in which politics, and therefore, institutional 
development, take place. These systems are imbued with roles, some of which have much power, 
and some of which have less power. Through contrasting ordinary language acts and legal 
language acts, the power relations between different roles can be observed, and understood, in 
stealth authoritarianism. 
Identities are created through language and its practice. Scholars attribute roles to actors 
through their observations of language acts, and through those roles, we can begin to identify the 
rules that actors follow and their consequences. Rules, or institutions, are not only those formally 
instituted by law, but are also the linguistic conventions that certain roles must follow to achieve 
aims, or face consequences such as subordination or exclusion from the dialogue. In this way, 
language and institutions are co-constituted. Co-constitution means that institutions can develop 
from social conventions, or they may be institutions codified in law. Strict social conventions 
may make the potential of performative language acts more constrictive, or less emancipatory, 
by defining shared, distinct, communities through speech.  
Law is an official type of “speech” itself, with great power to both emancipate and 
confine the actions of its subjects. By examining the changing language around the changing of 
the law, we can pinpoint where these co-constitutions have taken place. Identifying irregularity 
or unconventionality exposes potentially important attempts to challenge existing conventions. In 
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stealth constitutional authoritarianism, social conventions around speech acts should conflict 
with legal institutions about speech, making observations of conflicting political language acts 
crucial to explaining the phenomenon. 
When people perform norms associated with nationalism, they become national citizens. 
Two conventions are particularly historically important in the evolution of constitutionalism in 
from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey: the public practice of religion, and the protection or 
persecution of non-Muslim, non-Turkic minority groups (Bayir 2013). In the Ottoman Empire, 
the practice of Islam was public, and the existence of minority groups was clear and separate. 
These groups’ rights were protected to some degree in the millet system (Karpat and Yildirim 
2010; Lekka 2007; Yıldız 2007). Over the course of the Young Turk revolution, these norms 
were challenged as a national identity based on Turkishness developed, and minorities became a 
threat, and the conventions associated with the Ottoman Empire were belittled. The foundation 
of the Republic was enveloped in a normative revolution that made many changes, but for 
parsimony, two changes are emphasized here: religion was to become a private practice 
unassociated with the state (laiklik), and minority groups and their practices were to be 
eliminated completely (Yildirim 2010). 
While these conventions changed constitutionally, the legal changes did not necessarily 
change social conventions; instead, many have argued that a “center” and a “periphery” 
developed in which the core’s conventions regarding public religion and minorities changed, but 
the periphery’s remained the same (Mardin 1973). The changes to Turkey’s constitution have 
largely been a part of keeping the so-called periphery from being represented as the majority in 
the government. The coups of 1960, 1971, and 1981 solidified the position of the military as a 
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guardian to prevent politics based on majority rule from controlling the government, as it did in 
the 1950s with the Democrat Party in power. 
When the AKP was able to take majority power in Parliament despite the barriers to 
representation the previous regimes had put in place, and maintain it despite existential threats 
such as the constitutional court case to disband the party, it gained both an institutionally and 
ideologically predominant status (Gumuscu 2012). The AKP then slowly started taking away the 
powers of the military establishment built throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which were 
constitutionally codified in 1982. In terms of discourse, this made new social conventions 
possible. Over the last decade in Turkey: the conventions associated with nation-building have 
been subordinated to those associated with Ottomanism, which have seen a resurgence: Islam 
should be public, Atatürk and Kemalism have lost their protected status, and minorities are no 
longer an existential – but an electoral – threat (White 2012; White 2002; Bayir 2013). 
Assessing the impacts of allowing or performing public communication over 
constitutional reform reveals the achievements of these deliberative processes for the regime: to 
protect its project to consolidate power, while maintaining legitimacy and power through a 
modified commitment to constitutionalism. Democratic deliberative processes over 
constitutional reform make several assumptions. First, citizens should be free to talk about the 
constitution; in Turkey, they are not. Under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code implemented 
on 1 June 2005, it is illegal to insult Turkey, the Turkish nation, or Turkish government 
institutions. Criticizing the constitution can be subject to prosecution by the national security law 
or of anti-Turkishness; however, amendments to the Penal Act were made in 2008 that were 
intended to prevent misuse of the article to censor government critics or opposition, they have 
not succeeded in doing so. Citizens should be free to voice their opinions about past regimes, 
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and, again, in Turkey, they are not, both explicitly in the law, as according to the same Penal 
Code, Article 301, criticizing Atatürk is a criminal act; but, also, implicitly through punishment 
for criticism of the AKP government. Citizens should be free to voice their opinions about the 
current regime, and, in Turkey today, they are not. The Introductory chapter details the AKP 
regime’s crackdown on free speech. They also foreclose or omit understandings of what 
inclusive participatory democratic processes are: they must have free speech, and there must be 
uptake into the policymaking process itself; because democratic political culture never existed in 
Turkey, inclusion and uptake into the policymaking process are not understood. 
The effects of moving from discussions about “who should the Turkish constitution be 
protected from?” to “what Turkey’s constitution should contain” had the effect of making 
minority rights a central topic of the discourse. The social conventions regarding nation-building, 
in which minorities are a threat, changed due to this discourse. Meanwhile, the discourse around 
nation-building is used in a new way: to deflect attention from the topic of power consolidation 
while directing attention to the project of redefinition of national identity to one that 
instrumentally protects minority rights, a position which is still not supported by the majority of 
the population. Therefore, the regime can encourage public communication about this issue 
about it without the potential for it to turn into collective action. However, the Kurdish political 
opposition broadened their electoral agenda in 2015 to include democratic rights for all Turkish 
citizens, propelling the party into the national political scene as it passed the 10 percent threshold 
to gain representation in the TBMM. 
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9.2.1 Democratic Rhetoric, New Methods, and Text-As-Data 
By stitching together various policies behind a façade of lawfulness and democratic intent, 
political leaders and policymakers govern through rule-by-law and use the discourse of 
constitutional democracy, evade criticism by international democracy promoters, and use 
constitutional reforms to consolidate power over what are supposed to be separate, competing 
political institutions. After it passes a certain threshold, unchecked, excessive use of these 
processes generates a type of dictatorship in disguise. The nomenclature used by Scheppele is 
innovative and appropriate: she labels Hungary and similar states “frankenstates” (Scheppele 
2013). 
A detailed look at public communication over constitutional reform is described in depth 
in the Chapter VI. The change in information technology gives semi-authoritarian regimes 
entirely new characteristic tactics, such as cyber-sabotage for repression, and an opportunity to 
explore some of the finer points of the theory of stealth authoritarian constitutionalism in greater 
detail. The data available with which to analyze them has changed as well. The methodology 
used in this research is an exploration of how to use new text analytics to untangle the meaning 
and consequences of language irregularities. 
To address these new data sources, new methods have been developed to analyze them, 
like the Structural Topic Model. Social and computer scientists developed the STM in 2013, 
intentionally for application to applied problems in social science with large amounts of text, 
including both social media data and large surveys that have closed- and open-ended survey 
responses. Turkey’s use of deliberation in a participatory process between Parliament, civil 
society organizations, and citizens, over its constitutional reform, from 2007 to the present, 
allows us to use such data to untangle the web of complex policymaking, public communication, 
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and the interpretation of these dynamics within the contemporary and historical context, to 
understand how such a tactic for stealth authoritarian constitutionalism may work. 
This dissertation found that regimes utilize these reform processes on multiple levels, 
from subnational to the national level, to gather information about how and where citizens are 
united or divided, to allow citizens to vent their frustration, and to adjust policies to placate 
potential citizen activists or opposition, but to discourage collective action. This allows the 
regime to prevent citizens from reaching a threshold of discontent that becomes an uprising the 
government cannot control. These new tactics allow for controlled dissent that the regime 
manipulates to increase its impenetrability to critiques from international democracy promoters, 
but also reveal vulnerabilities to those seeking to promote democratization. Recently, with the 
help of international democracy promotion, those vulnerabilities seem to have been exploited by 
the Kurds. 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of this research on constitutionalism between democracy and authoritarianism, 
recommendations can be made to policymakers or democracy proponents, specifically, that by 
understanding several conditions within a country we can better understand authoritarian 
strategies that are making regimes more impenetrable.  
9.3.1 Identification of Cross-cutting Issue Areas Across Groups 
First, the identification of a supported issue area that cross-cuts citizen groups can go a long way 
in breaking out of the Stealth authoritarian dynamic. In Turkey, this issue was the consolidation 
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of executive power under President Erdoğan. Public communication under semi-authoritarianism 
allows regimes to prolong their longevity as they adjust policy and identify conflict through 
information exchange with citizens to dissuade those discontent with regime policies from 
collective action; however, “sticking points” may be found that can stop reform in its tracks 
(Varol 2015). 
9.3.2 Knowledge Regarding Citizens’ Perceptions of Grievances 
We should understand local-level and domestic conflict over issue areas within publics in 
authoritarian regimes and how the regime may use the differential between groups to exert 
control. Second, it is increasingly clear that propaganda and censorship interact as dynamics as 
manipulation of information exchange and control, to dominate the political landscape and 
control its contents. Looking in these areas, it may be possible for proponents of democracy to 
reveal strategies to undermine the new trend of impenetrable authoritarian consolidation. 
The AKP regime restricted information exchange about areas where only a minority of 
citizens were in opposition to the regime’s preferences, but where the regime could not be 
accused of “cheap talk” or of using selective discretion in its upholding of the law. Under the 
issue area of changing the structure of the political system, citizens’ preferences were united in 
opposition regarding policy changes on the creation of a presidential system and the electoral 
threshold. To cover up this ‘self-dealing’ policy agenda, the regime then encouraged deliberation 
around issues that citizens had a moderate or high level of conflict about – these included the 
issues of minority rights, religious expression, and the role of the state in religion to stoke the 
fires of discontent in the public – but the conflict over the border in Iraq and in Syria brought the 
Kurdish issue back to the center of the political agenda.  
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9.3.3 Increasingly Nuanced Control of Free Media 
Another conclusion and policy recommendation is to further research the control of free media 
across issue areas and the use of increasingly nuanced information control tactics. The AKP 
regime controlled information exchange about an issue that citizens were united in opposition to 
the regime’s inconsistent position, where it could be accused of both using its own discretion in 
selective application of the law, and could be held accountable for committing to upholding the 
law on paper, but violating that in practice, or “cheap talk.” The AKP used outright oppression in 
response to opposition to the violation of laws of freedom of expression, including violent 
suppression of public protests, harassment, intimidation, and imprisonment. The AKP also used 
relatively new information control tactics, a topic for further research, such as cyber-sabotage on 
Twitter, which was, along with other social media sights, monitored and banned at key points 
during episodes of high risk of collective action.  Concomitantly, the party made concessions by 
encouraging deliberation over the issue of religious expression and the role of the state in 
religion, where the public could “vent frustrations” regarding issues where majority support 
aligns with the regime’s policy position. This took place over the issue areas of religious 
expression and the role of state in religion. New tactics must be addressed with new monitoring 
measures by democracy promotion actors. 
9.3.4 Norms Determine How Laws Work 
As “high policy,” constitutions coordinate governance through serving as operating manuals – 
constitutionalism-in-practice – or as blueprints for the architecture of governance (Ginsburg and 
Simpser 2013). Constitutional change processes may allow incumbents to force opposition into 
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policy compromises that they otherwise may not be able to achieve. Constitutional change 
processes can exert social control through imposition of majoritarian rule on minorities through 
domination of the process. Popular participation in a constitutional change processes may also 
serve as an outlet for social expression but lack real input into the process or uptake into 
decision-making bodies’ agendas. Constitutional change processes can build legitimacy for a 
regime by showing that it is concerned with constitutionalism, which is often conflated publicly 
with concern for democracy. 
This dissertation offers a response to a growing community of scholars who view the 
policy option of self-organization as a form of normless anarchy, of extreme libertarianism, by 
underscoring that all political action, whether formally constitutional or not, is informed by the 
norms that guide the behavior of those acting within the system. Indeed, it is not paternalist to 
acknowledge that the norms of democratic constitutionalism – of political systems that protect 
rights, promote freedoms, and build institutions to protect those rights and promote those 
freedoms – exist, and that these norms of democratic constitutionalism are preferable to norms 
that encourage despotism or discrimination. Moreover, scholars make misguided conclusions 
when conceptualizing political systems as normless or “anarchic.” 
This dissertation extended a theory of learning by authoritarian regime incumbents for 
operating “under the radar” of democracy audits to enact stealth authoritarianism at the 
constitutional level. The dissertation analyzed how an authoritarian regime utilized a democratic 
process, wielding the extraordinary constituent power of the rewriting of the constitution, to 
achieve democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation in a legal, and seemingly 
democratically legitimate way. Yet, the dissertation also showed that due to the emergent 
outcomes characteristic of a complex adaptive system, the Kurdish party was able to mobilize 
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enough support in the recent elections on a platform of broadened democracy to momentarily 
stop this backslide. It is up to those with a commitment to democracy in the Middle East to 
predict what happens next; however, the Kurds seem to hold the future of democracy in the 
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APPENDIX A: Coding Conditions and Outcomes 
 
Table 18. Process Variables Coding 
 
Condition Coding 
Length of negotiations (0-2, 
increasing inclusion) 0=no negotiations, 1=short (weeks or <6 months), 2=longer 
Transparency (0-3, 
increasing transparency) 0=secrecy, 1=low, 2=moderate, 3=transparent 
Public involvement (0-4, 
increasing inclusion) 
0=none, 1=referendum, 2=referendum+controlled, 3=controlled no 
referendum, 4=inclusive 
Compromise reached (0-2, 
increasing deliberation) 
0=no, 1=agreement reached through force, 2=agreement reached 
through compromise 
Deliberation (0-3, increasing 
inclusion) 
0=no deliberative processes, 1=controlled deliberative processes 
among policymakers, 2=controlled deliberative processes among 
public, 3=inclusive deliberative processes 
International intervention (0-
2, increasing sovereignty 0= international occupation, 1=international influence, 2=none 
0-16, increasing inclusion/ deliberation 
 
 
Table 19. Network/ Repression Conditions Coding 
 
Condition Coding 
Structure and cohesiveness of 
the regime or elite network 
0=cohesive hierarchical, .25=cohesive opinion-leader, 
.5=factionalized hierarchical, .75=factionalized opinion leader, 
1=anarchy 
Overt tactics of repression or 
removal from the network 
0= high strength/high technology, .25= high strength/low 
technology, .5= low strength/high technology, .75=low 
strength/low technology 
0-2, increasing factionalization and repression 
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Military: Military involvement in 
politics (0-3, increasing civilian power) 
0=direct-personal, 1=direct-corporate, 2=indirect, 
3=civilian 
Party: Restrictions on political parties 
(0-3, increasing party freedom) 
0=don't participate, 1=banned, 2=single, incl. cases 
where mult parties are legal but operate under leadership 
of a single party, 3=multiple parties are legal 
Legislative: Legislative selection (1-6, 
increasing party freedom) 
1=none, no legislature, 2=unelected or appointed, 3=one 
party or candidate per seat, 4=largest party controls more 
than 75% of seats, 5=largest party controls less than 75% 
of seats, 6=nonpartisan, or multiple candidates may 
compete but parties are banned 
Executive: Executive selection (1-5, 
increasing civilian power over 
executive) 
1=unelected, 2=one party or candidate, 3=selected by 
small, unelected body, 4=elected by more than 75%, 
5=elected by less than 75% 
Mpgov: Multiple party government (0,1 
– presence of more than one political 
party) 
0=no, 1=yes 
Execlegis: Executive party status (0-2, 
increasing executive-party integration) 
0=no, 1=head of executive is member/leader/supporter 
of single political party, 2= head of executive is 
member/leader/supporter of party of multiple parties 
Execparty: Legislative seat share 
executive's party (0-4, decreasing party 
hegemony) 
1= between 75-100, 2= between 50-75, 3=between 25-
50, 4=below 25, 5=none,  999=N/A 
Lparty: Multiparty government and 
largest party (0-1, decreasing executive-
legislative integration) 
0= multiple party government, executive's party control 
the largest share, 1=multiple party government, 
executive's party does not control the largest share 
Opposition: Opposition parties in 
legislature (0,1- presence of opposition 
parties) 
0=none, 1=at least one seat controlled by opposition in 
legislature 
Founder: Executive founder of party of 
affiliation (0,1 – decreasing executive-
party integration) 
0=yes, 1=no 
Previous: Affiliation of previous leader 
was the same party as current leader’s 
party (0-2, decreasing executive-party 
integration) 
0=yes, 1=previous leader had no party, leader is first 
under current spell or first after independence, 2=no 
 
 
0-29, decreasing authoritarian integration of institutions or consolidation 
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APPENDIX B: Coding Citizen Conflict and Language 
B.1 TOPIC MODELS WITH TURKISH AND ENGLISH 
 





Top words FREX 
Topic 
1 
sendika (union); gerekiyor (necessary); 
verilmel (should be given); kesinlik 
(certainty); yar (harm) 
sav (argument/war); nede, 
(why/question); tutulmamal 




yaş (age); dernek (association); okul (school); 
serbest (free, without constraints); öğrencis 
(student) 
yaş (age); serbest (free, without 
constraints); öğrencis (student); 




yaşlı (elderly); denil (statement); olmamas 
(absence); uygulama (application/ 
administration); açı (angle/ perspective) 
denil (statement); olmamas (absence); 




topluluk (society/community); mutlu (happy); 
türklük (Turkishness); türkçe (Turkish 
language); kavra (grip/conception) 
topluluk (society/ community); türklük 
(Turkishness); isteye, (to want); 
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Table 22. STM 1.2 in Turkish and English 
 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Topic 
# 
Topic words/ Covariate 
Words 
Şube (local branch), 
köle (slave), politikas 
(politics), atmamal 
(should not throw), 
görmemiş (unseen) 
Konuşmal (should 









(to be veiled or 
covered), alabilmes 





Yasamak (to live); 
Diyarbakır 
(Diyarbakır); sınıf 




(the law), yapmamas 
(should not do), 










konuşul (to talk); 
















Beşinci (fifth), yaşlı 
(elderly), doğumlu 
(birth origin), katıla 























accent); davranma,  


















hari (external/ exotic), 
karade (Black Sea 
region), denetme 
(oversee/audit), 
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1 Çocuk (child), meslek (profession), asker (soldier), ayrımcılık (discrimination), ilkes 
(province or policy) 
2 Suç (crime), fıkra (clause), sebep (reason), siyasî (politics), aykır (contrary) 
3 Topla (society), rapor (report), prof (professor), üniversites (university), yerel (local) 
4 Sor (question), milli (national), başlangıç (preamble), vatandaşlık (citizenship), 
egemenlik (sovereignty) 
 
Table 24. STM 2.2 in Turkish and English 
 
 
 Committee Minutes: 
hani (to tell the truth),  
saati (time), 









arrested for),  
sömür (to exploit) 












(all the while we fall),  
aşağılayıç (humiliating) 
Açıklayabilme (to be able 
to open/ make public), 
doldurmaya (to be able to 
fill), açıklanmadıkça (as 
long as it was 
unexplained) 
Değiştiril (to be 
changed), kararname 
(legal decision), 
yargıtay (Court of 
Cassation) 
Fıkir (idea), keyfı (to 
relax), açıklayabilir 
(generally able to 
open) 
Topic 3: 
yetişkin (adult),  
şüphe (suspect),  
tutukla (to arrest) 
iyima, bitirme 
(completion), diyebilir 
(to be able to say) 
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APPENDIX C: Coding System Dynamics 
Data on human rights allow for a comparison of de jure constitutional commitments to de facto 
constitutional rights and freedoms. Observations of constitutional commitments show different 
trends in different areas in the three countries. I show the overall trend for a longer period of 
time, from 1981 to 2011. Data were available for observations of personal integrity rights, 
empowerment rights – which include equality, civil and political rights – and judicial integrity.  
 
1. Personal Integrity Rights 
 
Turkey shows a decrease in de facto observation of personal integrity rights until 2000, when 
observation of personal integrity rights starting increasing. Syria shows the opposite trend, 
increasing until about 2000, and then decreasing. Iraq has the highest level of violation of 





Figure 23. Observation of Personal Integrity Rights, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
 
 
In contrast, the countries showed low (Turkey), moderate (Syria) and high (Iraq) levels of 
changes in de jure constitutional commitments, Turkey had a 2% increase, Syria had a 14% 
increase, and Iraq a 45% increase, from 2000 to 2012. The Table below contrasts the de jure 
change at 1982 and 2012 with changes in observed rights and freedoms from 1981 to 2011 with 
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Table 25. Personal Integrity Rights in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria 
 
 
 Turkey Syria Iraq 
De Jure 
PIN 
Low: Slight increase 
(2%) from 1982-2012 
Moderate: 14% increase 
from 1982-2012 





Increases after 2000 
Downward trend; 
Decreases after 2000 
Upward trend; rises 
above zero and 
increases after 2005 
Dynamic OCA-Sham to Stealth OCA-Weak to OCA-
Sham to OCA-Weak 
OCA-Weak to OCA-
Sham to Stealth/DEM 
 





Figure 24. Observation of Empowerment Rights, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
 
 
Turkey’s observation of empowerment rights shows it holding steady at a level of between 40-
50% with a spike around 2000. Syria’s observation of empowerment rights decreases from 25 to 
10% from 1981 to 2011, while Iraq’s observation of empowerment rights hits nearly zero at 
2000, and then increases to about 25%. For empowerment rights, the countries again showed low 
(Turkey), moderate (Syria) and high (Iraq) levels of changes in de jure constitutional 
commitments, Turkey had little change in equality/ gender, civil and political, or minority rights 
from 1982 to 2012, at 0, 10, and 0 percent respectively. Iraq had a 25% increase in equality/ 
gender rights, a 40% increase in civil and political rights, and a 70% increase in minority rights. 
Syria had 10, 15, and 0 percent increases in these areas respectively. Again, Table 4 below 
contrasts the de jure change at 1982 and 2012 with changes in observed rights and freedoms 
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Table 26. Empowerment Rights in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria 
 
 
 Turkey Syria Iraq 
De Jure EMP Low 
Equality: 0 








Civil Political: 40 
Minority: 70 
De Facto EMP Downward trend; 
40-50%, peak in 
2000 
Downward trend; 
Decreases from 25% to 
10% with valley in early 
1990s 
Upward trend; 
Decreases from 25% 
to 10%, valley in 
2000, rises back to 
30% 
Dynamic OCA-Sham to 
Stealth 




3. Judicial Integrity 
 
Observations of judicial integrity show nearly the same trend in Syria and in Turkey, peaking 
around 2000 and then dropping to nearly zero in 2011. In Iraq, judicial integrity was highest in 
the early 1980s, and then drops to nearly zero from 2000 to 2011. For observations of judicial 
independence, the same pattern occurred as with personal integrity rights and empowerment 
rights, with Turkey showing the lowest change, Syria a low increase, and Iraq a moderate 
increase. In the changes in de jure constitutional commitments, Turkey had no further increased 
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Table 27. Judicial Independence in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria 
 
 
 Turkey Syria Iraq 
De Jure JUD Low: No increase Low: 5% increase Moderate: 40% 
increase 
De Facto JUD Downward trend; 
Decreases after 2000 
but increases in 
2010 
Downward trend; 
decreases to zero after 
peak in 1990 
Decreases to nearly 
zero 
Dynamic OCA-Sham to 
Stealth 
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Appendix C.4 
Table 28. Factions in Kurdish Groups Making Self-Determination Claims 
 























Iraq Committee for 
the Defense of 
the Kurdish 
Peoples Rights 
1963 1963 414001     
Iraq Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan 
(PUK) 



































Iraq Iraqi Kurdistan 
Front 
































1996  414013     
Iraq Kurdistan 
Toilers Party 





1997 2005 414011     
Iraq Committee for 
the Protection 
of the Kurdish 
People 
2003 2003 414002     
Iraq Referendum 
Movement 




































































1991 1993 133002 DEP   




Front (ERNK)  







Exile in the 
Hague 


































Turkey Rights and 
Freedoms Party 
(HAK-PAR) 
















Turkey Peace and 
Democracy 
Party (BDP) 













Source: Self-Determination Organizational Behavior Dataset and qualitative sources 
(Cunningham 2014) 
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Appendix C.5 
Table 29. Timeline of Conflict & Cooperation in CASoS, 1980—2012 
 
 
Year Kurdish Groups in 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria 
International and state 
interactions with non-
Kurdish groups in Turkey, 
Iraq, and Syria 
International and national 
cooperation in battles against 





Democratic Party (facid 
414006) founded in Iraq 
in 1961. Committee for 
the Defense of the 
Kurdish Peoples Rights 
(facid 414001) founded in 
1963, terminated in 1963. 
PKK: Kurdish Workers 
Party (facid 133066) 
founded in 1974 in 
Turkey, has various 
political and armed 
manifestations. PUK: 
Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (facid 
414015) founded in 1975, 
and Iraq Communist 
Party (facid 414003) 
founded in Iraq in 1978, 
has various political and 
armed manifestations. 
Throughout the late 1970s and 
early 1980s the Soviet Union 
supplied the Ba'ath regime in 
Syria with both military 
training and military 
equipment in order to support 
the rule of the socialist Ba'ath 
party. Approximately 2000-
3000 Soviet military advisers 
were present in Syria 
throughout these years, 
engaging in training the Syrian 
armed forces and giving 
advice on the battle with the 
MB. The Soviet Union also 
gave a significant amount of 
military aid through arms 
transfers. It is unknown what 
support the Government of 
Iraq or the warring groups 
received from international 
sources against the PUK, 
KDP-QM, and KDP, from 
1976 to 1988, except for some 
evidence there was no funding 
to Kurdish parties in this 
period in Iraq. 
 
1980 Kurdish Socialist Party 
(facid 414008) founded in 
Iraq in 1980. 
1981 
1982  The Government of Iraq 
received no funding to battle 
SCIRI from 1982-1996. 
The United States is a very 
important ally of Turkey, 
providing it with ample amounts of 
military support with both direct 
financing and credits towards the 
purchase of US-made equipment 
(through the Foreign Military 
Financing direct loans and MAP 
grants), as well as through IMET 
training programs. While most aid 
was not specifically designated to 
fight the PKK, it is certain that at 
least part of the aid went to 
1983 
1984 
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improve the military's capability 
against the PKK. About 2500 
Turkish officers received training 
from 1984 to 1997 through the 
United States International 
Military Education and Training 
program. It is however unclear 
whether this aid was intended to 
help Turkey against the Kurds. An 
agreement providing for the pursuit 
by security forces of 'subversive 
groups’ across the Iraqi-Turkish 
border was concluded at the end of 
a visit to Iraq by the Turkish 
Foreign Minister in October 1984. 
The agreement provided for 
security forces of both countries to 
penetrate up to a distance of five 
kilometres across the border, and 
to remain there for a period of up 
to three days without prior 
notification. In 1984, over 718 
million US dollars were disbursed 
in various forms.  
1985 In mid-June 1985 it was claimed 
that Iran had invited Turkish 
security forces into Iranian 
territory to pursue Kurdish rebels 
active in the border area. The 
United States is a very important 
ally of Turkey, providing it with 
ample amounts of military support. 
In 1985, over 703.5 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms. 
1986 In 1986, over 618 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. 
1987 Kurdistan People’s 
Democratic Party (facid 
414012) founded in Iraq 
in 1987. 
In 1987, over 493 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. 
1988 Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
(facid 414004) founded in 
Iraq in 1988, terminated 
in 1992. 
In 1988, over 413 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. 
1989  The Government of Iraq 
received no funding to battle 
KDP from 1989 to 1991. 
In 1989, over 503 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. 
1990 In 1990, over 501 million US 
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dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. 
1991 DEP: Democratic Party 
(facid 133022) founded in 
Turkey in 1991, 
terminated in 1993. 
ERNK: Kurdistan 
National Liberation 
Front (facid 133009) 
founded in Iraq in 1991, 
terminated in 2000. 
In 1991, over 710 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms to fight the PKK. During 
1991 Dev Sol attacked American 
military personnel and civilians on 
several occasions as a protest to the 
Gulf War. As the United States had 
thousands of troops deployed at the 
time it was possible for American 
and Turkish Intelligence to 
cooperate to reduce the threat from 
the left-wing militants. Except for 
normal security cooperation, as 
was conducted during President 
Bush's visit in July 1991, it is 
unclear to what extent the United 
States supported Turkey against 
Dev Sol. However, the U.S. gave 
very large amounts of aid to 
Turkey  (over 710 million US$). 
The added capabilities made 
available by this level of aid were 
clearly usable by Turkey in order 
to fight Dev Sol, and, as such, the 





Assembly (facid 414007) 
founded in Iraq in 1992. 
 
Kurdish Conservative 
Party (facid 414005) 
founded in Iraq in 1993.  
 
Kurdish Islamic League 
(facid 414010) founded in 
1993 in Iraq. 
The Government of Iraq 
received no funding to battle 
PUK from 1989 to 1996. 
During 1992 and 1993 the United 
States gave Turkey massive 
shipments of military hardware, 
according to one source the 
shipments included 1509 tanks, 54 
fighter planes and 28 armed attack 
helicopters. The shipment was 
made possible under the 'southern 
region amendment' and after the 
military hardware had to leave 
Europe after a 1990 treaty on 
conventional forces in Europe. 
Some of the equipment has 
reportedly been used against the 
PKK. In 1992, over 503 million 
US dollars were disbursed in 
various forms to fight the PKK. In 
April 1992 the intelligence 
agencies of Turkey and Syria 
signed a security cooperation 
protocol. That the intelligence 
sharing arrangement was actually 
implemented during 1992 and 
  256 
1993 became evident on 8 March 
1993 when Turkish police, 
supported by Syrian intelligence, 
managed to arrest 29, and kill five, 
members of Dev Sol. The United 
States is a very important ally of 
Turkey.  In 1992, over 503 million 
US dollars were disbursed in 
various forms of military aid to 
Turkey, as both direct financing 
and credits towards the purchase of 
US-made equipment (through the 
Foreign Military Financing direct 
loans and transfer from excess 
stocks), as well as through IMET 
training programs (2500 officers 
being trained between 1984 and 
1997). The improved capabilities 
brought by US aid were clearly 
used to fight Dev Sol. 
1994 Kurdish Parliament in 
Exile in the Hague (facid 
133004) founded in 1994 




Democracy Party (facid 
133010) founded in 
Turkey in 1994, 
terminated in 2003. 
In 1994, over 412 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms of military aid to fight the 
PKK. According to the US 
Assistant Secretary of Defence the 
United States was to continue to 
provide Turkey with arms under 
the 'southern region amendment' 
during 1994. Under this 
amendment excess defence 
equipment could be given to 
Turkey, Greece and Portugal at 
repair, revision and transfer costs 
only. The American official also 
said that the US government 
viewed the PKK as a terrorist 
group, and this seems to indicate 
that the shipments were, at least to 
some extent, intended for counter 
insurgency warfare in south-
eastern Turkey. 
1995 Kurdistan Independent 
Labor Party 
(facid414009) founded in 
Iraq in 1995. 
In 1995, over 361 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms of military aid to fight the 
PKK. 
1996 Kurdistan People’s 
Movement (facid 
414013) founded in Iraq 
in 1996. 
 
Kurdistan Toilers Party 
In 1996, over 432 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms of military aid to fight the 
PKK. 
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(facid 414014) founded in 
Iraq in 1997. 
1997 Kurdistan National 
Democratic Union 
(facid: 414011) founded 





in Turkey in 1997. 
 In 1997, over 177 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms of military aid to fight the 
PKK. 
1998 In 1998, 5.7 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to Turkey to fight the 
PKK. Further, in 1997, the United 
States designated the PKK as a 
terrorist organization. During 
1998 the United States sent a 
special operations team to train 
Turkish Mountain Commandos. 
Commandos whose principal 
objective is to fight Kurdish 
guerrillas. 
1999 Kurdistan National 
Congress (facid 133008) 
founded in Turkey in 
1999, terminated in 2003. 
In 1999, 15.5 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to fight the PKK. 
2000 In 2000, 3.6 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to fight the PKK. 
2001 In 2001, 1.84 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to fight the PKK. 
2002 In 2002, 71.5 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to fight the PKK. 
2003 Committee for the 
Protection of the 
Kurdish People (facid 
414002) founded in Iraq 




(facid 414016) founded in 
Iraq in 2003. 
 
Democratic Union Party 
of Kurdistan (facid: 
652001) founded in Syria 
in 2003. 
In 2003, 20.4 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms to 
fight the PKK. 
2004 HAKPAR: Rights and 
Freedoms Party (facid 
133011) founded in 
Turkey in 2004. 
 
In the fight against the al-
Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, 
TQJBR, IAI, from 2004 until 
2009 in Iraq, the multinational 
coalition (see secondary 
In 2004, 39.99 million US dollars 
were disbursed in various forms of 
military aid to fight the PKK. 
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People’s Protection 
Movements (facid: 
652005) founded in Syria 
in 2004. 
warring parties), who in effect 
was the government forces 
during the first half of the 
year, also contributed to the 
rebuilding of Iraq. The 
coalition included the United 
States; United Kingdom; 
Netherlands; Netherlands; 
Spain; Portugal; Poland; 
Czech Republic; Slovakia; 
Italy; Albania; Macedonia; 
Bulgaria; Romania; Estonia; 
Latvia; Lithuania; Ukraine; 
Georgia; Azerbaijan; Norway; 
Denmark; Dominican 
Republic; Egypt; Jordan; 
United Arab Emirates; 
Kazakhstan; Mongolia; South 
Korea; Philippines; Australia; 
Honduras; El Salvador; and 
Tonga. 
2005 DTP: Democratic 
Society Party (facid: 
133033) founded from 
HADEP and DEHAP in 
2005 in Turkey. 
During 2005 Turkish and Iranian 
security forces carried out a few 
joint clashes against PKK/HPG. 
The clashes took place in the 
border area between Turkey and 
Iran. In 2004, 37.44 million US 
dollars were disbursed in various 
forms of military aid to fight the 
PKK. 
2006 The US supports Turkey's struggle 
against the PKK, but with certain 
restrictions (such as PKK presence 
in northern Iraq). In 2006 it was 
clearly stated by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US 
that the USA supports Turkey on 
the PKK issue, although he did not 
want to state publicly in what way 
actions were being taken. Military 
aid flows to Turkey, in substantial 
amounts. Over 17.8 million US$ 
have been disbursed to Turkey in 
2006, under the Foreign Military 
Financing and IMET programmes 
to fight the PKK. 
2007 In 2007, the USA was at first 
reluctant to approve a planned 
cross-border operation by the 
Turkish government, but 
eventually agreed to share 
intelligence about PKK positions 
in northern Iraq. US-military 
reconnaissance aircraft and 
unmanned aerial vehicles searched 
for PKK locations in northern Iraq. 
US-made equipment as helicopters 
was reportedly used in the raids in 
December.  In November 2007, the 
USA also put pressure on Iraqi 
Kurds for the release of Turkish 
soldiers captured by the PKK and 
held in northern Iraq. Moreover, 
the Turkish intelligence centre was 
set up in Ankara with the help of 
U.S. military personnel. Military 
aid was further given to Turkey, 
under the form of Foreign Military 
  259 
Financing loans and grants and 
IMET training funds. The total aid 
disbursed was 17.7 million US$ to 
fight the PKK. 
2008 BDP: Peace and 
Democracy Party (facid: 
133012) founded in 
Turkey in 2008, 
terminated in 2014. 
In 2007, the USA had approved 
Turkish cross-border operations 
against PKK positions in northern 
Iraq, and support for these 
operations continued in 2008. 
During 2008, the US also pledged 
a continuation and streamlining of 
the supply of intelligence and 
equipment for locating PKK bases 
in northern Iraq. Meanwhile, steps 
were also taken in 2008 to increase 
cooperation between Turkey and 
Iraq. In July, Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
visited Iraq and held talks with his 
counterpart, Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki, and the two agreed 
on the need for security 
cooperation to combat terrorist 
threats in the area. In November, 
talks between Turkish, Iraqi and 
US officials signalled future 
cooperation on combating the 
PKK. Military aid was further 
given to Turkey, under the form of 
Foreign Military Financing loans 
and grants and IMET training 
funds. The total aid disbursed was 
9.69 million US$. A memorandum 
of understanding to deepen 
security cooperation was signed 
between Iran and Turkey in April 
2008, leading to joint operations 
against PKK and PJAK in May. 
2009 The Turkish army targeted PKK in 
Iraq with the help of intelligence 
from its NATO ally USA. Iraq and 
Turkey agreed to step up 
cooperation against PKK operating 
rear-bases in northern Iraq in late 
December 2008. With Iraqi 
permission, Turkish warplanes 
bombed PKK hideouts in northern 
Iraq in 2009.  It should be noted 
that if Turkish warplanes shelled 
PKK hideouts in northern Iraq, it 
happened that Iranian artillery 
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attacked camps of the Iranian 
Kurdish rebel group, PJAK, in the 
same area. This happened for 
example in January 2009. 
2010   
2011 People’s Council of 
Western Kurdistan 
(facid: 652004) founded 
in Syria in 2011. 
  
2012 HDP: People’s 
Democratic Party (facid: 
133013) founded in 








Sources: (UCDP 2011; UCDP 2015; Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Cunningham 2014)
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
i Though most reports on the injuries and fatalities by non-governmental organizations, such as 
the Turkish Medical Association, were removed from public view, some are still publicly 
available online. See the Turkish Medical Association’s Reports on Demonstrators’ Health 
Conditions (Türk Tabipleri Birliği 2013) and international associations reports on the protests 
and their repression (Amnesty International 2013). 
ii The AKP’s reforms took place both at the constitutional and sub-constitutional level, on the 
administrative and electoral systems under the AKP. The AKP reformed articles 123, 126, and 
127 of the Turkish constitution, and passed the following legal reforms: Law on the Election of 
District Chiefs, Local Authorities, and Councilors, Law Number 2972; and Official Gazette 
Number 18285. Law Number 5216, Greater City/Metropolitan Municipality Law, Official 
Gazette Number 25531. The AKP reformed Parliamentary elections by changing election rules, 
district boundaries, and the structure of political administration at municipal, district, and 
provincial levels; and made a number of electoral reforms that attempt to incorporate more 
conservative, rural voters in the political system. In 2009, the AKP passed an amendment to give 
low population provinces two representatives in Parliament despite the provinces’ populations 
being under the threshold. In addition, reforms have centralized local and provincial 
administrations under the pretense of decentralizing local administrations on condition of EU 
accession. The redistricting and administration reform has occurred in municipalities 
(belediyeler), county municipalities (il belediyesi) and first-stage or metropolitan district 
municipalities (ilk kademe belediyesi).ii The district boundaries (“election zone”) of elections for 
the metropolitan municipalities (büyükşehir belediyesi) were changed to include outlying forest 
villages and towns. This extension gives mayors (vali) more support from rural constituencies. 
This reform also set new criteria that made granting greater municipality status to urban areas 
more difficult. Author expert interview confirmed the impact of legal reforms on electoral 
system (Keleş 2013). 
iii President Election Law, Law Number 6271 Official Gazette entry number 28185. In 2012, the 
AKP further specified the rules for election to this office. They changed the term limit of the 
President from seven to five years, with possible reelection for one-term. Candidates are 
nominated by at least 20 members of Parliament (rather than the previous 1/5 of Parliament). 
iv The OSCE/ODIHR Report for the Presidential election of 2014 noted “misuse of 
administrative resources and the lack of a clear distinction between key institutional events and 
campaign activities grant[ing Erdoğan] an undue advantage,” (OSCE/ODIHR 2014). 
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v The OSCE/ODIHR Report for the Parliamentary elections in 2011 described how the existing 
electoral environment, including the 10% threshold for a political party to enter Parliament, 
made opposition gains difficult: “elections demonstrated commitment to democracy, but freedom 
of expression and electoral rights remain limited,” (OSCE/ODIHR 2011). 
vi Liberal democratic constitutionalism is defined and summarized here as briefly as possible as 
the reference for normative democratic constitutionalism and the theoretical functional of 
institutions in constitutional democracies. Liberal democratic constitutionalism has five major 
categories: popular control or consent, separation of powers, rule of law, rules for the process of 
amendment, and political culture. These categories are based on the work of Donald Lutz (2008) 
but the categories of rule of law and political culture are added to put more emphasis on the 
application of justice in the limitation of power and the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms. These categories also lack the establishment of national identity and other ideological 
functions that constitutions most often play. Constitutional democracy unites an electorate with 
power and sovereignty (Lutz 2008). The system then limits that sovereign power through 
processes that separate power among actors, check and balance that power, and impart justice. 
The system balances the tension between giving the public the power of majoritarian consent to 
control government without violating the rights of minorities (Dahl 2006). Separation of powers 
transforms popular control into popular sovereignty, through checking representative institutions 
with non-representative institutions and vice-versa, or, pitting ambition against ambition 
(Madison or Hamilton in the Federalist Paper No. 51, Madison & Hamilton, 1788). Different 
constitutional structures, such parliamentary or presidential systems, have different mechanisms 
for achieving these goals (Shugart and Carey 1992). Rule of law creates predictable decision-
making processes to judge individual and group behavior (Lutz 2008). This decision-making 
power is also diffused across many actors. Some types of decision-making outcomes are 
prohibited to place limitations on arbitrary exercise of power and to protect individuals’ rights 
and freedoms (Lutz 2008). The amendment process is a key part of the constitutional system that 
specifies how the system is self-sustaining: how it can be changed, by whom, and under what 
conditions. Formal amendment procedures call on actors in different branches to cooperate (Lutz 
2008). Constitutional scholars later deemed this parsimonious Madisonian system insufficient as 
a standalone guarantor of constitutional democracy and emphasized the importance of political 
culture (Almond and Verba 1989; 1962), including norms of toleration, public participation, and 
civic engagement, to the separation of powers and checks and balances that make democracy 
work (Dahl 2006). These norms form the behavioral codes for individuals in the system. The 
system, as a network of interacting institutions, provides equal representation for citizens whose 
rights and freedoms are guaranteed through justice in a system that checks itself against 
developing a concentration of power in any one organ of government. Third, democratic 
constitutionalism is also a balance between major tensions in the political system. The first, 
aforementioned, tension is that between majority rule and minority rights. A balance must be 
achieved through making policies preferred by a majority of individuals and protecting the 
preferences of those who more intensely prefer a different alternative (Dahl 2006). A second 
tension is between special interests and social welfare, or the public interest. A balance can be 
achieved by constraining small groups from exerting too much influence on policymaking that 
benefits them and implementing universalistic policies that ensure a basic level of welfare 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Fourth, tolerance must take precedence over dominance. Norms 
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of tolerance that govern interactions between the state and society determine the competition 
between the forces of public participation and the dominance of a group or party. A balance must 
be achieved through facilitating the development of norms of tolerance, public deliberation, and 
participation, and restricting the ability of one group to control information and accumulate 
power (Young 2002). Finally, the state must be constrained: the government must both protect 
the rights of individuals and exercise self-restraint (Tsebelis 2011) to refrain from violation of 
individuals’ rights. These are the norms I refer to when defining a “moderate commitment to 
normative constitutional democracy” or when referring to actions that violate the spirit of these 
laws but follow them in procedure.  
vii For adequate prediction of major events such as the end of the Cold War and the so-called 
“Arab Spring,” there is a great need to unify different strands of research on authoritarian 
regimes, see, for example, the debate in Perspectives on Politics (Bellin 2014; Howard and 
Walters 2014a; Howard and Walters 2014b; Howard and Walters 2014c; Lust 2014; Lynch 
2014). 
viii For the ongoing development of radical democracy in Öcalan’s movement and its relationship 
with the Turkish state, see (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012; “Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish 
Settlement - International Crisis Group” 2013; “Is Turkey-PKK Reconciliation Really Moving 
Forward? - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East” 2013). 
ix Turkey shows a decrease in de facto observation of personal integrity rights until 2000, when 
observation of personal integrity rights starting increasing, Turkey’s observation of 
empowerment rights shows it holding steady at a level of between 40-50% with a spike around 
2000. Observations of judicial integrity in Turkey, peaked around 2000 and then dropped to 
nearly zero in 2011. For observations of judicial independence, the same pattern occurred as with 
personal integrity rights and empowerment rights, with Turkey showing the lowest change. 
Turkey had a low de jure level of commitments for personal integrity (2%). Turkey also had 
little change in equality/ gender, civil and political, or minority rights from 1982 to 2012, at 0, 
12, and 0 percent respectively. In the changes in de jure constitutional commitments, Turkey had 
moderate increased commitment to judicial independence, at 13%. 
x Syria shows the opposite trend as Turkey in personal integrity rights, increasing de facto rights 
until about 2000, and then decreasing. Syria’s observation of empowerment rights decreases 
from 25 to 10% from 1981 to 2011. Observations of judicial integrity show the same trend in 
Syria and Turkey, peaking around 2000 and then dropping to nearly zero in 2011. For 
observations of judicial independence, Syria had a low increase. Syria’s de jure commitment to 
personal integrity increased 14%, and had a low increase in empowerment rights of 
equality/gender, civil and political, and minority rights (10, 15, 10%, respectively). In changes in 
de jure constitutional commitments to judicial independence, Syria had a 5% increase. 
xi Iraq has the highest level of violation of personal integrity rights until after the passage of the 
last constitution, in 2005. Iraq’s observation of empowerment rights hits nearly zero at 2000, and 
then increases to about 25%. In Iraq, observations of judicial integrity were highest in the early 
1980s, and then drops to nearly zero from 2000 to 2011. For observations of judicial 
independence, the same pattern occurred as with personal integrity rights and empowerment 
rights, Iraq had a moderate increase. However its de jure commitment to personal integrity rights 
increased 45%. Iraq had a high increase in de jure empowerment rights, a 25% increase in 
equality/ gender rights, a 40% increase in civil and political rights, and a 70% increase in 
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minority rights. In the changes in de jure constitutional commitments to judicial independence, 
Iraq had a 40% increase. 
xii See UCDP for lower limit, upper limit given by expert interview (Xulam 2015). 
xiii This is largely due to the influence of the American anarchist Murray Bookchin’s writings on 
Öcalan, whose reformed political program can be found in his statements to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) cases protesting his detention (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012). 
xiv Anfal comes from the Koran, and means “spoils of battle.” By naming their operation “Anfal” 
against the Kurds, Iraqi state forces were providing a religious justification for their slaughter of 
Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq (Gunter 1993). 
xv Bonacich derives this from (K. S. Cook et al. 1983, 277) make between positive and negative 
exchange systems. To modify their definition slightly to apply to whole systems: A set of 
exchange relations is positive if exchange in one relation is contingent on exchange in others and 
negative if exchange in one relation precludes exchange in others. 
xvi These definitions and measures apply to directed graphs (digraphs), or networks where the ties 
between nodes are potentially reciprocal. 
xvii The out-tree network has reachable connectedness (M. G. Everett and Krackhardt 2012, 3). 
Connectedness, which involves the directionality of or where reciprocal communication has 
higher costs, is measured by the smallest number of actors required such that all actors in the 
network are reachable from this set of actors.  
xviii The out-tree network is the graph hierarchic (2012, 3). In this definition, this means the 
digraph has no reciprocated arcs. Reciprocity measures the consistency of dyadic orientation, it 
therefore allows for cyclical triads and shows constraints on individual dyadic relations, but does 
not imply an overall status ordering of the actors. It means for every pair of actors, if Actor X 
can reach Actor Y, then Actor Y cannot meet Actor X (2012, 1). 
xix The out-tree network is graph efficient. Efficiency is about the number of ties when 
communication is expensive, across time zones, or where information is large or complex such 
as amendments to large documents or classified information (M. G. Everett and Krackhardt 
2012, 3–4). A graph is efficient if each component of the underlying graph has exactly q − 1 
edges where q is the number of nodes in that component (2012, 1).  
xx Actor-level measures include degree and closeness centrality (Bavelas 1950), betweenness 
centrality (Freeman 1977, 36), eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987). Degree centrality is 
calculated from walks of length one, while eigenvector centrality is calculated from an infinite 
number of walks. Betweenness centrality is a measure of how many times a node is a bridge 
between other nodes on their shortest paths, or geodesics. 
xxi The geodesic is the shortest path between two actors. Paths occur when no node can be visited 
more than once, trails occur when nodes can be visited multiple times but no edge can occur be 
used more than once, and walks occur when nodes and edges can be visited and used multiple 
times. 
xxii Centralization is calculated by the sum of the difference between the highest centrality value 
found in the network, and the centrality value of all the other nodes, divided by the sum of the 
maximum sum theoretically possible. Betweenness centralization, on the other hand, is 
operationalized by the number of geodesics an actor is situated on, standardized by the number 
of dyads not involving the actor for which betweenness centrality is being calculated (Leifeld 
2014). 
